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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s business environment is anything but certain, simple, or static.  Sustaining a 
viable enterprise in such a high-turbulence market is a major challenge for all organizations.  
Innovation—be it incremental or novel—must continue.  Enticing products must be 
developed and introduced seamlessly to maintain market position.  Manufacturing 
capabilities must be maintained.  Supply chains and logistics must resist disruption.  Post-
sale maintenance and service must deliver that which is promised.  Corporate policies and 
processes must keep a vigilant watch over the firm’s financial, infrastructural, and 
technological resources.  In other words, products or services must be sustained once 
engendered, and this effort touches all areas of business operations.  Failures to perceive a 
game-changer in any of these areas can bring adverse consequences as demonstrated time 
and again in our history by many notable examples.  As Rastogi (2000) discusses, well-
known cases include, but are not limited to, 
• U.S. auto manufacturers’ losing a large market share to the new entrants from 
Japan 
• Sears’ failing to adapt to changing landscape of retailing exemplified by Wal-
Mart’s new business model 
• Compaq’s missing the opportunity to adopt the just-in-time assemble-to-order 
process, which Dell exploited to huge success 
More recently, Blockbuster Inc. and Borders Group Inc., once very successful 
enterprises, went into bankruptcy.  Blockbuster’s success was founded on its computerized 
inventory tracking system that optimized its movie selection, from classics to newest 
releases, available at its family-friendly stores (Gandel, 2010).  Eventually, rivals such as 
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Netflix and Redbox overtook the market by enabling even easier access, often at much lower 
costs, to films through on-line streaming, delivery by mail, and pick-up at vending kiosks 
(Gandel, 2010; Lee, 2011).  Similarly, Borders continued expansion of its brick-and-mortar 
stores and invested heavily in CDs and DVDs just when the industry was going on-line and 
digital.  By the time the company went on the defensive, Amazon had captured a large 
market share of the on-line bookstore and released its first Kindle; Barnes and Nobles 
released its Nook e-reader; and iTunes had firmly taken hold of music market ("Why Borders 
failed and Barnes & Noble hasn't: 4 theories," 2011).  Failure to fully embrace the impact of 
media digitization (Lee, 2011) is not limited to Borders’ and Blockbuster’s cases.  The record 
industry is dwindling for very similar reasons despite increasing listenership to recorded 
music (Hiatt & Serpick, 2007).  Analysts attribute the industry’s decline to its inability to 
adapt to a variety of new ways consumers now interact with music, coupled with its failure to 
effectively address on-line piracy issues earlier when illegal file-sharing was rampant (Hiatt 
& Serpick, 2007).   Sustaining operation is indeed a multi-dimensional affair that requires 
attention to all aspects of one’s business.  
Operational sustainability has an intimate link to knowledge management and 
learning.  Innovation is sustained by leveraging the organization’s accumulated knowledge to 
prompt new ideas and possibilities (Bartel & Garud, 2009).  Entrepreneurial firms grow by 
engaging themselves in “experimental behavior” to induce experiential learning and 
understand what works and what does not (Fuller, Warrent, & Argyle, 2007).  Suppliers are 
retained because of, among key sourcing factors, their know-how (Ulaga & Eggert, 2006).  
Organizational capabilities that sustain competitive advantage in dynamically evolving 
markets are tied to the firm’s ability to integrate its knowledge bases into appropriate 
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operational contexts (Grant, 1996; Rastogi, 2000).  Simply put, in today’s increasingly 
complex and rapidly changing environment, effective knowledge capture and translation into 
practice is critical for sustaining an organization. 
Engineering has a major influence on operational sustainability through its 
contribution to product lifecycle management.  Engineers leverage their technical knowledge 
bases to translate customer expectations into product specifications; to design and 
manufacture products to these specifications; and to perform post-launch maintenance and 
services.  Essentially, engineering involvement in each phase of the product lifecycle—from 
concept to launch to field operation—is about managing and addressing product 
requirements.  Learning comes out from each phase, and it is via seamless feedback of 
lessons learned into the existing product requirements and future product management 
routines that engineers enhance the quality and reliability of their products (Boersma, Loke, 
Petkova, Sander, & Brombacher, 2004; den Ouden, Yuan, Sonnemans, & Brombacher, 2006; 
Magniez, Brombacher, & Schouten, 2009).   
Engineering lessons learned are derived from new knowledge gained from technical 
problem solving.  Problem solving as a mechanism for creating knowledge is addressed in 
organizational learning and related literature.  Cori and Storto’s (2000) causal model, for 
example, treats behavioral aspects of technical problem solving as mediators influencing the 
quality of knowledge generation.  Similarly, McEvily and Marcus (2005) hypothesize a fully 
mediated relationship between organizational factors and development of new capabilities by 
firm-supplier “joint problem solving.”  Engineering, essentially, is about problem solving.  
Engineers are “hired, retained, and rewarded for solving problems” (Jonassen, Strobel, & 
Lee, 2006, p. 139).  Despite the intimate link between engineering and problem solving, 
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however, the literature is lean in bridging the understanding of engineering problem solving 
processes to knowledge creation.  Engineers solve problems every day, but how their 
solutions become part of sustained organizational learning is underexplored in engineering 
and management research. 
Literature addressing business sustainability issues highlights two key aspects of 
organizational mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining competitiveness.  One is flexibility 
and routinization aspects of processes and a careful interplay between the two.  These 
dialectical dimensions of “coherence and pliability” (Bartel & Garud, 2009) or the “tension 
between […] pattern-breaking and recurrent practices” (Fuller et al., 2007, p. 11) promote 
dialogs for new ideas, essential for innovation (Bartel & Garud, 2009).  The second aspect is 
tapping into tacit knowledge possessed by individuals in the organization.  Integration of 
such knowledge is described as key to developing new capabilities and thereby maintaining 
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996). While behavioral and cognitive aspects of 
organizational mechanisms are well established in the organizational learning literature as 
having profound effects on knowledge creation, the engineering literature is relatively silent 
about them. 
Engineering literature—and practice—is saturated with outcome-based, prescriptive 
routines that approach problem solving by emphasizing explicit forms of knowledge.  Both 
routines and explicit knowledge are undoubtedly required for effective engineering 
operations.  Structured routines bring coherence to people with diverse knowledge and 
connect them to a larger context in which they share goals and purposes (Bartel & Garud, 
2009), thereby attaining efficiency through endorsing commonized practice (Fuller et al., 
2007).   Explicit knowledge takes the form of product designs, specifications, and other 
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artifacts of engineering and signifies outcomes of engineering processes that codified 
existing knowledge for easy and rapid transfer across organization (Edmondson, Winslow, 
Bohmer, & Pisano, 2003).  For example, the Design for Reliability (DFR) and Design for Six 
Sigma (DFSS) methodologies facilitate pre-emptive design optimization during the front end 
of product lifecycle to avoid future failures (Goh, 2002; Sarakakis, Gerokostopoulos, & 
Mettas, 2011).  On the production floor (i.e., the back end of product lifecycle) 
manufacturers pursue defect reduction with such initiatives as Quality Circles, Kaizen (= 
continuous improvement), Zero Defects, and Poka Yoke (= mistake proofing)—introduced in 
American manufacturing since the 1980s in response to the challenges from international 
competition, especially from the Japanese (Raisinghani, Ette, Pierce, Cannon, & Prathima, 
2005).  Six Sigma, a widely popular methodology pioneered by Motorola, deftly integrates 
traditional process and statistical tools to improve processes (Linderman, Schroeder, Zaheer, 
& Choo, 2003; Raisinghani et al., 2005; Schroeder, Linderman, Liedtke, & Choo, 2008).  In 
a yet broader scope, the ISO 9000 series quality standards—from which the U.S. automotive 
industry developed its own QS 9000 system that has since then evolved to become the TS 
16949 standard—provide a set of quality system criteria necessary for firms to compete 
effectively (Franceschini, Galetto, & Cecconi, 2006).     
Supporting these frameworks are well-established analytical tools that induce 
knowledge.  Myriad tools exist in engineering to support structured problem solving 
endeavors.  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
major tools for risk assessment, aid safety analysis by applying inductive (FMEA) and 
deductive (FTA) logics (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1981).  Life data analysis and 
physics-of-failure approaches in the framework of reliability engineering enable modeling of 
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product failure patterns (Lewis, 1996).  Designed experiments (often referred to as “DOE” in 
industry jargon) assist in establishing design parameters that optimize product performance 
(Barker, 2005).  Cause-and-effects diagramming (Ishikawa, 1982) helps identify possible 
causes for a specific problem and continues to serve as an indispensable tool for structured 
problem solving, especially on the shop floor.  Taken together, these methodologies facilitate 
the production and codification of useful product knowledge in both qualitative and 
quantitative forms. 
Engineering problem solving, however, is not just about following prescribed steps 
and operating various tools to capture knowledge.  Within each routine, there exist instances 
in which highly situated human cognition is more critical than consistency of action for 
reliable performance (Ndubisi, 2011).  Further, technical know-how that drives engineering 
problem solving is tacit in nature and “raises […] interesting and complex issues regarding 
its transfer both within and between organizations” (Grant, 1996, p. 377).  Seeing 
engineering problem solving from a perspective of consistency-flexibility interplay that 
leverages practical knowledge culminating in solutions, then, leads to several interesting 
questions.  How do engineers go about defining a problem, which is the first step of any 
structured problem solving routine?  How do they assign meaning to the problem, given the 
fact that real-world problems tend to be “ill-structured” (Jonassen et al., 2006)?  How do 
engineers make sense of customer feedback from the field given that such information is 
noted for being incomplete and ambiguous (Wu & Meeker, 2002)?  Setting parameters for 
reliability modeling (e.g., Weibull beta, Lewis, 1996) is as much art as science and requires a 
great deal of prior knowledge about the failure pattern (Abernethy, 2004; Nicholls & Lein, 
2009).  How do engineers go about pulling existing product knowledge, much of which is 
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likely to be deeply embedded in local contexts, so they can make inferences about 
appropriateness of chosen design parameters?  Likewise, for a designed experiment, 
identification and selection of experimental variables often require amassing knowledge from 
boundary-spanning areas of expertise.  How do engineers balance diverse perspectives while 
accounting for resource constraints (Barker, 2005)?  At the completion of a problem solving 
routine, such as the five-step DMAIC process prescribed by Six Sigma (Goh, 2002), how do 
engineers make sense of the outcomes?  While past research has enriched the understanding 
of engineering problem solving from the “what” perspective, it has yet to offer in-depth 
analyses and answer to these “how” questions.  
The gaps of the how of engineering problem solving in extant literature call for an 
alternate perspective that complements the existing orientation that emphasizes structural 
control and visible outcomes.  Historically, engineering system / operations research 
frameworks treated human cognition as if it were perfectly rational (Gino & Pisano, 2007; 
Loch & Wu, 2007) on one end; as error-prone thereby requiring minimization on the other 
(Ndubisi, 2011).  Altogether, they “invoked oversimplified models of motivation, learning, 
creativity, and other such aspects of human behavior that are vital to the success of 
management policies in practice” (Chopra, Lovejoy, & Yano, 2004, p. 13).  Incorporation of 
elements that more realistically represent such human factors, therefore, will further enrich 
traditional models (Chopra et al., 2004).  In this light, studies that address the behavioral and 
cognitive sides of engineering problem solving will be a useful addition to the research 
landscape.   
The purpose of this dissertation research is to study engineering problem solving from 
experiential and cognitive perspectives and illuminate pathways to effective and efficient 
  
8
achievements of goals and outcomes.  The core focus of the study is to explore how the 
dynamics of engineering knowledge that is embedded in local contexts can be leveraged to 
find solutions and achieve (or not achieve) sustained learning.  Empirical studies have 
already established links between organizational antecedents and technical performance 
outcomes.  Cumulative experience impacts product reliability (e.g., Ramdas & Randall, 
2008). Organizational learning influences product quality (e.g., Levin, 2000).  A socio-
technical system that integrates learning-driven management philosophy and technical 
practices, exemplified by Toyota’s lean manufacturing concept (Womack, Jones, & Roos, 
1990), enhances operational sustainability.  By framing engineering problem solving from 
both experiential and cognitive perspectives, and by focusing on tacit knowledge, this study 
expects to uncover the dynamics of how these links are formed and actually play out in 
practice.  As Levin (2000) suggests, a more qualitative exploration into “the how of 
organizational learning curves[…] to probe more deeply inside the ‘black box’ of 
organizational learning” (p. 645) is a fruitful area of research.     
This research is implemented as a two-stage inquiry process and addresses the 
following four questions: 
1. How do engineers perceive problem solving prompted by product-related 
problems? 
2. How is knowledge created through problem solving routines?  
3. What conditions promote or inhibit problem solving and sustained organizational 
learning? 
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4. To what extent can the findings about engineering problem solving, knowledge 
creation, and organizational learning be generalized across engineering 
communities? 
Due to the nature of the inquiry, which is both exploratory and confirmatory, the 
study uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods to leverage the distinct 
methodological strengths of each to answer these four questions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2007).  In the first stage, which addresses the first three questions, a qualitative investigation 
is conducted to explore the dynamics of engineering problem solving, discover key aspects of 
knowledge creation, and generate hypotheses to theorize how engineering knowledge 
obtained through problem solving is transformed into sustained organizational learning.  The 
findings from the first stage are subsequently followed up with a confirmatory study using 
quantitative methods to test the hypotheses and answer the fourth question.  By combining 
the inductive and deductive analyses that a mixed-methods approach enables (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), the research framework intends to provide full coverage of the issues 
in question.   
The unit of analysis throughout the two stages is “engineers” as the study focus is the 
“emic”1 perspective of engineering problem solving.  The study adapts Schein’s (1996, p. 14) 
definition of “engineer” and “engineering culture” and broadly defines engineers as 
“designers of products and systems that have utility, elegance, permanence, efficiency, 
safety, and aesthetic appeal.”  In the first stage of the study, strict application of this 
definition limits engineers to those who are directly engaged in the design, application, or 
                                                 
1
 The term “emic” was coined by a linguist, Kenneth Pike.  It was later adopted by anthropology.  An “emic” 
perspective (as opposed to its counterpart “etic”) emphasizes the subjective meanings shared by the “natives” of 
a social group (e.g., engineering) and attempts to shed light on their “culturally specific model of experience” 
(Seymour-Smith, 1986, p. 92). 
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manufacture of a product.  This definition is relaxed in the second stage to include those in 
engineering professions that play key technical support roles to the architecture or design of 
products, for example, quality, reliability, and field service engineers.  Finally, the research 
framework adopts Lloria’s (2007) perspective that knowledge creation is a direct outcome of 
organizational learning, despite the treatment in some of the literature of these two constructs 
as separate research streams.  Knowledge is almost akin to “a stock” that is created through 
“a flow” of learning (Lloria, 2007, p. 675).  Extending this viewpoint, in this study, 
organizational learning and knowledge creation are defined as having taken place when 
engineering problem solving, the learning flow, results in system changes. 
The goal of this research is to develop a model for understanding and effectively 
managing the dynamics of engineering problem solving.  The research framework draws 
heavily from Nonaka’s knowledge-creation theory (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000), while building on the research stream of 
organizational learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988) and related 
concepts such as organized sensemaking (Weick, 1979, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
2005) and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  The 
outcomes of the study are expected to make a contribution in three major ways:   
1. The research will help fill the gap in engineering management literature by 
providing a complementary perspective to engineering problem solving and 
exploring the little addressed link between organizational learning and 
engineering. 
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2. The results from this study are expected to further enrich the research landscape 
of organizational learning by offering empirical evidence of engineering 
knowledge creation dynamics.   
3. For practitioners, the new perspective being developed from this research effort 
should contribute to enhancement of such areas as product development, warranty 
management, and operational sustainability in general. 
Additionally, this study, to the best of our knowledge, will be the first to 
quantitatively model and test the concept of ba—an empirically underexplored yet critical 
ingredient of knowledge creation (Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006).  Within the 
framework of Nonaka’s knowledge-creation theory, previous studies focused predominantly 
on Japanese and South Korean cultural settings and, more recently, on European firms 
(Schulze & Hoegl, 2006).  Schulze and Hoegl’s (2006) study on 33 European (German, 
Austrian, and Swiss) firms found no support for some researchers’ “doubts about the 
transferability [of Nonaka’s concept] from an Asian setting to European and North American 
contexts” (p. 225).  Following their lead, this research will further the knowledge about the 
applicability of Nonaka’s theory in non-Asian cultural contexts, which is an additional 
benefit of this study. 
Past engineering problem solving research has offered a wealth of knowledge about 
structural control and its measurable outcomes.  By exploring the cognitive aspects of 
engineering problem solving, the underlying process that creates knowledge and sustains 
organizational learning for competitive advantage is better understood.  This enhanced 
understanding will contribute to building a more complete epistemology of engineering 
practices, particularly as they pertain to engineering problem solving. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
Chapter 1 has illuminated the need for exploring the cognitive and experiential 
aspects of engineering problem solving and how they link to knowledge creation.  Engineers 
solve problems every day, but the process through which the solutions become sustained 
learning is not well understood.  Chapter 1, in closing, posed four basic questions: 
1. How do engineers perceive problem solving prompted by product-related 
problems? 
2. How is knowledge created through problem solving routines? 
3. What conditions promote or inhibit problem solving and sustained organizational 
learning? 
4. To what extent can the findings about engineering problem solving, knowledge 
creation, and organizational learning be generalized across engineering 
communities? 
The goal of this chapter is to establish a theoretical foundation for addressing these 
questions, upon which to develop investigation strategies.  The literature review in this 
chapter draws heavily from streams of extant research in organizational learning and systems 
theory, with particular focus on problem solving and failure management, to develop an 
initial conceptual framework for viewing engineering problem solving (EPS) as a 
knowledge-creation vehicle.  The existing body of EPS literature that probes deeply into the 
lived lives of engineers is scarce and tends to be concentrated in engineering educational 
research (see, for example, Atman et al., 2007; Jonassen, Strobel, & Lee, 2006; Trevelyan, 
2007; Williams & Figueiredo, 2010, 2011).  In particular, the roles of organizational routines 
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and tacit knowledge in enabling sustained learning in engineering contexts are little 
addressed. 
In facilitating the literature review, engineering knowledge creation is viewed as a 
subset of general organizational learning that is facilitated in specific contextual settings.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  First, it establishes a link between 
problem solving and knowledge creation, as well as identifies key factors that enable this 
link.  Secondly, the literature review explores the influence of organizational contexts on the 
EPS process and outcomes.  Finally, the discussion zooms into the role of mental models in 
realizing sustained learning.  The chapter concludes by establishing an initial view of EPS, as 
a set of exploratory and structured routines carried out in a dynamic socio-technical system. 
Problem Solving as a Path to Knowledge Creation 
The path to knowledge creation and sustained learning from problem solving is 
double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976) because that is the only way to make system changes.  
The discussions that follow first establish the role of double-loop learning in problem solving 
and demonstrate that it is not possible without a successful root cause analysis.  Further, 
because of the nature of knowledge, especially its tacitness and sociality, effectiveness of a 
root cause analysis becomes very dependent on the protocols used as the discussions will 
illustrate. 
Problem, problem solving, learning, and knowledge.  Problem solving as a 
mechanism for learning is well recognized in the literature (Corti & Storto, 2000; Hedberg, 
1981; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Tucker, Edmondson, & Spear, 2002).  Learning tends to 
be triggered by problems, so problem solving is a dominant form of learning in many 
situations (Hedberg, 1981).  Since engineering is really about solving problems (Jonassen et 
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al., 2006), ample opportunities should be available for learning.  The question is how the 
knowledge created from EPS becomes sustained organizational learning.   
Organizational learning literature defines “problem” as the gap between the existing 
state and the desired state (Corti & Storto, 2000; Tucker et al., 2002), and “problem-solving” 
as a set of rational activities to reduce or eliminate this gap (Corti & Storto, 2000).  If a car 
operates with a higher than expected noise level, then there clearly is a gap between the 
expected and observed performances.  The implication, from the perspective of problem 
solving, is that how the "desired" state is defined will set the course for the problem 
investigation.  Since "problem-solving framing naturally fosters identification of new 
interpretations of the situation" (Corti & Storto, 2000, p. 251), this framing will influence 
problem-solving outcomes.  Improvements made over time in everyday products—from the 
reliability of passenger cars to the speed of computers—are all cumulative results of 
technical problem solving that set the goal to a higher state of product performance.  In so 
doing, the interpretations of expected driving and computing have forever changed.  No 
longer does anyone expect to carry spare automotive parts and tools on a casual holiday 
outing; nor do personal computer users think of processor speed in lower than GHz terms.         
Huber (1991, p. 89) proposes that “an organization learns if any of its units acquires 
knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization.”  Organizational 
learning is about "a process of improving organizational action through better knowledge and 
understanding" (Tucker et al., 2002, p. 124).  Further, organizational learning has taken place 
when system changes—such as changes in product, work designs, or routines—occur in 
response to new knowledge or insights that can improve the organization's performance 
(Dodgson, 1993; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Product features, blueprints, specifications, 
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and design approaches are all engineering artifacts that reflect past system changes, which 
themselves are likely to have been prompted by previous EPS.  Even though system changes 
can occur as a result of problem solving, however, the link between the two is not necessarily 
automatic.  Not all problem-solving endeavors immediately—or ever—result in system 
changes.  As often seen in the management of warranty claims, customer complaints, and in 
the worst case, recalls, there is a time lag (Hora, Bapuji, & Roth, 2011).  Sometimes there is a 
considerable time span between a problem solving event and the eventual changes in the 
product, especially in a fast-paced industry such as consumers electronics (Magniez, 
Brombacher, & Schouten, 2009). 
Organizational learning is about amalgamation of people’s knowledge.  The only way 
for an organization to “learn” is for its members to learn, specifically through the action of 
individuals who create ways in which organizational transformation can be facilitated 
(Dodgson, 1993; Senge, 2006).  Learning produces knowledge, and a constructionist view of 
knowledge associates knowledge development with social interactions within the 
organization and thereby also associates knowledge with the cognitive characters of 
individuals (Corti & Storto, 2000).  This view implies that the collective learning starts with 
individuals’ tacit knowledge, and the manner in which these knowledge holders socialize 
greatly influences collective knowledge output.  Because tacit knowledge is embodied in 
each individual and does not easily transfer to others (Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer, & 
Pisano, 2003; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), it will need to be transformed into 
a more portable form so it can be elevated to an organizational level.  Tacit knowledge is 
closely tied to procedural knowledge or know-how; explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is 
often referred to as know-what or declarative knowledge (Edmondson et al., 2003; Nonaka, 
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1994).  Engineers use both theories and practical know-how to design, test, and manufacture 
products.  Thus, both types of knowledge—explicit and tacit—have close affinity with 
engineering.     
Knowledge is transformable.  Individual cognitive development is facilitated by 
processing of declarative knowledge into one's procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1993), and 
declarative knowledge was once upon a time someone's tacit knowledge that was later 
codified (Edmondson et al., 2003).  Indeed, Nonaka (1994) argues that knowledge 
transformation can be bi-directional, capable of not only changing its state from one to the 
other but can also amplify by combining multiple knowledge sets of the same type.  In other 
words, in his concept, knowledge can morph from tacit to explicit and vice versa, as well as 
from tacit / explicit to amplified tacit / explicit.     
Double-loop learning.  Problems trigger problem solving, but not all problem-
solving endeavors result in learning.  Double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976) links problem 
solving to organizational learning.  Double-loop learning is a result of second-order problem 
solving immediately following first-order problem solving and is by definition required to 
effect fundamental system changes (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  While first-order problem 
solving “fixes” the problem, the resulting learning—single-loop learning—does not question 
the organization’s fundamental norms and assumptions to look for better ways of doing 
things as does double-loop learning.  If a car buyer’s complaint about an ill-functioning audio 
unit is resolved by merely replacing the unit without further investigation, no new knowledge 
is gained other than the fact that a complaint was received and a replacement was made.  Yet, 
if the product developer seeks to understand why the unit did not work as intended, new 
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insights about the audio unit’s susceptibility to conditions affecting its design parameters can 
be gained.   
Double-loop learning is possible only through a successful root cause analysis 
(Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Originally developed in psychology and systems engineering, 
a root cause analysis seeks underlying causes by going beyond an analysis of symptomatic 
issues (Wu, Lipshutz, & Pronovost, 2008).  A "root cause" is a condition, the elimination of 
which would have precluded the problem from occurring in the first place (Handley, 2000; 
Smith, 1998).  Using the analogy of fire, without oxygen and fuel (underlying causes), sparks 
(direct cause) would not cause a fire.  It is only through a successful root cause analysis to 
get down to the "bottom of it" to produce relevant knowledge needed for system 
improvements to "destroy existing premises and establish new ones" (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995).  Therefore, knowledge creation is intimately tied to double-loop learning (Nonaka, 
1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), which root cause analyses support.   
Structured problem solving methods used widely in engineering practice are designed 
to engender root cause analysis.  Be they Five-Why’s, Kepner-Tregoe, Six Sigma, or any 
other, all are intent on getting to the root of the problem and make systemic changes to 
prevent problem recurrence (Handley, 2000; MacDuffie, 1997; Smith, 1998).  Structured 
problem-solving approaches are typically designed as multi-step investigation routines.  
While the actual number of steps varies among different methods, a structured problem-
solving methodology normally begins with a problem definition and ends with a routinization 
of new solutions (MacDuffie, 1997).  Particularly important here is the first step, which sets 
the tone for the remainder of problem-solving journey.  Problem definition does not take 
place in a vacuum but rather is a reality that is “perceived by organizational actors in light of 
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established routines” (MacDuffie, 1997, p. 481).  How the problem is framed—for example, 
major versus minor, design-related versus process-related—will determine what and how 
much information to seek to understand the problem, the amount of effort exerted on 
analyzing the data, and how to go about selecting and implementing a solution.  
Framing will also affect routinization of the new solution.  Routinization is a result of 
successful double-loop learning.  In order for double-loop learning to occur, the relevant 
knowledge generated during the root cause analysis, some (if not, most) of which is tacit, 
must eventually be translated into organization-wide routines.  Routinization is achieved via 
codification of the learning and knowledge gained—that is to say, making the individual and 
group-level knowledge explicit—so the organizational members outside that group are able 
to adopt it.  In engineering, for example, development of new design guidelines and 
specifications enables the deployment of codified knowledge.  Because framing influences 
formation of attitudes and opinions (Chong & Druckman, 2007), the quality of tacit 
knowledge affected by framing effects permeates all the way into the quality of chosen 
solutions and their implementation effectiveness.   
Justification.  Cognitively speaking, problem solving can also be seen as an attempt 
to deal with uncertainty or ambiguity by trying to resolve or reduce this state (Corti & Storto, 
2000).  For example, an engineering problem, when first reported, may be as vague as “the 
car makes a lot of noise.”  The problem can be caused by any number of factors in the 
drivetrain, chassis, or anywhere else.  Through iterative diagnostics, more insight is gained 
that infuses clarity into the picture.  Thus, problem solving proceeds as actors' cognitive 
perspectives move progressively from fuzzy to less fuzzy—and eventually to "completely 
understood" if the root cause analysis is successful.  A successful root cause analysis should 
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take engineers "through a subtle game going from the creation of highly uncertain and 
ambiguous situations to the reduction of these” (Corti & Storto, 2000, p. 253).  At the end of 
a successful double-loop learning routine, a new set of standards is created, through which 
"contradictions are resolved and concepts become transferable” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 21)—
hence, a successful routinization. 
A problem-solving environment does not transition from fuzzy to clear without a 
conversion mechanism.  Bits and pieces of data initially available must be churned into a 
cohesive set of facts as the root cause investigation progresses.  Learning, after all, is about 
human action (Senge, 2006).  This aspect of learning lends itself to a subjective and context-
specific nature of knowledge, which is consistent with a constructionist view (Corti & Storto, 
2000).  The subjective nature of knowledge points to a need for its validation.  In other 
words, in order for knowledge to become an institutional-level logic set, it needs to be 
gauged and polished against a set of “standards” or “justification mechanisms” as Nonaka 
(1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) conceptualize.  As already touched upon, the 
quality of a root cause analysis depends on how causality is ascribed in light of what is 
deemed abnormal versus normal (Smith, 1998), that is to say, framing.  MacDuffie (1997) 
cites, from his case study of three automotive plants, an example in which problem solvers 
operate with a preconceived notion (which is developed through iterations of past problem-
solving experience) that design-related changes are nearly impossible to implement due to 
organizational constraints.  Having learned that the “normal” problem-solving framework is 
to stay within the boundary of product features that can be controlled without involving 
design engineering, the root cause investigation team attempts to assign causality to only the 
aspects that can be worked out directly between the plant and its suppliers—eliminating 
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opportunities for potential design improvements.  Causality, thus, can largely be a mental 
construction and is influenced greatly by the organizational justification logic provided.  
Somewhat akin to the control logic for an embedded (i.e., microprocessor-based) system, it is 
this justification mechanism that first elevates the outcome of a first-order problem solving to 
a cause worthy of further investigation in the second-order problem solving; facilitates cause 
assignment that “makes sense” to the entire problem-solving team; and provides algorithms 
necessary to work each bit of data to transform the system status from less coherent to more 
coherent, culminating in a clear set of executable directions. 
Organizational Contexts 
If an EPS effort is to culminate in learning, stewardship must be provided to help 
transition the actors’ cognitive perspectives from fuzzy to clear and to raise the group 
knowledge from local to a higher level.  Contextual factors greatly influence problem solving 
and resulting knowledge and learning.  The discussions that follow explore organizational 
contexts and their effects on EPS.  The EPS environment viewed from a system perspective 
provides a powerful explanation for factors that inhibit or promote learning.   
EPS environment as a socio-technical system.  The quality of organizational 
knowledge creation depends heavily on the social interactions that take place within a 
cultural milieu (Corti & Storto, 2000; Dodgson, 1993; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Simon, 1991).  EPS may very well be viewed as an exercise that plays out in a socio-
technical system.  Every non-conformance is ultimately traced to system design, as 
evidenced by many documented failures of quality / process improvement initiatives.  
Organizational initiatives, such as Lean, fail to take root unless implemented with concerted 
effort to appropriately alter the organization’s culture, which a socio-technical system 
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engenders (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; Senge, 2006).  Lean operations emerge 
from a purposefully constructed system architecture (Liker & Morgan, 2006; Womack, 
Jones, & Roos, 1990).  Likewise, as Leveson (2011) argues from a product safety 
management perspective, safety is an emergent property of a socio-technical system.  
Similarly, quality does not just happen; quality management is effective only so far as the 
system enables it (Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1982).  Learning from EPS, then, is also an 
emergent property of the socio-technical system in which the problem-solving activities 
occur. 
Following Leveson’s (2011) application of system controls theory to a human socio-
technical structure, an EPS environment may be conceptualized as a controller that 
dynamically controls a problem-solving process using a set of algorithms.  Further, from the 
perspective of safety management, Leveson (2011) draws attention to three insightful 
characteristics of a dynamic system:  It (1) has interacting components; (2) can change over 
time (often referred to as "asynchronous evolution"); and (3) requires feedback to maintain a 
desired state, for example, gauging how successfully the intended functions are being 
performed.  Implications of the first point are that a well-functioning system is one in which 
all parts are operating together in a seamless manner.  Leveson (2011) argues that accidents 
or failures are often a result of dysfunctional interactions among the system components.  
The success of the Toyota Production System—hailed as the founder and master of Lean—is 
attributed to a well-orchestrated system of reciprocal obligation among workers, 
management, and suppliers who support each other for a collective cause (Liker & Morgan, 
2006; Womack et al., 1990).  In EPS situations, inter-dependencies of system components 
have implications in the way information is shared among all stakeholders.  EPS is typically 
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a cross-functional endeavor as the product complexity of this day and age surpasses the 
technical expertise possessed by any one engineer.  More often than not, the problem itself is 
a complex system of various hardware and software sub-systems and components.  
Information sharing among subject-matter experts helps pinpoint areas of interactions among 
these components.  The key, then, is to facilitate healthy interactions among team members 
and stakeholders who may not, at first, necessarily share the same technical views.  Effective 
information sharing in a root cause analysis context should create new opportunities for 
people to communicate with each other, as well as constructively challenge each other to 
rethink their assumptions (Carroll et al., 2002). 
A dynamically-operating system can change its state in a fraction of a second, as well 
as evolve over time.  Socio-technical systems in the context of single- and double-loop 
learning can exhibit similar behaviors.   Just as any system control loop includes time lags 
between the receipt of input and generation of output, there is a time lag before single-loop 
learning has a chance to advance to double-loop learning.   If this time lag is too great, first-
order problem solving will be less likely to develop into second-order problem solving 
because valuable information gained from the single-loop learning has been lost.  As Tucker 
and Edmondson (2003) and Tucker et al. (2002) demonstrate in their case study of a 
healthcare unit, a socio-technical system that encourages “problem-solving behaviors that 
focus solely on remedying or overcoming immediate obstacles preclude organizational 
learning…[partly] because valuable data that can be used to justify and inform removal 
effects are lost” (Tucker et al., 2002, p. 123).   
In addition to the input-to-output conversion time span, in a closed-loop control 
system there is also the time lag that is associated with the system’s feedback on the 
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generated output.   At every iteration of problem investigation that ends with first-order 
problem solving, that is, without proceeding to second-order problem solving, the extent to 
which the feedback is delayed has a profound effect on the future state of the system.  If the 
delay is excessive or near infinity—in other words, feedback never comes or comes only 
after the problem occurrence frequency has reached a major crisis level—the system is 
effectively endorsing the short-term effectiveness of first-order problem-solving behaviors.  
Such feedback diminishes the motivation for second-order problem-solving efforts.  Over 
time, with multiple iterations of such lost opportunities for second-order problem, the system 
eventually evolves into a stable state in which repeated short-term fixes become a normal 
way of life.  If engineers continuously “explain away” or “write off” problems with no 
further action, lack of engineering system response to question such behaviors has effectively 
established the premises of single-loop learning that are now ingrained in the organizational 
culture.  Such a system may be “stressful, but basically in balance…[leading to] worker 
burnout…[which] further decreases the chance of effortful engagement in second-order 
problem solving” (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003, p. 66).   
Structural controls and exploration.  Viewing EPS environment from a system 
perspective sheds light on the dynamics of the double-loop learning process and how the 
socio-technical system itself can dynamically adapt through behaviors of the controller.  The 
controller, in this case, is the one that controls the problem solving process and environment, 
to which the system feeds back response signals prompted by the process outcomes.  The 
controller is a critical component of a system.  Akin to the electronic control unit in a piece 
of complex machinery, organizational routines fulfill the process control function in a socio-
technical system.  Organizational routines are “forms, rules, procedures, conventions, 
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strategies, and technologies” but also include more intrinsic factors such as “the structure of 
beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, [and] cultures” (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 320).  In 
the context of EPS, routines are analogous to algorithms that purposefully process data and 
convert them into executable instructions to run the problem solving process.   
EPS routines are essentially knowledge-transfer mechanisms that leverage tacit 
knowledge embedded in local engineering contexts.  Tacit knowledge by its nature is 
idiosyncratic because it is held by individuals coming from varied backgrounds (Nonaka, 
Toyama, & Konno, 2000; Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006).  The heterogeneity of tacit 
knowledge makeup makes its transfer far more susceptible to coordination mechanisms than 
knowledge already explicitly written on paper or expressed in a hardware form.  The choice, 
sequence, and combination of routines introduced at the right time maximize effectiveness 
and efficiency of tacit knowledge transfer.  For example, an experienced engineer may 
immediately seek cross sectioning and metallurgical analysis in an attempt to find a root 
cause of a failed microelectronic component.  A less experienced engineer, on the other hand, 
may first have to learn about such techniques as scanning electron microscopy and energy 
dispersive spectroscopy.  Depending on the knowledge level of the EPS team, the 
investigation may begin with a hypothesis grounded in previously experienced failure 
incidents or an open-ended brainstorming session to find a clue on where to begin.  If the 
level of expertise or analysis capability required for problem solving is not available in-
house, the engineer may have to coordinate with his purchasing department to outsource the 
needed service.  All of these factors change the nature of dialog and logistics in EPS, which 
the organizational routines can help or inhibit.  In other words, an EPS process, having a high 
tacit knowledge content, can be a very path-dependent affair (Edmondson et al., 2003). 
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Some routines are oriented more towards exploration of new ideas than exploitation 
of existing premises (Bartel & Garud, 2009; March, 1991) and vice versa.  Consequently, 
matching tasks with appropriate execution routines based on the task characteristics is a 
logical thing to do—since some tasks are more effectively executed by explorative routines 
than narrowly prescribed set of directions.  In some contexts, the nature of business is such 
that both types of routines can exist side by side in an organization.  Hwang and Christensen 
(2008) argue, for example, that the existing healthcare system is a mixture of both the 
explorative and routine elements.  They call the former “solution shops” which are 
characterized with high ambiguity and uncertainty and rely exclusively on the highly-situated 
human cognition of physicians.  The latter are “value-adding processes” that is more 
repetitive in nature such as routine diagnostics performed by nurses and billing specialists.  
For EPS, how the routines are applied at various phases of root cause analysis may be 
critical.  Edmondson et al. (2003) argue for contingent thinking that matches knowledge 
contents of tasks to appropriate routines.  They argue that an effort to adopt practices based 
on codified knowledge may benefit from a straight transfer by copying existing best 
practices.  Practices that have a high tacit knowledge content, on the other hand, may be 
more appropriately implemented in an improvisational, learn-by-doing environment.  
Following their logic, then, it makes more sense to enact an environment that fosters a 
forward-looking, explorative outlook in early phases of EPS when engineers must confront 
ambiguity.  As the root cause investigation moves toward completion, the routines should 
exercise control to standardize and deploy across the organization the new solutions that the 
investigation has discovered. 
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Routines can be structurally induced.  For example, Schroeder, Linderman, Liedtke, 
and Choo (2008) discuss Six Sigma as one of the methodologies that facilitate structural 
controls and structural exploration simultaneously through systematically executed routines.  
Structural exploration is conducive to early phases of EPS when the level of ambiguity is 
high.  Purposefully designed training routines, such as those used by Six Sigma, can not only 
facilitate acquisition of technical problem solving skills but also provide a forum for 
socialization and learning the basic values underlying the process improvements (Schroeder 
et al., 2008).  Schroeder et al. (2008) argue that Six Sigma training institutes a “common 
language” and enhances boundary-spanning communication as a result, which greatly 
facilitates opportunity exploration.  Similarly, MacDuffie’s (1997, pp. 495-497) shop-floor 
case study reports that Honda’s “actual place, actual situation” dialog policy implemented 
through “spontaneous meetings” (coined “Y-gaya” at Honda) is likely to “yield a common 
language and a common understanding of what standards should be applied to deciding what 
will or won’t be defined as a problem” in the problem definition phase.   At the same time the 
exploration of improvement opportunities is pursued, Six Sigma’s five-step DMAIC (= 
define-measure-analyze-improve-control) meta-routine coupled with periodic toll gate 
reviews to assess progress acts as a form of structural and behavioral control to ensure 
consistency in approach (Schroeder et al., 2008).  In EPS, any structured problem-solving 
methodology, such as 8D and Five Why’s, has the capability of doing the same.   
Transition from structural exploration to structural controls as the root cause analysis 
nears its end may be induced by routines such as experimentation and pre-/post-data 
comparison to confirm efficacy of the chosen solution (MacDuffie, 1997).  Such transition 
routines ready the system for complete standardization.  The basic principles of statistical 
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process control and Kaizen dictate that the system must first be stabilized and standardized 
before the next rounds of continuous improvement can begin (Deming, 1982; Liker & 
Morgan, 2006; MacDuffie, 1997).  In this light, Liker and Morgan (2006) and MacDuffie 
(1997) argue, structural controls that foster a mental vision that the end of this problem-
solving journey may be the start of a next one should help keep the performance frontier 
open.  Structural exploration and control, thus, can be induced.  Both are needed and both 
need to be introduced at appropriate times as the EPS effort is underway, thereby achieving 
both adaptability and efficiency. 
Deliberate creation of contexts.  Structural exploration seeks to evoke innovative 
ideas while structural controls target consistency.  In this vein, Liker and Morgan (2006) 
demonstrate how the Lean / Toyota Production System (TPS) principles—which are now 
widely deployed in manufacturing areas across industries—may be applied to the product 
development process (PDP).  Their idea of a “lean PDP” is expressed in terms of a four-step 
process that begins with establishment of customer values—followed by exploration of 
various solutions—and ends with a standardization of activities (Liker & Morgan, 2006).  
From the perspective of context-induced routines, these four steps are very much analogous 
to structural exploration eventually transitioning into a routinized operation.  Organizational 
contexts that prompt different routines can be—and probably should be—deliberately 
created, especially in EPS effort because a swift resolution of the problem is usually desired.      
Effective problem-solving contexts, indeed, can and should be created through a 
deliberate effort. As chronicled in MacDuffie’s (1997) case study of three automotive 
manufacturing plants, problems are “fuzzy” in their definition when first discovered.  If the 
plant’s “quality systems force problems into one category or another…the benefits of rich, 
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ambiguous data will be lost and the search for solutions may be misdirected” (MacDuffie, 
1997, p. 498).  In an EPS context, if the problem solvers know from the start that a particular 
categorization of the problem can lead to a potential solution that management would not 
approve until the next model change, they might try to steer the root cause analysis to assign 
causality to other product features that are less difficult to convince management to be 
potential solutions.  MacDuffie (1997) notes the powerful effects that the system imposes 
upon problem framing by contrasting two scenarios observed in his case study.  One is a 
plant operation routine at an American automotive manufacturer that requires, at the start of a 
problem investigation, charging costs for resolving the problem to specific parties; the other 
is a practice at a Honda manufacturing facility, whose “accounting system is deliberately 
designed to minimize the time spent figuring out who’s to blame” (MacDuffie, 1997, p. 488).  
Openness in the information exchange resulting from the system feedback to endorse “Five 
Why’s”—rather than “Five Who’s”—in the latter case is dramatic.  Such is the power of 
system feedback.   
A system eventually becomes what its feedback mechanism instructs it to be 
(Leveson, 2011), as discussed earlier on how too much success in first-order problem solving 
in a context that does not support double-loop learning further amplifies single-loop culture 
(Tucker et al., 2002).  Once again using the system controls analogy, contexts can serve as a 
feedback mechanism to encourage or discourage particular routines.  For example, Jidoka, 
which is one of the building blocks of the TPS (Liker & Morgan, 2006), provides a 
mechanism for assemblers to call for help if a problem is detected in the assembly line.  The 
mechanism is the Andon system, another signature item of TPS, which uses lights and 
sounds to announce detection of a process deviation (Liker & Morgan, 2006).  When an 
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operator activates the Andon, help arrives—“not in the next few hours but in the next few 
seconds” (Liker & Morgan, 2006, p. 7).  The immediacy of attention to the help request then 
feeds back a signal to the “controller” (i.e., the operators) assuring the legitimacy of Andon 
action and restoring the system state to that which TPS continuously strives to maintain.     
Feedback, in the context of knowledge construction, is essentially a justification 
mechanism to align quality of knowledge with the organization's vision (Nonaka, 1994).  The 
physical presence of managers participating in the dialog about problems, right at the spot 
where they were discovered—demonstrated by the Gemba-Genjitsu policy practiced by 
Honda and Toyota (Liker & Morgan, 2006; MacDuffie, 1997)—helps build common 
language and definition of the issue at hand.  Such active and direct management 
participation encourages boundary crossing, assures psychological safety, and thus promotes 
structural exploration (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Likewise, deliberate attempts to foster 
creative tension, i.e., a positive tension between constancy and change, also enhance 
structural exploration (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Senge, 2006; Womack et al., 1990).  Effective use 
of EPS goals, such as that which is demonstrated by Six Sigma’s goal-focused approach, can 
influence the members' perceptions about their "performance frontier" (Linderman, 
Schroeder, Zaheer, & Choo, 2003). 
Role of Mental Models   
Equating the EPS socio-technical environment with a “system” has illuminated 
system feedback as a justification mechanism for the EPS action.  In system controls, proper 
feedback provided at the right time keeps the controller healthy.  In a microprocessor-based, 
embedded system, it is the health of this microprocessor that is central to ensuring correct 
operations of the controller.  Further delving into the system analogy, one could say that the 
  
30
role of microprocessor equates to that of mental models, shared by people on the problem-
solving team.  A system without an effective feedback loop drives people to substandard 
alternatives by adversely influencing their mental models.   
Bounded rationality.  Humans can be rational only to the extent that their 
surrounding environment allows them to be (Leveson, 2011; Senge, 2006), which is a 
bounded-rationality problem (Simon, 1991).  The theory of bounded rationality—which is 
“about the limits upon the ability of human beings to adapt optimally, or even satisfactorily, 
to complex environments” (Simon, 1991, p. 132)—helps explain how organizational factors 
can affect the state of the mental model held by each EPS player.  An organization learns 
only through its people, and their learning will go so far as “their ability to interpret complex 
reality” (Dodgson, 1993, p. 384).  One of the extensions of bounded rationality, which is 
particularly relevant in EPS contexts, is that people rarely attempt to go beyond the perceived 
system boundaries so “the learning process is generally conservative and sustains existing 
structures of belief” (Dodgson, 1993, p. 385).  For a double-loop learning process to occur, 
therefore, problem solving must be framed in such a manner as to help the members 
overcome their own mental boundaries.  If contextual factors are overly restrictive—for 
example, forcing the problem into pre-set categories or restricting the repertoire of corrective 
actions from the beginning—will further inhibit the problem solvers’ mental frontiers and in 
turn cause their investigation scope to atrophy (MacDuffie, 1997).  A reduction of the 
problem-solving frontier will undoubtedly affect quality of learning.  
EPS is normally instigated by a performance failure.  While mistakes and errors are 
opportune triggers for problem solving and thereby setting a launch pad for learning (Scott & 
Vessey, 2000; Tjosvold, Yu, & Hui, 2004)—more so than the experience of success 
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(Baumard & Starbuck, 2005)—impediments exist that can inhibit learning from failure.  
Potential barriers to learning are embedded in both the technical and social systems and will 
need to be addressed through measures such as information systems, systematic reviews, 
training, availability of needed expertise, and deliberate postulation of “failure as 
opportunity” to ensure psychological safety (Mark D. Cannon & Edmondson, 2005).  
Managerial behaviors that dismiss “small” failures result in reinforcing existing premises and 
over time give consistent patterns to these failure incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005).  
Eventually, these patterns will settle into a “normal state of affairs” now firmly ingrained in 
the organizational members’ mental models.  Similarly, a punitive or controlling response to 
errors—such as “shoot the messenger”—would reinforce mental barriers to the open flow of 
information and discourage participation in double-loop learning (Carroll et al., 2002; 
Leveson, 2011).  Hence, in order to effectively learn from failure, deliberate—not 
haphazard—attempts should be made to preclude undesired psychological interference.  
Effective and speedy completion of EPS requires opportunity framing to assure freedom to 
define the problem, not unduly constrained by costs, politics, or other organizational factors.  
Such freedom actively steers information processing and keeps the momentum going toward 
problem resolution (Mark D.  Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Mark D. Cannon & Edmondson, 
2005; Carroll et al., 2002).   
Intuition-reason balance.  Bounded rationality in double-loop learning, through 
which a problem must be transformed into a new solution that triggers system changes, has a 
profound effect on the state of mental models.  A mental model is concerned with the 
interplay between intuition and reason, which must be properly balanced to achieve the 
model’s maximum potential (Senge, 2006).  In EPS contexts, then, if the socio-technical 
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system is such that it places too much emphasis on highly situated human cognition—
without providing a mechanism to systematically and routinely address problem solving 
issues—the mental model will never reach an optimal intuition-reason balance.   
An account of single-order problem solving in a healthcare unit chronicled by Tucker 
and Edmondson (2003) demonstrates how a system that emphasizes individual vigilance and 
personal accountability without providing support structures goes into a perpetual cycle of 
reactive behaviors (Carroll et al., 2002; Senge, 2006; Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Over 
time, mental models operating in such a system eventually “collapse”—leading to the high 
personnel turnover chronicled in the case study (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  Learning, 
hence, cannot be expected from a system that continuously employs “symptomatic solutions 
as if they are fundamental solutions, [as] the search for fundamental solutions stops and 
shifting the burden sets in” (Senge, 2006, p. 110). 
Borrowing Leveson’s (2011) system analogy, akin to a microprocessor in a 
controller, problem solvers’ mental models dynamically seek intuition-reason balance 
through constant justification provided by the system’s feedback loop to counteract changes 
in the environment.  Weick and Sutcliffe's (2007) “high reliability organization (HRO)” 
concept, for example, offers a practical strategy for developing resilience against crisis 
situations.  They identify five characteristics that HROs appear to have in common: pre-
occupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to 
resilience, and deference to expertise.  Put together, these five principles form a deliberate 
strategy of organizational mindfulness to promote properly-situated human cognition and 
keep organizational members’ mental models robust.  In the context of EPS, therefore, 
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properly administered structural controls and exploration routines discussed earlier should 
also play a role in maintaining a healthy mental model.   
Intention as a system boundary.  The impact of bounded rationality is that people 
rarely question their own conclusion-drawing processes (Carroll et al., 2002); that our mental 
models are often systematically flawed, missing critical feedback, misjudging time delays 
(Senge, 2006); and that people essentially will not do what does not make sense to them 
(Leveson, 2011; Senge, 2006).  Further, as the system dynamically changes its state, what 
made sense at one time may not any longer—the reason that, according to Leveson (2011), 
“instructions and written procedures are almost never followed exactly as operators try to 
become more efficient and productive and to deal with time pressures” (p. 41).  Similarly, as 
Smith (1998) demonstrates in his example of shop-floor problem solving, parts coming out of 
the American factory’s final run each day were of substantially lower quality than its 
Japanese counterpart because American workers, in a hurry to get home, did not cool 
furnaces as slowly as they should.  Understanding of human behavior in different contextual 
settings led to this root cause that is deeply tied to bounded rationality. 
Leveson (2011) argues, from a safety management point of view, that better learning 
is achieved by framing accidents not as events stemming from operator errors but as a 
“sense-making” events.  She advocates that we change “our emphasis in analyzing the role of 
humans in accidents from what they did wrong to why it made sense [emphasis added] for 
them to act the way they did” (Leveson, 2011, p. 39).  Leveson (2011) argues that causes of 
an accident ultimately point, not to the operators or faulty components, but to a lack of 
properly administered system constraints that gave rise to faulty behaviors.  What is meant 
by “constraints” is a set of explicitly stated value criteria that provide a yardstick for judging 
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legitimacy of one’s action (Leveson, 2011).  Depending on the nature of the system, the 
constraints may be a set of engineering requirements or a safety mission statement such as 
“Water quality must not be compromised” (Leveson, 2011, p. 86).  Enforcement of system 
constraints, Leveson (2011) argues, along with the system feedback administered 
appropriately at appropriate times, help limit the type of undesirable changes from occurring 
in the system while allowing maximum flexibility and improvement.   
Leveson’s (2011) concept of system constraints is very analogous to Nonaka’s (1994) 
and Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) concept of “intention.”  Intention is an organizational 
vision that sparks knowledge creation and serves as judgment criteria for the type of 
knowledge to be developed.  Similarly, Deming (1982) advocates that quality starts—and can 
only start—with the organization’s intention and constancy of purpose expressed by senior 
management.  Placing these concepts in an EPS context, it can be envisioned that an effective 
EPS environment would have problem-solving goals explicitly expressed by a high authority.  
These goals then set the system boundaries that will provide a frame of reference for problem 
resolution and sustained learning.   
Initial View of Engineering Problem Solving 
Engineering problem solving (EPS) is, hence, conceptualized as an epistemic journey 
to conquer ambiguity by dynamically converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge.  
The goal of this journey is double-loop learning, that is to say, system changes.  Further, 
situating EPS as a set of routines that dynamically take place in a socio-technical system 
lends itself to a system controls analogy.  Analogous to an engineered embedded control 
system, the EPS environment can be characterized with problem-solving goals and vision, 
akin to system constraints, which provide the initial trigger needed to put the first-order 
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problem solving onto the launch pad for the second-order problem solving; and with 
structurally induced control and exploration routines that serve as the control logic that 
operates the problem-solving activities.  Furthermore, similar to a closed loop control system, 
these routines are adjusted by input from a higher authority—for example, management— 
serving as a sensor that feeds back data to communicate the system state.  The amount, 
quality, and timing of this sensor feedback will intimately affect the information processing 
power of the EPS team, very akin to that of a microprocessor. 
In conclusion, a socio-technical system that properly bounds EPS contexts with 
appropriate constraints and feedback that adjusts with time is likely to promote streamlined 
root cause analysis, knowledge creation, and thereby sustained learning.  Such a system 
provides effective justification mechanism throughout the EPS journey and by so doing 
facilitates properly balanced cognitive state to keep the problem solvers’ mental models 
healthy. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
This dissertation research is implemented as a two-stage investigation that follows the 
“exploratory sequential” research design within mixed methods approaches (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2007).  In this design, the focus is exploratory.  The investigation begins with a 
qualitative study, which is then followed by the second study that collects and analyzes 
quantitative data to confirm or further explain the qualitative findings.  The quantitative 
phase, thus, builds on the preceding qualitative phase by connecting the two sets of data 
obtained sequentially (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).  Themes resulting from the qualitative 
data are to be analyzed to form a theoretical model, which is to be subsequently tested in the 
quantitative study.  The expectation of this approach is that the qualitative findings and their 
analysis and interpretations provide a general understanding of the phenomena of interest; 
that once relevant variables are identified, the quantitative study can help measure their 
significance and relationships (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).      
The remainder of this chapter discusses the strategy for implementing the exploratory 
sequential protocol in detail.  It does so by first providing a justification for using a mixed 
methods approach, the exploratory sequential design in particular.  Subsequently, planned 
designs and methods for executing the qualitative and quantitative studies are presented.  
Note that the scope of this chapter stays within the strategic aspects of implementing the two 
studies.  Methodological specifics such as interview protocol (qualitative study only), 
hypotheses (quantitative study only), and data analysis tools and procedures will be discussed 
in detail in conjunction with the study findings in the subsequent two chapters. 
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Rationale for Mixed Methods 
The central premise of a mixed methods research approach is that quantitative and 
qualitative methods in combination can provide a better understanding of the phenomenon 
under study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  In a 
qualitative study, people’s voices are directly heard.  Qualitative data are rich in nuances and 
subtle cues, which are directly observable.  Findings from a qualitative study help researchers 
understand the contexts in which actors express their views.  Such richness of data content 
cannot be delivered by a quantitative research design.  While lacking contextual richness, 
however, quantitative study findings are far-reaching.  A quantitative study can encompass a 
wide audience efficiently, which is difficult to achieve with a qualitative investigation.  In 
other words, a quantitative methodology is much more suited if the focus of the investigation 
is to study the generalizability of hypothesized trends.   Thus, a qualitative investigation can 
work to reveal important variables in the phenomenon of interest, which may be evaluated 
quantitatively to ascertain their relevance and applicability to wider audiences (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2007; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Simply stated, the two methods put 
together are more likely to offer comprehensive evidence and answers to the research 
questions that neither method alone can effectively address. 
As discussed in the first chapter, there are four questions that guide this research.  
They are re-stated below: 
1. How do engineers perceive problem solving prompted by product-related 
problems? 
2. How is knowledge created through problem solving routines?  
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3. What conditions promote or inhibit problem solving and sustained organizational 
learning? 
4. To what extent can the findings about engineering problem solving, knowledge 
creation, and organizational learning be generalized across engineering 
communities? 
 The first three questions are about “how” and “what”—rather than “how many” or 
“how much”—and so are qualitative in nature.   The experiential aspects of engineering 
problem solving (EPS), in the eyes of engineers as the chief actors, constitute unknown 
entities which is best approached using field work with an inductive orientation (Koro-
Ljungberg & Douglas, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  The need to extract intricate details 
from the actors’ responses without prior knowledge naturally points to a qualitative approach 
(Ercikan & Roth, 2006; Koro-Ljungberg & Douglas, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  The 
fourth and last question, on the other hand, logically lends itself to quantitative analysis 
methods—once the important variables that answer the first three questions become known.   
This research has as its aim to develop a model of EPS and resulting knowledge 
creation.  The inquiry is exploratory in nature because, as Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) 
suggest, 
• The variables are unknown 
• No guiding framework or theory exists 
In such a case, the exploratory sequential design is ideal because it seeks to “explore a 
phenomenon in depth and then measure its prevalence” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 
75).  Hence, a two-phase sequence strategy to first identify important variables and to later 
generalize the findings across a large group is warranted.   
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Shown below is a process flow diagram that depicts the study procedures, adapted 
from Creswell and Plano Clark (2007): 
 
Figure 1. Process flow diagram for the proposed two-phase sequence study design. 
Adapted from Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (p. 53) by J. W. Creswell 
and V. L. Plano Clark, 2007, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  Copyright 2007 by 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
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As shown in Figure 1, an instrument to measure the variables identified based on the 
participants’ qualitative responses is to be developed during the intermediary stage that 
transitions the research from the first phase to the second.  The design and methods for each 
study phase—qualitative then quantitative—are presented next. 
Qualitative Study 
The design and methods for the qualitative study follow a grounded theory approach.  
Grounded theory is well-suited to this investigation phase, which attempts to uncover 
complex processes in potentially intricate contexts (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Suddaby, 2006; Vandenbosch, Saatcioglu, & Fay, 2006) of EPS.  Grounded 
theory aims to develop a theory and makes “knowledge claims about how individuals 
interpret reality” (Suddaby, 2006, p. 634).  The major goal of this study phase is to develop a 
conceptual model of EPS dynamics, which grounded theory is expected to facilitate.   
Sampling procedures.  “Product engineers” who have product-related problem-
solving experiences are expected to constitute the sample for this study.  Potential 
respondents are to be recruited from the author’s personal networks, and the recruitment 
effort is to be augmented with snow-balling techniques to reach desired sample size and 
composition.  For the purpose of this study, “product engineers” are “designers of products 
and systems that have utility” as Schein (1996, p. 14) defines.  Exercising a strict 
interpretation of this definition, the sourced respondents are to be U.S.-based technical 
professionals who take ownership in designing, applying, integrating, or manufacturing 
products.  A “product” may be a physical entity, software, or an information technology (IT) 
architecture.  “Product-related problem” can include any problematic issue that pertains to 
design, application, testing, manufacturing, servicing, or field usage of the product. 
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Grounded theory, by its design, does not dictate sample size and composition a priori.  
Instead, the approach relies on “theoretical sampling,” which is a process of sampling 
responses to generate comparisons between them until no new data appears (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; Suddaby, 2006).  Theoretical sampling is closely tied to 
grounded theory’s central tenet, “method of constant comparison” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; 
Douglas, 2003).  The method of constant comparison principle denotes an iterative process of 
continually interacting with the data, gradually advancing from coding to conceptual 
categories and eventually to theory development (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; 
Suddaby, 2006).  As new insights unfold during the data analysis, the sample may require 
adjustments.  Sample recruitment is expected to continue until the data analysis demonstrates 
that conceptual saturation has long since been reached. 
Permissions needed.  Permission to conduct the qualitative study has been granted 
by Wayne State University’s institutional review board (IRB) through IRB’s Expedited 
Review process.  Details of this IRB filing are available under HIC #088509B3E and 
Protocol #0908007458.  Included in the IRB filing is information on how the respondents’ 
anonymity and confidentiality are to be assured.   
Data collection and recording.   Data collection is to be accomplished by means of 
personal interviews, either face-to-face or by telephone, conducted by the author.  Each 
interviewee is to be asked to narrate “stories” from his or her past product-related problem 
solving experience.  With each interviewee’s approval, the author plans to digitally record 
the interview and subsequently to have the recording transcribed.  Should a respondent 
choose not to grant permission for audio-recording, the author is prepared to develop a 
transcript based on her notes taken during the interview.  This transcript is to be subsequently 
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reviewed and approved by the interviewee for accuracy.  The interview is to be administered 
in a semi-structured format using a pre-fabricated interview protocol, which may require 
adjustments based on the new insights that in-process findings reveal.      
Data analysis.  Qualitative data analysis normally starts with coding text segments, 
proceeds to theme formation, and eventually arrives at broad generalization by inter-relating 
the emergent themes (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).  In grounded theory, data analysis is 
concurrent with data collection (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Thus, the data analysis is to begin 
immediately after the first interview.  The entire procedure works to synergize “emic” and 
“etic” approaches.  While an emic outlook is an insider’s view of the culture under study, the 
etic perspective seeks generalized cultural principles as an outsider to that culture (Morris, 
Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999).  The emic approach pursues “tribal knowledge” that is deeply 
situated in a bounded milieu (Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009).  The etic 
investigation, on the other hand, is concerned about discerning the “differences across 
cultures in terms of a general, external standard” (Morris et al., 1999, p. 781).  The data 
analysis in grounded theory, as such, works in such a way as to “combine emic 
understanding with etic analysis” (Ybema et al., 2009, p. 11) and proceeds in three steps. 
The first step is “open coding” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; Walker & 
Myrick, 2006).  Open coding is a rigorous process of reading each transcript line-by-line and 
identifying “codable moments”—which are words, phrases, sentences, or paragraphs of 
potential significance (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; Walker & Myrick, 2006).  
These textual segments are categorized and assigned labels.  These categories are not 
selected a priori but are rather allowed to emerge directly from the data, that is, the 
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engineers’ voices.  Thus, the open-coding phase has a heavy emic leaning to attain “thick 
description” (Morris et al., 1999) to maximize the gain of initial data exploration.   
The second step is “axial coding” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; Walker & 
Myrick, 2006).  The activity in this phase involves clustering the open codes around specific 
points or conceptual “axes” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003; Walker & Myrick, 
2006).  Here, the process starts to interact with the etic domain.  The purpose of axial coding 
is to understand categories in relation to other categories and subcategories—specifically, 
contexts and cause-effect relationships recounted in problem solving narratives that may hint 
relationships among the assigned code labels.  In other words, the researcher continues to 
strive for increased familiarity with the data, but also starts to incorporate an etic stance at the 
same time.  She starts to distance herself in an attempt to see “new things more clearly 
[while] sustaining an inquisitive stance” (Ybema et al., 2009, p. 11) as a cultural insider.  In 
axial coding, she also consults the literature to facilitate identification of patterns and 
distinctions in the data.  At the end of the second step, iterative grouping / re-grouping of 
codes is expected to result in a reduced number of label categories.  
The third and final step is “selective coding” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 
2003; Walker & Myrick, 2006) where an active interplay between emic and etic insights 
occurs to abstract general findings from the lived lives (Morris et al., 1999; Ybema et al., 
2009) of product engineers.  Selective coding further analyzes code clusters for their 
potential relationships.  Literature continues to aid this process, as do research memos and 
journals to be kept in tracking the analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Douglas, 2003).  
Through the iterative process of “zooming in and zooming out” (Ybema et al., 2009), the 
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selective coding process further collapses the code clusters, until key findings emerge at 
which point the analysis has reached a conceptual saturation.  
Quantitative Study  
Some scholars argue that an emic approach works well in exploratory research, 
whereas etic orientation can effectively generate criteria for evaluating hypotheses (Morris et 
al., 1999).  In this light, the quantitative study can serve to provide refinements to the 
findings discovered by the cultural insiders (Morris et al., 1999).  Quantitative research 
hypotheses are to be formulated after the qualitative study phase is completed.  The 
quantitative research design and methods described here rely on the general quantitative 
procedures provided by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007).  The outcomes of the qualitative 
investigation are to determine the further specifics of the quantitative study design.  
Development of measurement instrument.  Prior to starting the quantitative study, 
a measurement instrument needs to be developed to gauge the importance of and 
relationships among the variables in the hypothesized model.  As much as possible, the items 
in the instrument are adopted from existing scales that have established acceptable levels of 
reliability and validity.  Scale development is to follow well-recognized guidelines, such as 
those provided by DeVellis (2003) and Hair and his colleagues (2010). 
Sampling procedures.  The unit of analysis continues to be the same as that in the 
qualitative study, that is, product engineers.  U.S.-based engineering / technical professionals 
are to comprise the quantitative research sample.  The same definitions as those used in the 
qualitative study for “engineer,” “product,” and “product-related problem solving” apply 
except that consideration for expanding the definition of “product engineer” is made.  
Whereas a strict adherence to the earlier definition of engineer (Schein, 1996) can limit 
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respondent categories to design or manufacturing engineers, engineering professions also 
encompass product support roles such as quality / reliability / safety / field service engineers.   
Including them in the quantitative study is likely to be beneficial for testing the boundaries of 
model applicability, as well as for ease of meeting the sample size requirement.  
Once again, the same recruitment strategies used for the qualitative study are to be 
deployed.  Solicitation sent to the qualifying individuals in the author’s personal networks, 
coupled with snow-balling techniques, is expected to be a primary means for recruiting 
respondents.  Sufficient time is to be allotted to collect a minimum of 200 responses. 
Permission needed.  Permission to conduct the quantitative study has been granted 
by Wayne State University’s IRB with an Exemption status.  Further information of this IRB 
filing is available under HIC #108711B3X and Protocol #1110010264.  The IRB filing 
contains details of the strategy to assure the respondents’ anonymity and confidentiality, such 
as absence of identifier in the measurement instrument that ties any respondent to his / her 
answers unless he or she voluntarily provides contact information for the purpose of 
receiving summary survey results. 
Data collection and recording.  Data collection is to be accomplished by a self-
administered, on-line survey that asks questions about the respondent’s experience in 
product-related problem investigation and resolution.  The on-line survey is to be set up 
using the services of a provider selected among Wayne State University’s approved sources.  
Prior to deployment, the questionnaire is to be thoroughly pre-tested then pilot-tested using a 
convenience sample.  Results from these tests are to be used only for debugging purposes and 
should not be included in the study.  The real survey, once deployed, are to be kept open for 
an adequate length of time to collect a desired sample size.  
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Data analysis.  The model of engineering problem solving and knowledge creation 
dynamics resulting from the qualitative investigation is to be studied using correlational 
analysis techniques.  Possible methodological choices in this analysis strategy are multiple 
regression analysis, path analysis, and either component-based or covariance-based structural 
equation modeling (SEM) with measurement analyses.  Subject to the final sample size 
attained, the preferable approach is that of SEM.  Several unique features distinguish SEM 
from other covariance structure analysis techniques.  For example, SEM allows estimation of 
simultaneous impact of observed variables on one another without implementing artificial 
measures such as blocking (Clayton & Pett, 2008).  Additionally, should the hypothesized 
research model posit mediation, SEM can more robustly analyze mediation structures than 
can conventional regression analysis (Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng, 2007).   
Concluding Remarks 
Mixed methods research approaches are “often the best way to address the complex 
research questions” allowing researchers “to measure trends, prevalences, and outcomes” 
while examining “meaning, context, and process” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 175).  
Further, organizational phenomena involve both the emic and etic logics (Morris et al., 
1999).  This two-phase investigation first capitalizes on the power of qualitative-inductive 
approach to generate a theory of EPS dynamics.  Through the iterative immersion in and 
distancing from the data, the complementary nature of emic and etic approaches are expected 
to facilitate theory generation.  At the end of the process, the etic functional logic is expected 
to link engineering cultural practices to hypothesized antecedent factors (Morris et al., 1999).  
Once the model and accompanying hypotheses are developed, the quantitative-deductive 
methodology can confirm the extent to which they hold across a wider engineering audience.  
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
This chapter presents the qualitative study conducted based on the methodological 
approach discussed in Chapter 3.  The results of the investigation have, to date, been 
published through three venues (see Itabashi-Campbell, Gluesing, & Perelli, 2011, 2012; 
Itabashi-Campbell, Perelli, & Gluesing, 2011).  The aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
insights gained from this qualitative inquiry and set the ground for the next and final phase of 
the research, the quantitative investigation.   
The chapter has three major parts.  The first part provides the methodological details 
of the field work and data analysis—namely, sample, data collection, and data analysis.  In 
the second part, discussion zooms in on the key findings that emerged from the data analysis.  
In the third and final part, these findings are vigorously interpreted.  Aided by the extant 
literature, the discussion infuses meaning into the phenomena observed, leading to a 
conceptual model of engineering problem solving (EPS) dynamics.  The chapter concludes 
with a set of propositions derived from this model, thus transitioning the study to the 
quantitative investigation. 
Methods 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the central tenet of grounded theory is a “method 
of constant comparison,” pairing and comparing cases for similarities and differences until 
patterns in the observations become coherent.  In a grounded theory approach, data sampling, 
collection, and analysis proceed concurrently and in an interactive manner.  Rather than 
proceeding in a sequential fashion that characterizes quantitative methods, these activities 
constantly feed into each other, influencing the next course of action as the investigation 
progresses.  The entire process is fluid and integrative, rather than linear and driven by steps 
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set a priori as it would be in a quantitative study.  Robustness of analysis in a grounded 
theory protocol is controlled, not through statistical procedures, but by two procedural 
attributes.  One is the use of multiple sources or indicators to identify rising themes so, as the 
sections that follow will demonstrate, “Each case is analogous to an experiment, and multiple 
cases are analogous to multiple experiments” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 542).  The other aspect 
is the use of literature in conjunction with data analysis, which is “particularly crucial in 
theory-building research because the findings often rest on a very limited number of cases” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 545).  Thus, construct validity is established through building 
evidence and internal validity through tying the emergent theory to existing literature. 
The data collection proceeded from August 2009 through August 2010.  Data 
analysis, which started concurrently with data collection, continued through December 2010 
and was guided by both Dr. Sheri Perelli and Dr. Julia Gluesing.  
Sample.  In grounded theory, a research sample is determined by theoretical sampling 
strategy.  Theoretical sampling chooses samples, not based on statistical justification, but for 
theoretical reasons to replicate, expand, or confirm the emergent themes (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  
As such, research subjects were initially recruited utilizing the author’s personal and 
professional networks.  As data collection and analysis proceeded, the sample composition 
was continuously assessed while adding new recruits.  A snowball technique to source new 
interviewees nominated by earlier respondents generated additional subjects.  Recruiting 
efforts continued until no new thematic insights could be gained from the data, that is to say, 
theoretical saturation. 
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Thirty-one product engineers2 having from three to over 30 years of experience with 
an average of 17 comprised the final sample.  Recruitment criteria followed Schein's (1996) 
definition of "engineers"—that is, "designers of products and systems that have utility" 
(Schein, 1996, p. 14)—to seek “product engineers having ownership of design, application, 
integration, or manufacture of physical goods, software, or information technology (IT) 
architecture.”  Meeting these requirements, the respondents were typically “product,” 
“applications,” “systems,” “software,” or “manufacturing” engineers and managers.  They 
were also “information services” or “information technology” specialists and managers.  
They were, on the other hand, not “quality,” “reliability,” or “field service” engineers (or 
managers) since these professionals do not typically play a primary role in regards to 
designing or manufacturing a product.  Additionally, a two-year minimum work experience 
that included team-based problem solving was specified as participant criteria.  Table 1 
below summarizes the respondents’ basic demographic characteristics. 
Table 1  
Basic Demographic Characteristics 
Years of 
experience: 
2+ but less 
than 5 
5+ but less 
than 10 
10+ but less 
than 15 
15+ but less 
than 20 
20+ 
Men 2 1 6 8 10 
Women 0 0 1 2 1 
 
Twenty-seven men and four women with varying industry backgrounds participated 
in the study.  The small number of female respondents corresponds well with national 
statistics on women in the engineering professions (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009).  As the 
                                                 
2
 There were originally 32 interviewees.  Narratives provided by one of the interviewees, however, were out of 
scope and had to be dropped from analysis.  
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data in Table 1 demonstrate, a majority of the participants were in their mid- to late-career 
stages.   
All but one of the respondents held bachelor’s degrees, 16 had earned master’s 
degrees, and two were PhD’s.  Many had multiple industry, as well as product, experiences.  
In terms of the nature of product ownership, 24 had been engaged in design / application / 
system integration of physical goods, three in manufacturing, and the remaining four in IT 
architecture / infrastructure development.  Using the Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB)3 scheme developed by FTSE as a guide, the respondents’ current industry associations 
were classified into eight categories4 as follows:  
• Automotive & Parts (16 respondents) 
• Aerospace & Defense (3 respondents) 
• Software & Computer Services (3 respondents) 
• Other (one respondent each in Alternative Energy, Chemicals, Construction & 
Materials, Financial Services, and Household Goods & Home Construction) 
Twenty-seven respondents were currently employed full time.  The remaining four 
had either recently retired or were temporarily out of the workforce.  Finally, the majority of 
the recruits were U.S.-born (22 respondents) with the rest representing five countries of 
origin: Three from India, two each from Canada and China, and one each from Japan and 
Lebanon. 
Data collection.  The primary method of data collection was semi-structured 
interviews that lasted from 40 to 90 minutes with an average of 50 minutes.  The author 
                                                 
3
 Available at http://www.icbenchmark.com/ICBDocs/ICB_%20Product_Spec_Nov2011.pdf 
 
4
 Used ICB’s “sector” level classification, for example, “automotive & parts” is classified under sector code 
3350. 
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conducted all of these interviews between August 2009 and August 2010, either face-to-face 
or by telephone.  A total of 31 interviews5— face-to-face (14) and by telephone (17)—
constituted the first wave of data collection.  Subsequently, a follow-up interview had to be 
conducted on three interviewees to clarify a few points that surfaced during their earlier 
interviews.  These additional interviews were done by telephone.  All interviewees granted 
permission to digitally record their interviews, and a transcript was produced from each 
recording.  An interview protocol, developed in advance but adjusted as the research 
continued, guided the interview process.  On-going adjustments of the interview protocol are 
not only acceptable but are necessary in a theory-building qualitative study in order to 
effectively probe potential themes as they surface (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Appendix A presents 
the final interview protocol. 
Each interview began by asking the respondent’s personal and professional 
background including education, motivation for becoming an engineer / technical specialist, 
past and current roles in engineering, and other information such as hobbies that the 
interviewee cared to volunteer.  Following this introductory dialog, each interviewee was 
asked to recount an example of product-related problem solving that, from his or her 
perspective, was “very successful” and then to narrate a second, “less effective” case.  It was 
made very clear to each interviewee that he or she was free to define what constituted 
“effective” or “successful” problem solving.  All of the 31 engineers were able to provide a 
“successful” story each.  All but two were also able to come up with a “less successful” 
example, resulting in 29 samples.  The interviewees who had been able to recite both the 
successful and less successful examples were then asked to compare and contrast the two 
                                                 
5
 The number excludes one interview that was dropped from analysis due to the out-of-scope nature of narrated 
account.  
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cases.  The strategy of contrasting polar opposite cases to inform the emergent themes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) helped to understand “what is” and “what is not” a “successful” problem-
solving scenario.  Probes were used to elicit rich elaboration.   
Finally, the interviewee was asked to comment, in generalities, on what he or she 
thought might be the best ways to capture and share knowledge that engineers create every 
day.  This final part of the interview prompted further reactions and insights from the product 
engineers that chronicled real-world experiences outside the specific problem solving cases 
that they had narrated earlier.  They brought up examples of ways in which engineering 
knowledge could effectively be captured and disseminated in an organizational context, 
including “things gone right” and “things gone wrong” observed in their respective work 
experiences.  These additional stories not only confirmed the findings but enhanced the 
understanding of their inter-relationships, helping to facilitate the development of a new 
model of engineering knowledge creation dynamics.  The interview concluded with 
administration of a short survey to collect demographic data. 
Data analysis.  Data analysis began with the first interview and continued non-stop 
throughout data collection and beyond.  Each audio recording, as well as its transcript, was 
subjected to several rounds of review prior to a formal analysis.  Thereafter, every transcript 
was open coded.  All coding work, starting with open coding and ending with selective 
coding, was performed manually.  Memos and journals were kept throughout the study to 
track analysis.   
As already touched upon in Chapter 3, the purpose of open coding is to identify and 
document “codable moments” that potentially contain significant meaning underlying the 
observed phenomena.  Following the protocol of grounded theory, the analysis proceeded 
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with a conscientious effort to “avoid thinking about specific relationships between variables 
and theories as much as possible, especially at the outset of the process” (Eisenhardt, 1989b, 
p. 536).  A total of 2,675 textual fragments were identified from the 31 interviews, containing 
31 “successful” and 29 “less successful” problem solving narratives, and were subsequently 
categorized under 189 labels.  Just as the definition of “successful” versus “less successful” 
problem-solving effort was left up to each interviewee, no pre-set classification scheme was 
used for label assignment.  Rather, code clusters and labels were allowed to emerge from the 
data.  Thus, multiple indicators from multiple sources were generated, from which to search 
for patterns and build evidence.   
Subsequent to open coding, the “method of constant comparison” goes into full swing 
with the axial and selective coding procedures that follow.  In axial coding, the second 
analytic phase, interview narratives were actively paired and compared in an attempt to better 
understand the relationships among the code clusters.  Effort was made to determine the 
conditions, contexts, actions, interactions, and consequences of problem solving that hinted 
association among them.  The literature, at this time, was reintroduced into the process.  
Patterns and distinctions in the data started to emerge, enabling reduction of the 189 clusters 
to 51 labeled categories.  The search for cross-case patterns continued, with the aid of 
literature, as well as the field notes.  In the final analytic level, selective coding, the presence 
or absence of certain attributes in successful versus less successful problem solving 
endeavors further shaped the emerging themes.  Additionally, the respondents’ answers to the 
last interview question—about effective ways to capture and disseminate engineering 
knowledge—were analyzed and tied into the emerging themes.  The analysis continued until 
no new themes emerged, at which time the author and her advisors concurred that theoretical 
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saturation had long since been reached.  Inductively moving to and fro between the data and 
the literature until theoretical saturation, the analysis further collapsed the 51 code clusters to 
21, which led to three key findings as discussed next.  
Findings 
The data demonstrate stark differences between successful and less successful 
product-related problem solving efforts by engineers in U.S. firms.  The analysis points to 
external conditions that appear to influence the extent of product engineers’ success in 
facilitating root cause investigation.  Successful versus unsuccessful problem solving efforts 
also proceed and end differently in achieving (or not achieving) solution implementation.  
Perhaps the most intriguing finding is that the data portray product engineers as being not 
only technical investigators but also managers of relationships among stakeholders in 
facilitating the problem-solving process.  Their ability to effectively manage stakeholders’ 
viewpoints appears to be correlated with important outcomes such as system changes and 
knowledge distribution beyond the immediate workgroup.  These differences in the 
environmental conditions, outcomes, and processes of the problem solving are elaborated in 
the remainder of this section. 
Finding 1: environmental conditions.  In the research sample, product engineers 
portrayed environmental conditions differently in successful versus less successful problem 
solving narratives.  Five conditions from the textual analysis stood out.  Successful problem 
solving efforts (1) received a clear guiding vision from external leadership (2) were 
unconstrained, (3) were associated with controlled urgency, (4) had access to a right mix of 
resources, and (5) actively utilized an available framework for knowledge sharing.  Table 2 
below summarizes these findings.   
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Table 2  
Environmental Conditions in Successful versus Less Successful Problem-Solving Efforts 
 
Clear guiding 
vision 
Autonomy Controlled  
urgency 
Access to  
resources 
Framework  
for sharing 
Successful 31 of 31 29 of 31 31 of 31 31 of 31 26 of 31 
Less successful 0 of 29 0 of 29 0 of 29 1 of 29 1 of 29 
 
The figures in this table denote the number of narratives containing at least one cited 
instance of the corresponding condition.  There is a clear contrast between the successful and 
less successful narratives, which the remainder of this section elaborates further. 
Clarity of external leadership vision.  “External leadership,” in this study, refers to a 
source of direction or to the guiding force that is external to the work group engaged in 
solving the problem.  Depending on the nature of problem solving, the firm’s management or 
other constituents such as customers and suppliers played external leadership roles.  The 
analysis results show that external leaders are more likely to provide clarity of vision to team 
members in successful problem solving efforts than in unsuccessful efforts. 
All 31 of successful problem solving stories included descriptions of the positive 
impact of their leadership in effective resolution of the problem.  Instances of leadership 
influence included a “you shall solve this” decree by senior management, as well as 
descriptions of close status monitoring by members of management.  Many product 
engineers spoke of “a very strong management team” and “getting things resolved quickly by 
having our management’s support.”  In one story, a vice president cut his personal vacation 
short and showed up to the plant to attend to the problem solving effort.  One product 
engineer whose problem solving efforts encompassed several plant locations described his 
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experience as knowing that “whatever we came up with was going to be supported by the 
management team” not just at his facility but throughout the company.  In the instances of 
problem solving that was initiated by the customer, the “we are in this together” message 
conveyed from the customer side greatly facilitated the customer-supplier joint teamwork.  
In contrast, not only was a mention of clear leadership oversight or guiding vision 
absent in the 29 less successful problem-solving narratives, 27 of them explicitly cited 
instances that were contrary.  For example, “lack of firm leadership” caused “wheel 
spinning” or allowed “multiple competing interests” to prevail.  In a few cases, managers 
“scrapped” or “wrapped up” the problem solving effort without discovering root causes.  
Instances in which members of management were not entirely truthful—or in some cases 
ignorant—about the nature of the problem were also mentioned.  One product engineer 
described the firm’s management as being one that “minimized the value of its workforce.”  
Instances of customer-instigated problem solving degraded into a “bring-me-a-rock 
exercise”a metaphor used by one engineer to describe the “unclear” or “confusing” nature 
of the customer’s expectations. 
Autonomy.  Another pattern that was noted across narratives is the extent to which 
problem solving proceeds in an autonomous and unconstrained fashion.  The textual data 
draw a sharp distinction between successful and less successful stories in this regard.  
Twenty-nine of 31 successful problem solving examples were described as “open” and free 
from “outside influences that might have created road blocks.”  They involved “very open 
brainstorming,” “open and honest communication,” and “open-mindedness to new ideas” of 
stakeholders.  Product engineers had “authority to ask for help” and “direct control over 
design or process changes if needed.”  
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In contrast, none of the 29 less successful problem solving stories chronicled 
autonomous characteristics of the successful problem investigations.  In fact, 25 of them 
cited instances of having “limited choices” or “constraints” imposed on the team’s decision 
making.  For example, the existing contracts with their suppliers restricted options, 
culminating in “a deteriorating relationship” and eventually “resourcing the business to 
another company at a higher cost.”  Customers “forced” materials or designs that were not of 
the engineers’ first choices.  The management created one-sided directives that “were forced 
down on engineering’s throat.”  Politically-motivated agenda having “a lot of . . . hidden 
agendas, cross purposes, contrary goals and objectives” constrained the problem solving 
environment. 
Controlled urgency.  The third environmental factor is the degree to which a sense of 
urgency existed and the extent to which this urgency created a positive momentum.  
Successful problem-solving efforts tend to be characterized with a positive tension or a sense 
of urgency that is controlled, as opposed to inertia or chaos observed in less successful 
problem solving.     
All 31 successful problem solving stories were "rather hot" and “high-paced,” 
prompted by high pressure from the customer or management, safety-critical nature of the 
problem, or imminent deadlines for resolution imposed by the organizational process such as 
product development timelines.  The problem solving efforts were driven by “a controlled 
sense of urgency,” and this urgency was perceived as “exciting” by many engineers.  
In contrast, none of the 29 less successful narratives conveyed such a positive sense 
of urgency.  All of them were associated with helplessness arising from either very high 
tension or inertia due to organizational disinterest.  High-tension situations often degraded 
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into chaos—“getting a lot of help and advice from people you don't need,” “going into all 
kinds of escalation modes,” or “lots of emotions and stress and then . . . panicking.”  At the 
other end of the tension scale was a total lack of urgency.  Problem solving failed to gain 
momentum because “this is the way that we have always done it,” the problem “[had] a low 
occurrence rate,” or the problem was simply “not visible to the customer.”  “Lack of 
financial pressure” also failed to push for solutions. 
Resources.  “Resources” here refer to people with particular skill sets, reference 
materials, and facilities relevant for technical problem solving.  The extent to which they 
were accessible made a difference between successful and less successful problem-solving 
efforts.     
All 31 successful problem solving stories had instances in which the right mix of 
resources—for example, technical experts, technicians, laboratory equipment, and 
manufacturing lines—were provided internally by the firm or by the external stakeholders 
such as customers and suppliers.  Engineers reported success in “getting the right people 
involved at the right level quickly” to “put . . . some brainpower into coming to a solution.”  
They attributed success of their problem solving efforts to “a combination of all these people 
in addition to people who design tooling . . . who specify the metallurgy of the metal” 
because “it is always a team effort.”  The major success factor, to them, was that they “had . . 
. most of the needed expertise . . . were able to, at least, have access to the needed skills” 
when warranted.       
Contrarily, of the 29 less successful stories, only one described resources as being 
satisfactory.  Thirteen of them explicitly cited difficulty in accessing personnel and expertise 
due to a variety of organizational reasons.   Corporate restructuring, for instance, caused 
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“degradation of service” because “[w]hen you've cut back, [by] maybe 15 percent . . . that 
makes it difficult . . . to give you the luxury to look at things with a clean mind.”  Prompted 
by workforce reductions, “so many people had left . . . had taken a package and . . . left [so 
the right] people were not available.”  Getting “more supplier involvement” was difficult 
because suppliers “don't have the time” or “are not supportive.”  Across narratives, people 
who could have helped with the problem-solving efforts “were spread too thin in terms of 
this problem” or were “now on three continents and . . . didn't have enough resources to go 
around and . . . really get to the heart of understanding why it was happening.”  Sometimes, 
corporate politics put in place a wrong resource, such as a project lead who “wasn't an 
engineering person [and] didn't really . . . know” the problem.   
Framework for sharing.  The final environmental condition is the extent to which 
knowledge sharing activities were pursued during the course of problem solving.  Sharing 
mechanisms were described in a number of ways, such as corporate processes for 
engineering changes (e.g., drawing revisions), data bases, expert systems, structured or 
unstructured forums for meetings and presentations.  Successful versus less successful 
problem-solving narratives exhibited a distinct pattern around the extent to which a context 
for sharing existed and was used.   
In 26 of the 31 successful problem solving stories, interviewees reported that 
information or knowledge sharing was accomplished in many forms at many organizational 
levels.  They may be informal or formal, ad hoc or structured, and intra- or inter-group level.  
Engineers shared knowledge via existing organizational routines or forums, such as “weekly 
technology meetings.”  They also communicated information informally using "a person list” 
that pointed users to the right person for the information being sought.  Engineers reported 
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“communication among all levels” to take place frequently and actively “to just go over the 
current issues.”  Special trips to other company locations to present the problem solving 
outcomes were also cited.  Engineers went “to Mexico to present to the [customer’s] 
management . . . and distributed and shared with the people there [the entire presentation]” or 
traveled “a few times to Europe to share the methodology and the process.”  
Contrarily, in less successful problem solving stories, only one story reported sharing 
lessons by inter-company e-mail.  Twelve examples explicitly cited instances in which 
sharing information was difficult.  “Collaboration was difficult” because “their system for 
change control wasn't set up to be rapid enough to allow all engineers to understand what is 
going on.”  Structurally or politically induced mental walls also inhibited communication and 
created “layers” between stakeholders.  Engineers’ effort to “break down those walls and to 
drive communication” was “sometimes . . . successful sometimes it wasn’t” so “there were 
no daily meetings . . . little communication between the different groups . . . little pockets of 
people working but it was hard for them to interface with each other.”  In one instance, 
management was cited as having no interest in enhancing communication so “people didn’t 
even know how to use computers . . . [and] things weren’t shared very well.” 
Finding 2: how problem solving ends.  Problem solving in the research sample ends 
differently for successful and less successful stories.  The interviewees’ narratives illustrate a 
clear contrast between successful and unsuccessful efforts in the impact they had on the 
engineering practices.  These differences are manifested in problem solving outcomes that 
are associated with sustained learning and conclusions that truly “make sense.”   
Positive system changes.  Problem solving started because there was a deviation from 
the norm in some aspects of the product, which needed to be fixed.  The patterns that 
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emerged around the data demonstrate that successful problem solving is not only more likely 
to correct the problem but to take it to a higher level of understanding, which manifests itself 
in system changes.  
In the research sample, virtually all 31 successful problem solving efforts were 
associated with positive system changes.  The efforts not only corrected the immediate 
problems but profoundly affected the fundamental premises surrounding the product, 
reflected in such engineering artifacts as product design, manufacturing processes, and 
testing protocol.  Engineers said, “[N]ot only did we get [to] our root cause but we also built 
up a bigger picture of information about the product and the components and the process so 
that we understood the sensitivity to variation . . . [leading] into . . . application to other 
programs.”  The problem-solving teams “were able to come up with a solution that even 
better matched or optimized the customer’s experience than the initial part.”  They effected 
“some design changes to subsequent products that made the products . . . simpler . . . easier to 
verify, and more cost efficient.”  The improved product performance was often “even better 
than the conventional system . . . that surprised all the management team.”  Problem solving 
also resulted in “a good long-term learning that changed everything that we did,” such as 
changes in process parameters and supplier management protocols.   Root cause analyses 
“triggered a change to standard procedure” and often yielded “benchmark information [that 
got deployed] across platforms.”  Teams “got to put two different technologies together for 
the first time ever and . . . were able to sort out and standardize all of the investigative tools,” 
winning “a technology award over that.”  One of the reported outcomes of the investigation 
was the creation of a new engineering function to address “all the [system] interfaces and 
interactions [which] became a new business opportunity.” 
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Contrarily, none of the 29 unsuccessful problem solving narratives contain instances 
of such learning or system changes.  Product engineers explicitly reported that there wasn’t 
“anything [that was] really learned or changed” from their problem solving, nor were the 
stakeholders “any happier than before the project started.”  The problem “was never studied 
properly . . . never understood properly,” resulting in no “benchmark system or anything 
changed because of this.”  There were no lessons learned because “the original design group . 
. . seems to be still perpetuating some of these designs that are going to be too complex and 
require extraordinary control plans and are not really going to be that cost efficient.”  
Sense of closure.  Very much intertwined with the presence or absence of system 
changes is the extent to which the interviewees’ narratives conveyed a “sense of complete 
and satisfactory closure.”   In the research sample, successful problem solving is more likely 
to be associated with a strong sentiment that the outcomes that “make complete sense” have 
been achieved.  
All 31 successful problem solving stories ended with everything “falling into place” 
and “making sense.”  The entire experience was looked back upon as being “fulfilling,” 
“fascinating,” or “something that you felt you had really achieved something.”  None of the 
29 less successful stories, in contrast, conveyed a sense of satisfactory and convincing 
closure.  Instead, their endings were associated with unresolved questions, feelings of regret, 
and even downright frustration.  Figure 2 provides selected quotes from interviews in 
reference to the ways in which successful and less successful problem solving sagas ended.  
They illustrate typical responses from each of the two categories of problem solving.       
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Successful Problem Solving Less Successful Problem Solving 
“[The lessons learned are] still used as Gosh, 
this is a nice one, way to go!"  (Male, 15 – 20 
years experience) 
 
 
“[T]he entire team . . . and I still get good 
feedback from XX [even] now . . . and we 
learned from each other.”  (Male, 5 – 10 years 
experience) 
 
 
 
“[Y]ou clearly achieved the goal and you solved 
the problem and you fixed it and you moved 
forward, and everyone is high fiving and you 
move on.”  (Male, 20+ years experience) 
 
 
“[W]e fixed the problem and the customer was 
happy with it . . . and then we learned as a 
company . . . we as a company know now that 
we can inform our customer if we think this is a 
design concern.”  (Male, 10 – 15 years experience) 
 
“Finally . . . we fixed that problem, and since 
then, this part has run reasonably well . . . there 
was a series of mistakes [that] we had to go 
through in order to learn the right way . . . and 
to me, it exemplified everything about product 
development.” (Male, 10 – 5 years experience) 
 
“I felt that the conclusion reached was really 
not a good conclusion and the project was 
wrapped up as an illusion of success.”  (Male, 
5 – 10 years experience) 
 
“[Management] was not interested in solving 
problems so much. . . . I never really 
understood why they wouldn’t give [it], it 
wasn’t a whole lot . . . it was in the $100,000 
range.”  (Female, 20+ years experience) 
 
“[J]ust that we didn’t really close the 
[investigation] the way we wanted.  Right now 
we consider it closed but in my mind it’s, it’s 
not . . . we don’t really have a clear story 
[here].”  (Female, 15 – 20 years experience) 
 
“[T]hat really turned me off, it was like I don't 
even want to work on this anymore because I 
just spent three days going to XX and didn't, 
nothing good came of it . . . this might be a 
scam anyway.”  (Male, 15 – 20 years experience) 
 
“I was never satisfied with this, because they 
never fixed the manufacturing process.  . . . I 
wanted to go down there, I wanted to beat up 
the supplier that was shipping these . . . and I 
wanted to beat up the plant that wasn't using 
this packaging. The stuff that had to get fixed 
didn't.”  (Male, 20+ years and just retired) 
 
 
Figure 2. “Sense of closure” in successful versus less successful problem-solving efforts. 
  
 
Hence, at least in the research sample, successful and less successful problem solving 
efforts are distinct in the way they reach completion.  
Finding 3: how problem solving proceeds.  The final area of notable discovery is 
problem solving process.  Distinctive patterns in the way root cause investigations unfold 
emerged from the data.  Successful, more so than unsuccessful, problem solving is likely to 
be facilitated by a systematic and disciplined five-step process that culminates in knowledge 
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distribution.  Further, this process appears to correlate with the degree to which multiple 
stakeholders’ views and beliefs eventually converged.  This finding links relationship 
management aspects to the quality of problem-solving process, as elaborated further below.   
Rigorous five-step routines.  Problem investigation routines as described by 
engineers differ in analytic rigor between successful and less successful problem solving 
examples.  The greater richness of detail presented in successful root cause analysis 
dynamics brings out clearer images of the problem solving process transition.  Patterns in the 
data clustered around visibility of five phases in engineers’ narratives: (1) problem discovery 
/ communication; (2) problem investigation; (3) root cause discovery and identification of 
potential solutions; (4) selection and execution of the team solution—as opposed to measures 
dictated without the team’s buy-in; and (5) active attempts to communicate the lessons 
learned within, and often across, the immediate workgroups.  Table 3 contrasts the degree to 
which the five phases were chronicled in the engineers’ narratives between successful and 
unsuccessful examples.   
Table 3  
Five-Step Problem Resolution Process 
 
  
65
In all of the 31 successful examples, five elements of the problem solving routines are 
prominent in their narratives.  Although iterative, problem solving efforts pressed on to 
eventually clear these five stages one by one.  A narrative typically starts out with a detailed 
description of how a failure event set the problem solving in motion, for example, “This part 
failed,  which allowed this to go in, and this to go in, and all of a sudden that component, . . . 
caused the problem.”  Subsequently, the problem solving team “[was] meeting . . . at 6:30 or 
7:00 a.m. in the morning for several weeks to resolve the issue” and “would run through the 
list of issues . . . create a time [schedule] and the team would go out and investigate those 
and…would be responsible to come back and report . . . the status.”  The team “looked at the 
theory . . . went back to theory and then listed all the potential areas, which could provide this 
unexpected bad performance.”  Following that, the team “started attacking one by one and 
then basically identified the root cause.”  Once the team “had design solutions that [the team] 
thought might be good,” it “would then send those off for the analysis . . . that would 
evaluate them.”  The team discussed in terms of “what we can do in the short and long term 
and not getting . . . all sprung up [by] some feedback from executives.”  The team members 
were doing “a good job of hearing the feedback and not trying to rush in a solution . . . to 
really optimize this experience [by] taking an iterative approach.”  In the end, the team “did 
get to the root cause . . . defined it, came up with a way of making it better [and] documented 
it and carried the lesson learned by correcting the problem permanently by updating the 
standard.”  Often, the lesson “was communicated through meetings and . . . in our cross 
functional meeting within our engineering group or weekly or monthly meetings,” as well as 
“[in] a corporate-wide steering meeting where we were exchanging knowledge [with] the 
engineering centers around the world.” 
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In contrast, all 29 less successful narratives are missing one or more of these five 
elements.  In other words, none of the 29 stories are “complete” with all five.  Three of the 29 
examples did not get past the first phase “because the data was hard to get . . . it was kind of 
like a phantom,” correlating with general lack of interest in starting the investigation.  Eight 
of the 29 cases stopped after the second stage, that is to say, failing to find root causes, 
because the problem investigation was “closed” or “scrapped” before it had a chance to 
identify root causes.  Eleven of the 29 stories did not move past the third stage or had an 
“incomplete” fourth phase.  They reached the root cause but resulted in either no solution or 
“suboptimal” countermeasures.  They are sometimes a consequence of a deliberate attempt to 
hide a “failure” of investigation that disclosed flaws in the product design that could not be 
corrected before a “deadline” or until the current iteration of the program was over, spanning 
two or so years that the problem had gone uncorrected.  Six of the 29 examples were not able 
to go past the fourth phase.  The problem solving teams ultimately implemented optimal 
solutions, but the product engineers felt that the process was extremely “painful” and 
“resulted in no learning.”  No learning occurred because of “the politics of troubleshooting” 
which made the publicized solution “half true and . . . half lie” or “[the team] didn’t want to 
tell anyone that they had messed up . . . or to let the other part of the business know what 
happened because they didn’t want to admit a mistake . . . didn’t want to dwell on this as a 
learning point.”  Sometimes the learning was only “partial,” for example, “beyond some 
manufacturing learning, any learning on the design side in terms of how we are going to 
avoid this in subsequent products” was missing.  In one particular problem solving story, the 
engineer reported that the investigation found the root cause but could not proceed to 
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identification of solution; nevertheless, he transmitted his learning by company e-mail to 
another group within the firm engaged with development of a similar product.   
Cognitive convergence.  Finally, the last phenomenon that draws a distinct line 
between successful and less successful problem solving processes is the manner in which the 
actors’ multiple viewpoints and perspectives play out.  The extent to which these views 
converged, or stayed diverged, differentiate between successful versus less successful 
problem solving efforts.  Such cognitive convergence of stakeholder beliefs, at least in the 
research sample, is actively managed by product engineers and plays a key role in facilitating 
a successful resolution.   
In all 31 examples of successful problem solving, product engineers reported the 
ability to harness and leverage the cumulative input and knowledge of a wide variety of 
stakeholders (e.g., management, customers, suppliers, fellow engineers, etc).  Engineers 
made purposeful and proactive efforts to manage relationships among relevant stakeholders 
by getting them to “understand the scope of the problem . . . of the solution . . . of the 
changes” and by “having “everybody on the same page.”  Teams aimed to have “a 
partnership to fix the problem and not [to] lay blame here or there” and promoted “learning 
to develop confidence in each other.”  Several engineers stated that “the value of getting 
everybody together” was in itself worthwhile “learning” that came out of the problem solving 
because “if we had tried to do it in a small group or solve the issues with the two or three 
people that were directly involved, I don’t think we ever would have resolved it.”  This way, 
the experience can be taken “forward as part of being more effective team . . . in the future.”   
In 12 of the successful problem solving examples, convergence was reported to be 
swiftly accomplished as all stakeholders were “willing to work together . . . and established a 
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mission quickly.”  In the cases that involved the customers, “supplier-customer lines kind of 
disappeared . . . for a period” making it possible to have “a cross-functional in between the 
customer engineering team . . . and . . . ourselves.”  In the remaining 19 narratives, 
convergence was more protracted and difficult—but was ultimately achieved despite the 
relationships being “heated” or “tumultuous at the beginning”.  Engineers “went to 
manufacturing management and explained the importance of this DOE to resolve this issue in 
a timely manner and . . . got their acceptance.”  They “also went to the manufacturing floor” 
by themselves and “worked with . . . the operators . . . [and] explained the importance” so 
that the problem solving “got priority.”  They pulled together “a quality department, a 
vibration analysis department, a CAE and . . . PhD's and Fellows . . . [who] were knocking 
heads” to “bridge the difference between their theories.”  They had “to be very patient” at 
first so as not to “have people . . . build . . . walls against each other.”  Their suppliers “were 
very reluctant on providing anything,” but by forcing collaboration or by going “to their 
facility at night or on the weekend,” they “started having a team where [suppliers] were 
involved and where [the] customer was involved.”  Engineers and their immediate team 
members made a conscious effort to broadcast the “We are not here to lay blame, we are here 
to fix the problem” message “every time anyone tried to lay blame or point fingers.”  Once 
everyone agreed to “get past that,” personal interactions became more constructive to form “a 
very unique bonding experience,” “partnership,” and even a “symbiotic relationship.”  
When reporting less successful problem examples, however, the same engineers often 
referenced the disinterest or confusion of stakeholders about the problem and emphasized the 
difficulty of aligning their divergent viewpoints.  In 28 of the 29 less successful cases, 
convergence failed to occur.  The problem solving efforts were described as “definitely . . . 
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not a team atmosphere,” “all around a bad situation,” “one region telling another region how 
things should be,” and “lots of . . . blaming session.”  Inter-personal relationships tended to 
be “adversarial,” “strained,” or “almost hostile.”  “[A] little mistrust” between team members 
precluded “a complete agreement on when and where the problem happened, whether it was 
our problem or their problem” and “contributed to the friction” so the problem “wasn't really 
clearly owned.”  Stakeholders “didn't want to be doing what they were asked to do,” and 
“Engineering didn't want to open up the tolerances, manufacturing didn't want to live with 
the way the situation was, the parts supplier didn't want to change his process.”  Some 
problems had a high enough visibility that involved “a lot higher management from multiple 
groups,” ending up with “like three different vice presidents basically telling me what to do” 
yet their views “don't line up.”  Often times “emotions got in the way and halted addressing 
the problem,” and the problem solving “became an emotional issue.”  Because “people gave 
up” trying to synchronize their viewpoints, the problem “became a political and emotional 
problem . . . and personal battle between people involved.”  Unable to cope with a cacophony 
of having “lots of different people involved,” the team “ultimately . . . scrapped [its effort] 
instead of solving the problem . . . just eliminated, changed the design, changed the whole 
process to a different process.” 
Summary of findings.  Summing up, the three major findings from the data analysis 
paint distinct images of successful and less successful problem solving dynamics.  The 
discussion section that follows analyzes these observations in depth and proposes a new 
concept that integrates them into an elaborated model of EPS dynamics.   
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Discussion 
Hence, the data demonstrated stark contrast between successful and less successful 
problem-solving efforts—both in terms of their associated environment and the manners in 
which they proceed and end.  The analysis has also pointed to a mediating force that brings 
all stakeholders’ interpretations together to form a unified understanding.  These findings 
have been interpreted using four strands of research in the literature: (1) absorptive capacity 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) as a dynamic capability in the firm (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000), (2) Nonaka’s (1994) organizational knowledge creation theory, (3) enactment 
perspective on organizational sensemaking (Weick, 1979, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005), and (4) the concept of ba (Itami, 2010a, 2010b; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 
2000; Yamaguchi, 2006).  The remainder of this section discusses the findings through the 
lenses of these theories.  The goal is to complete the conceptual framework laid out at the 
onset of the study, that is, EPS team as an epistemic group embarked on a unique learning 
journey.  The resulting conceptual model and propositions will be presented at the conclusion 
of this section. 
External conditions.  The differences between the successful and less successful 
problem solving stories in the research sample clustered around five external conditions: 
clarity of leadership vision, autonomy, controlled urgency, resources, and framework for 
sharing.  These organizational factors strike a chord with Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) five 
enablers that sustain innovation, as well as the five characteristics of Weick and Sutcliffe’s 
(2007) organizational resilience that avert crises.  These attributes are conditions that 
enhance the social and cognitive processes of the actors in their intended missions, be they 
new product development or risk management.  
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Leadership vision and trust.  Effectively communicated leadership vision provides 
goal clarification, guiding principles, and commitment to seeing that the problem is solved—
a necessary condition for setting root cause investigation in motion.  Leadership wisdom that 
guides learning with clear purpose is particularly important for learning from failure (Bierly, 
Kessler, & Christensen, 2000; Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Carroll & Edmondson, 2002) and is 
a foundation of organizational mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) that makes enterprises 
more resilient against crises.  Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) underscore the significance of 
direction setting through intention, one of the five enablers in their original knowledge-
creation concept.  Intention is tied to corporate vision and ultimately provides the yardstick 
with which to measure the knowledge output, in other words, a justification mechanism.  In a 
more recent work, Nonaka and colleagues (2000) augment the notion of intention with two 
additional concepts: (1) knowledge vision and (2) love, care, trust, and commitment fostered 
by leaders.  They argue that knowledge vision cannot be sustained without trust since  
“[personal] knowledge needs to be shared [emphasis added] to be . . . exploited [so] it is 
important for leaders to cultivate commitment amongst organisation members to motivate the 
sharing . . . based on the knowledge vision” (Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 28).  Factors akin to 
intention / vision and trust are, therefore, proposed as two ingredients of EPS environment 
that propel effective problem solving. 
Autonomy.  Successful problem solving in the research sample is closely associated 
with unconstrained environment, free from “political motives, hidden agendas, cross 
purposes, contrary goals, and contrary objectives.”  This finding is not too surprising since an 
underspecified organizational structure is known to promote flexibility of action (Barrett, 
1998; Dodgson, 1993; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006), facilitates rapid information flow (Nonaka, 
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1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), and more ably accommodates “shifts of beliefs and 
actions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 805).  Further, virtually all successful problem solving 
examples involved self-organizing or cross-functional work groups (of varying sizes), which 
is exemplary of Nonaka’s autonomy concept (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  As Grant (1996, 
p. 384) argues, “cross-functional product development teams . . . achieve better integration 
across broad spectra of specialized knowledge.”  In the same vein, deference to expertise that 
entrusts decision making to experts rather than to authority is an essential element of a 
resilient organization (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Autonomy, thus, is also proposed to be an 
essential element of effective EPS dynamics.  
Controlled urgency.  Engineers in successful problem solving, in the research 
sample, operated in a state of controlled urgency.  This condition is very similar to Nonaka 
and Takeuchi’s (1995) creative chaos condition, which treads a fine line between “order” and 
“fluctuation.”  Thoughtfully induced, creative chaos can trigger self-reflection and impetus 
for challenging the status quo, in the same way a purposefully constructed system such as 
Toyota’s lean production environment can produce creative tension (Senge, 2006; Womack, 
Jones, & Roos, 1990).  Such a deliberately introduced state of “tension between constancy 
and change” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 805) can also raise the quality of organizational attention 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) and enable “heightened sense of awareness”—analogous to the 
pre-occupation with failure characteristic engendered by resilient organizations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  For the EPS concept, a well-controlled sense of urgency is proposed as 
necessary for facilitating effective root cause analysis that leads to meaningful outcomes.  
Requisite variety.  Absorptive capacity, a firm's ability to deftly leverage new 
information to build competitiveness, is supported by the “interactions across individuals 
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who each possess diverse and different knowledge structures [emphasis added] that will 
augment the organization’s capacity for making novel linkages and associations . . . beyond 
what any one individual can achieve” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 133).  This argument 
denotes requisite variety, precisely the reason that access to a variety of knowledge sets made 
a difference in the outcomes of problem solving exercises in the research sample.  Successful 
engineering problem solving efforts were greatly enhanced by leveraging an appropriate mix 
of technical skill sets to cope with the complexity of problems, just as requisite variety helps 
organizations cope with the complexity of their environment by enabling a broader repertoire 
of responses (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Weick, 1979).  Requisite variety also reflects the 
essence of the reluctance to simplify principle in Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) organizational 
resilience.  In this context, requisite variety is key to safeguarding the organization against 
deviation amplification (Weick, 1979), a vicious causal loop that can mask critical variations 
occurring in the environment.  Failure to detect them can lead to oversimplification of a 
situation that warrants high attention (Weick, 1988).  An environment endowed with 
appreciation for and supply of relevant expertise and resources, or requisite variety, is 
proposed as another key enabler of effective EPS. 
Knowledge redundancy.  The “path dependency” implied in the concept of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) is the reason that firms, each having a distinct 
mix of resources, come to demonstrate equally superior performance in the markets, i.e., 
“best practices” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  The interviewees’ narratives illuminated many 
“pathways” through which the knowledge possessed by the stakeholders was leveraged to 
achieve EPS goals.  In problem solving, the individual knowledge has to, first, be shared and 
formulated into a collective capability that takes the team from “zero-level” to a “higher-
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order” change (Winter, 2003).  In the EPS narratives, various information sharing vehicles 
were used throughout the root cause investigation to “assemble and fuse” participants’ 
understanding, gradually moving towards a solution.  The discussion forums, special 
meetings, and information technology networks chronicled by the engineers helped create 
“overlap” of knowledge, a redundancy condition that “connects individuals and the 
organization through information, which converges rather than diffuses” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 
29).   Likewise, from the perspective of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) organizational 
resilience, sensitivity to operations creates a structure of “interconnections” among actions 
and “relations and networks [that] determine outcomes” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006, p. 285).  
Such a web of inter-relations in turn facilitates tapping into tacit knowledge, which can then 
be dynamically integrated into new capabilities (Grant, 1996).  Lacking such a mechanism, 
the product engineers in unsuccessful problem solving were unable to comprehend how 
product-related changes would affect others in the organization and could not reach an 
optimal solution.  A contextual setting that creates redundancy of knowledge is proposed to 
enhance EPS effectiveness. 
Problem-solving process and outcomes.  In the research sample, successful problem 
solving efforts featured a systematic and rigorous process leading to fundamental changes in 
the way the product was developed, tested, or manufactured.  These changes not only 
corrected the immediate problem but all took the existing premises to new levels—such as 
revised standards, processes, new technologies, and new business functions.  This entire 
process is essentially double-loop learning in action (Argyris, 1976; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Slater & Narver, 1995), the only means by which problem solving can result in sustained 
learning (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003).  By positioning EPS as a capability-based practice, 
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the analysis conceptualizes the double-loop learning dynamics observed in the research data 
as a set of routines that augment this capability to drive the problem-solving process.   
Building EPS capabilities.  One of the interesting discoveries noted in less successful 
EPS examples is the way resources and framework for sharing are portrayed.  As already 
discussed, 13 engineers expressed frustration about the lack of resources, and 12 recounted 
instances of limited information sharing in their narratives.  About half of the interviewees 
were silent on both.  When probed, however, these silent engineers did verify the existence 
of relevant expertise and skill sets, as well as information sharing mechanisms such as 
intranet-based change management and knowledge repository systems, in their respective 
problem solving contexts.  This intriguing aspect adds an insightful dimension into the EPS, 
especially with respect to its process dynamics.   
Having formal processes and organizational artifacts such as intranet sites and special 
meetings is one thing.  What matters, as Senge (2006, p. 321) argues, is “what happens 
[emphasis added] when people use the artifacts or processes or participate in the meetings.”  
The concept of absorptive capacity clearly distinguishes between a firm’s resources and what 
they may do for the organization.  From a system perspective, absorptive capacity as 
dynamic capabilities—the firm’s ability to build competence over time in order to 
dynamically respond to its changing environment (Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2009)—
restructures the traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm to include an 
intermediary force that mobilizes the firm’s resources to realize a desired performance 
(Grant, 1996; Verona, 1999).  Applying this framework to organizational learning, it 
becomes clear that it is the “integration” of knowledge—rather than the knowledge itself—
that is relevant for building a competitive resource base (Grant, 1996).  Absorptive capacity 
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is, thus, one way to explain the EPS system dynamics that facilitate successful attainment of 
project objectives by the organizational agents, who are the lead engineers in the stories. 
Zahra and George (Zahra & George, 2002, p. 186) define absorptive capacity as “a 
set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform, 
and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability.”  Lichtenthaler 
(2009) has expanded on this concept and modeled absorptive capacity as a higher-order 
construct that accounts for three lower-order constructs representing various modes of 
learning.  Just as learning is about action (Senge, 2006), capabilities are built through active 
routines (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).   In this framework, routines refer not to “what” the 
organization’s formal processes and procedures are but rather to “behavior that is learned, 
highly patterned, repetitious . . . founded in part in tacit knowledge—and the specificity of 
objectives” (Winter, 2003, p. 991).  Extending this argument to the EPS context, it is not 
“which” structured problem solving methodology the engineers followed that matters.  
Rather, it is "the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, and cultures" (Levitt & 
March, 1988, p. 320) that drove their problem solving that is crucial in understanding the 
EPS dynamics.   
Broadly framed, an absorptive capacity model has organizational antecedents, process 
dimensions, and outcomes (Volberda et al., 2009).  McEvily and Marcus’s (2005) study, for 
example, explores the mediating influence of customer-supplier joint problem solving on the 
relationship between two organizational antecedents and attainment of new capabilities.  
Their findings show that the two antecedents, “information sharing” and “trust,” do not fully 
explain the extent to which new capabilities result from the customer-supplier business 
relationship.  Rather, these conditions serve as precursors to the joint problem solving, which 
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in turn directly leads to new capability acquisition.  Hence, their findings highlight the 
prominence of shared routines as the driving mechanism for building capabilities.  Drawing 
on these previous works in literature, EPS routines that build the capability to realize a 
superior EPS performance are modeled as follows.  
EPS routines from a cognitive perspective.  As touched upon earlier in Chapter 2, 
problem solving from a cognitive perspective may be framed as an endeavor to confront and 
resolve uncertainty (Corti & Storto, 2000).  Ideally, therefore, EPS should proceed as the 
players’ cognitive state moves progressively from fuzzy to less fuzzy, and eventually to 
"completely understood"—if the root cause analysis is successful.  The enactment 
perspective of organizational sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005) helps explain the process by 
which organizational actors infuse clarity into the system to make it less ambiguous. 
Pointing to the relational nature of our physical world, Goldman (2004) argues that 
the seats of societal forces are found in the networks of clustered relationships.  By 
extension, organizations may be viewed as a “reality” created through the actions resulting 
from these relationships, that is to say, enactment perspective (Orr, 1998; Senge, 2006; 
Weick, 1979).  In Weick’s (1979) view, an organization is more than just the structural 
hierarchy depicted in its organizational chart but is fundamentally a network of relationships 
and interactions.  Such a network is a “system,” enacted by the organizational actors over 
time.  Their enactment routines are essentially sensemaking, a form of information 
processing to deal with “equivocality” of the system “input” in an attempt to reach or 
maintain a state that “makes sense” to them (Weick et al., 2005).  
Weick and colleagues (2005) propose a three-step model of organized sensemaking, 
the “ESR sequence.”  The three steps—enactment, selection, and retention (ESR)—together 
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constitute an iterative process in which the organizational actors perceive stimulus from 
outside (enactment), give it a meaning (selection), and ultimately decide on its final 
interpretation (retention).  Figure 3 illustrates this concept. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ESR Sequence.   
Weick’s ESR sequence adapted from “Organizing and process of sensemaking” by K. E. 
Weick, K. M. Sutcliffe, and D. Obstfeld, 2005, Organization Science, 16(4), p. 414.  
Copyright 2005 by Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld. 
 
 
Engineering problem solving may be seen as a form of organized sensemaking.  Orr 
(1998, 2006) argues that sensemaking occurs by default in any work situation because of 
cognitive and temporal gaps that exist between the current and previously worked problems, 
necessitating some amount of improvisation before the operator can apply a set of 
prescriptive instructions.  In engineering, for example, completely duplicative contexts going 
from project to project are rare.  As a result, engineers “solve problems by remembering 
similar cases and applying the lessons learned from those cases to the new one” (Jonassen, 
Strobel, & Lee, 2006, p. 140).  In other words, engineers are having to deal with, not only the 
temporal distance between projects, but also the cognitive distance between their mental 
models and those of the original product designers.  Seen from the vantage of enacted 
sensemaking, EPS can be conceptualized to start when the engineering team first organizes to 
“make sense” of the product failure, the enactment step.  The actors’ cognitive gap between 
the ideal and actual states of their product creates equivocality in their world.  Root cause 
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investigation that ensues parallels the next ESR phase, selection, in which the “bracketed” 
data go through additional filtering to “extract a meaning” (Weick, 1979; Weick et al., 2005).  
As conceptualized in the ESR framework, selection is the most intense part of sensemaking 
routine (Weick, 1979; Weick et al., 2005) as witnessed in the successful EPS processes that 
“looked at the theory . . . went back to theory and then listed all the potential areas . . . 
attacking one by one and then basically identified the root cause.”  Finally, the “happy 
ending” accomplished by successful problem solving efforts mirrors the last stage of ESR, 
retention, which delivers a new vision that is “worth keeping” (Weick, 1979).  Thus, product 
engineers organized to “make sense of equivocal inputs and enact this sense back into the 
world to make that world more orderly” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 410).  Their success depended 
on the quality of their sensemaking.   
Sensemaking can be ineffective.  It can also collapse completely when equivocality of 
inputs is high and the social structure weak (Weick, 1993).  Unsuccessful problem solving 
stories in the research sample basically chronicle examples of unproductive sensemaking.  
Many exhibit characteristics of deviation amplification loop (Weick, 1979), as well as of 
collapsed sensemaking, as exemplified by the following quote: 
[A]ll hell breaks loose. Nothing works as expected.  Everybody points . . . 
doing this [gestures finger-pointing] . . . so you have confusion on the part of 
manufacturing engineering, product engineering . . . and, many different 
managerial levels.  [One manager says] “This is my focus.”  But then, 
[another] says, “No, no, here, I want you to do this.”  And, another one says, 
“I want you to do that.”  And, another one. . . . This is how your small, finite, 
well-established project is getting bigger and bigger and bigger.  And, you 
wind up with something that you can’t do.  (Engineer with 15 – 20 years 
experience) 
 
Hence, ineffective EPS routines are akin to ineffective sensemaking, which fails to 
bring clarity into the picture.  Consequently, the system stays fuzzy indefinitely. 
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EPS routines from an epistemic perspective.  As already touched upon in Chapter 2, 
problem solving may also be viewed as a knowledge state transition from tacit to explicit 
(Corti & Storto, 2000).  Confronting the unknown, the problem solving team would be less 
inclined to formalize its knowledge until further clarity is gained.  In EPS, once the root 
cause is found and solution identified, that knowledge is implemented through hardware, 
software, or both.  Because “an organization’s absorptive capacity is not resident in any 
single individual but depends on the links across a mosaic of individual capabilities” (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990, p. 133), the seeds of success in resolving product problems reside in the 
engineers’ and their support personnel’s tacit knowledge, which must be fully leveraged.  To 
better understand the epistemic aspects of EPS routines, the analysis now turns to Nonaka 
and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge-creation model.  Figure 4, adapted from Nonaka’s and 
Takeuchi’s (1995) work, depicts their five-phase model of knowledge creation. 
 
Figure 4. Nonaka’s & Takeuchi’s five-phase model of organizational knowledge creation. 
Adapted from The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the 
Dynamics of Innovation (p. 84) by I. Nonaka and H. Takeuchi, 1995, New York: NY: Oxford 
University Press.  Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press. 
 
 
The model proposes that innovation develops through five epistemic phases: sharing 
tacit knowledge, creating concepts, justifying concepts, building an archetype, and, cross-
leveling knowledge.  In a nutshell, the model depicts creation of new knowledge as a 
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progression of informal knowledge exchange developing into a final product deployed 
through the system.  Supporting these five milestones is the socialization-externalization-
combination-internalization—or “SECI”—process that explains modes of knowledge 
conversion (Nonaka et al., 2000; Nonaka, von Krogh, & Voelpel, 2006).  Socialization 
stimulates sharing of tacit knowledge.  Externalization takes the shared individual 
knowledge and translates it into visible concepts so they can be validated through the 
organization’s justification mechanisms.  Combination provides the force necessary to 
aggregate justified concepts to build a final archetype.  Finally, system-wide deployment of 
archetype design and specifications cross-levels everyone’s knowledge about the new 
product, that is, internalization, thus readying the system for the next cycle of knowledge 
creation.  In the “unified model of dynamic knowledge creation” proposed by Nonaka and 
colleagues (2000), SECI is the fundamental routines that tap into individuals’ tacit 
knowledge and augment it to a higher ontological level, that is to say completely codified and 
shared organization wide.  Further, the process is conceptualized as iterative and spiral, not 
purely sequential or linear (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et al., 2000).  
Analogous to this five-phase concept, commonly used methods of technical problem 
solving tend to feature five stages: (1) problem definition, (2) problem analysis, (3) 
generation and selection of solutions, (4) testing and evaluation of solutions, and (5) 
routinization (MacDuffie, 1997).  Widely used structured problem-solving protocols—for 
example, 8D, Five Why’s, Kepner-Tregoe, or Six Sigma—all prescribe steps that reflect this 
philosophy (Smith, 1998).  Put into the perspective of knowledge state transition, as already 
explored in Chapter 2, a successful root cause analysis is one in which individual knowledge 
is leveraged and amalgamated into workable solutions, which are implemented across board 
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to effect system changes.  In the research sample, 8D, Kepner-Tregoe, Six Sigma, and other 
prescriptive methodologies appear, at comparable frequency, in both the “successful” and 
“less successful” narratives.  Thus, the presence of such tools is likely to be providing no 
more than a guiding framework that helps establish a structure for the group activities.   
Successful engineering problem solving stories as recounted by the product engineers 
have a striking similarity to Nonaka’s five-phase model shown above.  The process began 
with the problem communication phase, during which team members exchanged “what they 
knew” about the problem.  Once the initial dialog had taken place, three stages followed: (1) 
establishment of a hypothesis about the problem (or root cause or potential solution 
depending on the stage of problem solving), (2) testing of each hypothesis, and (3) selection 
and execution of the final solution.  Finally, the new learning gained from the problem 
solving culminated in changes in the system.  Further, the process was described as a 
dynamic and continuous sequence of activities that often included reverting back to the 
drawing board to re-examine the assumptions that the team made on problem definition, root 
causes, and potential solutions.  Based on these findings, the visibility of five phases in the 
successful problem solving protocols may be evidence that a set of routines akin to the SECI 
process was at play. 
Dynamic capabilities are about adapting to changing circumstances and so imply 
routines that are “iterative and cognitively mindful, not linear and mindless” pointing to “a 
richer conception of routines that goes beyond the usual view of efficient and robust 
processes” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1117).  It is in this spirit that the ESR sequence 
(Weick et al., 2005) and SECI process (Nonaka et al., 2000) are synthesized to explain the 
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cognitive and epistemic dynamics of EPS that transition the system state from fuzzy to clear, 
from tacit to explicit.  Figure 5 is a pictorial representation of this concept. 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual image of EPS as a synthesis of ESR and knowledge-creation routines. 
 
Based on the study findings, the EPS routines are conceptualized to be of similar 
“algorithms” to those of SECI, necessary for bringing sensemaking and knowledge creation 
to fruition.  The next and final section of this chapter will explore one more element of the 
EPS capability that completes the theoretical framework.   
Cognitive convergence and engineering epistemology.  There now remains one 
other characteristic of EPS needing explanation that the study has highlighted: cognitive 
convergence.  As touched upon earlier, in the research sample, successful problem solving 
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efforts are distinguished from less successful ones by the higher frequency of cognitive 
synchronization.  This is not too surprising as shared beliefs have been reported to positively 
influence group performance in previous empirical studies (e.g., Baba, Gluesing, Ratner, & 
Wagner, 2004; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; MacDuffie, 1997).  Further, Baba et al.’s 
(2004) longitudinal case study of global work groups reports that shared cognition is likely to 
be achieved through two parallel paths: a straight convergence of multiple perspectives and 
initial divergence that is subsequently overcome.  This dual-path convergence was also 
observed in the study.  What is surprising, however, is that the product engineers in the 
narratives are found operating almost as “agents” of diverse interest groups (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Hill & Jones, 1992), actively working to establish common ground among various 
stakeholders through technical discourse (Suchman, Blomberg, Orr, & Trigg, 1999).  To 
better comprehend this somewhat unconventional image of “engineers,” the process by 
which “shared cognition” is achieved is examined in detail.  The concept of ba as a vehicle 
for creating contextual factors that can induce shared cognition is then discussed.  Finally, all 
of the findings are brought together to form a conceptual model of EPS dynamics. 
Ways of knowing and shared cognition.  EPS state transition has, thus far, been 
conceptualized from two perspectives: cognitive and epistemic.  In the former, the system 
makes a transition from fuzzy to crisp; in the latter, from tacit to explicit.  Similarly, EPS 
may also be viewed from a “behavioral” perspective, conceptualizing the process as 
facilitating a transition from individual and local focus to collective and organization-wide 
aims.  In fact, as already explored, the relevant knowledge generated during the problem 
investigation must eventually be translated into standardized routines in order for a system 
change to occur.  Such standardization by way of improved design or manufacturing 
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processes helps prevent recurrence of defects (MacDuffie, 1997).  Collective learning is 
achieved through social interactions among individuals contributing their tacit knowledge, 
so, by extension, the manner in which EPS players socialize deeply affects the quality of EPS 
output.  Socialization greatly influences the cognitive characters of participating individuals 
(Corti & Storto, 2000) and ways in which their “knowing” occurs.  An ancient sage’s view of 
human “knowledge” may be helpful here to better understand this process. 
Aristotle (trans. 1934) divides knowledge into several dimensions, three of which are  
episteme, techné, and phronesis, that continue to serve as useful points of reference for 
modern scholars of organizational studies (e.g., Baba et al., 2004; Grint, 2007).  In technical 
problem solving, episteme and techné are analogous to theories (“declarative knowledge”) 
and practical know-how (“procedural knowledge”), respectively.  Both are essential in 
problem solving.  Episteme leads to “knowing what” to do in order to find solutions, and 
techné directs “how” to do it.  The two types of knowledge, therefore, provide “means” and 
“ends.”  The means and ends, however, must be “justified.” In problem solving, specifically, 
why certain methods are chosen and to what extent resulting outcomes are accepted in each 
step are judged using a set of evaluative guidelines.  This evaluative guidance, or a capability 
to “know whether” to take certain actions, is a result of the third dimension of knowledge, 
phronesis.  Often translated as “practical wisdom” or “prudence” (Aristotle, trans. 1934),  
phronesis provides the “evaluative knowledge” that completes the triad of “ways of 
knowing”—significant yet often lacking in organizational discourse (Baba et al., 2004; Grint, 
2007).     
Phronesis stands on both episteme and techné, encompassing the characteristics of 
both (Grint, 2007).  Phronesis evokes the intellectual power of episteme, not in abstraction 
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but in context as is techné (Grint, 2007).  On an individual basis, phronesis may be equated 
to Senge’s (2006, p. 131) “personal mastery” that “goes beyond competence and skills, 
though it is grounded in competence and skills” akin to the artistry demonstrated by 
champion ice skaters and prima ballerinas.  In organized activities such as EPS, however, 
phronesis becomes more of a “collective discipline” (Senge, 2006).  It is the phronesis 
dimension of knowledge that guides the EPS team’s course of action—whether or not to 
acquire more information when problem description is vague, to try a different technique 
when the initial diagnostics fail, or to pursue one solution over others.  While Aristotle makes 
it clear that all three types of knowledge are critical for one’s intellectual virtues, it is 
phronesis that provides a reservoir of interpretive power that delivers the most appropriate 
and reasonable judgment in a given context.     
It is through collective phronesis, the process of amassing various interpretive 
schemes and unifying them into the best fitting solution to the given situation, that an EPS 
project is brought to a closure that “makes good sense” to all that are involved.  As Hargadon 
and Bechky (2006, p. 484) argue, “In today’s rapidly changing environments, the complexity 
of problems requires solutions that combine the knowledge, efforts, and abilities of people 
with diverse perspective[s].”  In modern engineering, indeed, complexity is the norm rather 
than the exception.  The quote below succinctly illustrates this point, in the context of noise-
vibration-harshness (NVH) problem solving for an automotive powertrain system: 
I forced a collaboration because, originally, I would have had to accept one [view] 
and reject the other. . . . [H]ow could two people get a PhD and one be very wrong 
and one be very right?  So, I think there was more of a misunderstanding. . . . 
[Through] collaboration . . . I was able to use brainpower from a wide range of 
intelligence. . . .  [E]verybody brought a lot to the table, so I learned a lot . . . that 
would have been missing if I handled it alone or only chose one side.  And once they 
got beyond the conflict stage, they were actually more than willing, I got a lot of 
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firepower from departments that weren't even on my budget that might not have been 
available to me [had I chosen sides].  (Engineer, 20+ years experience) 
 
This example is a clear case of cognitive convergence after a protracted period of 
divergence.  The lead engineer who provided this quote had to exert a considerable effort to 
get his team members, all of whom had come with years of NVH experience yet with 
divergent opinions, to view the problem in what he referred to as the “same boundary 
conditions.”  His team was an assemblage of high-powered episteme and techné (PhDs and 
highly experienced engineers), but these knowledge holders were initially viewing the 
problem from disparate angles based on their respective past experiences with NVH.  Finally, 
with the lead engineer’s persistent effort, every member of the team concurred that the culprit 
of their NVH problem was not one particular component—as originally presumed to be—but 
the interactions of several within the assembly.  The team, from that moment on, proceeded 
to correct the problem and develop award-winning technologies to design and test future 
similar assemblies. 
Huber (1991, p. 102) proposes that “more learning has occurred when more of the 
organization’s units understand the nature of the various interpretations held by other 
units”— which is essentially what was observed in the study.  Engineering is a highly 
context-sensitive discipline (Goldman, 2004), and so by its nature interpretations are about 
everything.  Getting together a group of experts to solve a problem is one thing.  Their views, 
however, must be aligned with the context in which the product is applied, used, and 
interpreted.  Goldman (2004, p. 163) argues, “Engineering is contingent, constrained by 
dictated value judgments and highly particular.  Its problem solutions are context sensitive, 
pluralistic, subject to uncertainty, subject to change over time and action directed.”  
Engineering practice, from the epistemological perspective, is essentially about developing 
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useful interpretive schemes, a form of collective wisdom.  Engineering value judgment, 
which is the phronesis of EPS, cannot be reduced or abstracted into a set of prescriptive 
problem-solving routines (Grint, 2007).  This concept is proposed as being vital to cognitive 
convergence in EPS. 
Shared cognition in contexts.  EPS environment is a socio-technical system, so the 
quality of engineering knowledge creation depends heavily on the social interactions that 
take place within an engineering cultural milieu (Corti & Storto, 2000; Dodgson, 1993; 
Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Simon, 1991).  Just as learning “does not mean 
acquiring more information, but expanding the ability to produce the results we truly want in 
life” (Senge, 2006, p. 132), a single unified phronesis (Baba et al., 2004) is not likely to be 
achieved solely with logistic or infrastructural considerations (e.g., special meeting rooms, 
conferencing technology, information system database, etc.).   
In stark contrast to the brilliant success of the NVH example was a case involving an 
automotive sealant.  In this story, the sealant’s odor became a point of dispute between the 
American members and their European counterparts on the team.  The former found the 
smell objectionable, but the latter did not agree and resisted replacement.  Unable to unify the 
stakeholders’ divergent viewpoints on the disposition of the sealant, the team gave up its 
autonomy and relegated the decision to the senior management.  What this example 
demonstrates is a shift in the meaning of an artifact in the context that is not fully shared by 
all stakeholders.  In other words, a substance perceived as bad smelling by one group is 
accepted without objection by another, a re-contextualization process (Brannen, 2004).  
Human rationality is bounded by one’s cognitive limits (Simon, 1991), and the resulting 
sensemaking is likely to stay within organizational members’ perceived boundaries unless 
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deliberate measures are taken to expand their mental horizons (Leveson, 2011; Senge, 
2006).  Whereas in the NVH case the actors were eventually able to put their respective 
knowledge and experience into a single, unified context and jointly made sense of the 
problem, this sealant example was somehow lacking impetus to bring together everyone’s 
interpretive schema.  Akin to a host of environmental measures that designers of an 
embedded control system implement to protect the health of its controller, an appropriate 
sense-making “forum” where the problem could be better understood and opposing 
viewpoints worked out should have existed but did not.     
Shared cognition, especially in dynamically shifting and contingency-ridden world of 
engineering, is more than just an exchange of theoretical (episteme) or practical (techné) 
knowledge.  It is about collectively developing a higher interpretation, the phronesis way of 
knowing.  Such “wisdom” to prudently combine “insights from theories and research that 
draw upon diverse premises” (Nonaka et al., 2006, p. 1196), however, does not develop 
overnight.  As Baba et al. (2004, p. 583) argue, achieving a shared cognition is a rather 
lengthy process of “suspending our own judgment as we learn the cultural logic and 
rationality of others’ divergent beliefs and values, while also allowing those others to call our 
own beliefs and values into question as they learn about us.”   
Shared experiential space.  While sensemaking is improvisational, it can also have 
elements of “coordination” in the same way that “[t]he championship sports team and great 
jazz ensembles provide metaphors for acting in spontaneous yet coordinated ways” (Senge, 
2006, p. 219).  A problem-solving framework can be “engineered” to promote healthy and 
constructive interactions among stakeholders.  Such a context is one that all players trust 
each other to work together in ways that complement each other’s contribution, a place of 
  
90
“collective discipline” (Senge, 2006).  The concept of ba can be used to build such an 
environment.  
Closely related to the concept of enacted environment, ba is a Japanese word roughly 
translated as “place, space, or forum.”  Kitaro Nishida, a Japanese philosopher, originally 
proposed the concept, which was further developed by Hiroshi Shimizu (Nonaka & Konno, 
1998).  Scholars have since then adapted ba to various organizational contexts.  For example, 
Itami’s (2010a, 2010b) ba is a spatial structure that facilitates interconnectedness, which, he 
argues, is indispensable for understanding a broad spectrum of organizational phenomena to 
effectively manage an enterprise.  Nonaka and colleagues (2000) have adapted the original 
concept of ba to play an integral role in their knowledge creation model.  They define ba as a 
“shared context in motion for knowledge” (Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 13) and systematically 
classify it into different categories based on the nature of the personal encounter that takes 
place in the shared space (i.e., face-to-face or virtual) and the mode of knowledge exchange 
(i.e., tacit or explicit).  Yamaguchi’s (2006) framework for “paradigm-disruptive” innovation 
entails a “field of resonance,” which he portrays as a special type of ba in which engineers 
and decision makers intimately share technical tacit knowledge.  Put together, the core ideas 
of ba are that (1) the shared space can be, but need not be, physical, (2) it must be purposeful, 
and (3) its structure should enhance meaningful interactions among members.  Further, 
because it is a forum of sensemaking, a ba must engender and encourage spontaneous 
exchange.  This last point implies that just providing a meeting room or an intranet forum to 
potential ba participants is not sufficient; neither is merely following a set of prescriptive 
problem-solving procedures. 
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A ba of engineering problem solving may be envisioned as an improvisational theater 
in which engineers deftly operate as “agents” of diverse interest groups (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Hill & Jones, 1992) to unify different personal visions.  “[O]ne of the most reliable indicators 
of a team that is continually learning is the visible conflict of ideas” (Senge, 2006, p. 232), 
and so a fully functioning ba is likely to first witness exchange of divergent viewpoints 
followed by their gradual convergence—as was the case for the NVH example and many 
other successful stories provided by the interviewees.  The problem solving stories 
chronicled formation of, as well as absence of, ba where collaboration took place.  
Unsuccessful problem solving was lacking ba.  In spite of expertise and resources that 
existed, they could not be pulled together to form a shared space for carrying out constructive 
dialog.  In one such example, the lead engineer narrates: 
[W]e should get expert[s] involved.  [In] the first [case] expert support did 
make a difference when we faced difficulties . . . but this [less successful] one 
we dr[o]ve it pretty hard but we didn’t really have a chance to really talk to 
the bearing supplier and also our internal expert.  Well we had a review with 
the expert [but] didn’t really get him on board every time [we needed him] in 
this investigation process.  (Engineer, 15 – 20 years experience) 
 
The sentiment expressed here is in stark contrast with, for example, a story of 
manufacturing problem solving in which the team members had every confidence that 
“whatever [they] came up with was going to be supported” by all concerned parties.  This 
statement denotes the existence of shared mental models throughout the organization. 
Given that a successful problem resolution is a result of collective phronesis, a set of 
“beliefs” that support a formation of this unified understanding may be key to unraveling 
why views diverge or converge  (Baba et al., 2004).  Beliefs are formed through experience.  
Likewise, phronesis—unlike theories that can be taught in lectures or techniques acquired 
through practice—can only be secured through experience applying them in specific 
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contexts (Grint, 2007).  Much of what goes on in day-to-day engineering is grounded in 
particular contexts and involves development of situated logic.  Baba et al.’s (2004) 
empirical study suggests the role of “parallel or similar” experience in a “common” context 
as potentially a driver for gaining a shared understanding from “distributed” team members 
spread across geographical and cultural divides.  The role of experience in EPS, especially 
shared experience, may similarly facilitate recalibration of members’ past understanding to 
fit the new context in which the problem is being investigated.  “Successful” problem-solving 
narratives contained many instances of cross-functional team members together visiting 
customer sites, being engaged in experiments, or walking through production lines.  Hence, 
the ba of EPS is proposed to be a “shared experiential space.” 
The new integrated model of engineering problem solving.  Itami’s (2010a, 
2010b) ba theory appears to imply two major facets: the formative side and the reflective 
side.  A ba is formed by conditions that stimulate the social and cognitive processes of the 
actors engaged in purposeful activities.  The formation of ba, in turn, is evidenced by the 
increased inter-subjectivity among its members.  Facility re-design to enhance meeting room 
amenities, a chief executive officer’s declaration about increased investment in a new 
product venture, and special company-wide events to discuss lessons learned can all trigger a 
new venue for dialog and inter-organizational collaboration.  Among the varied views of 
absorptive capacity concept that exist, Volberda et al.’s (2009, p. 24) integrative framework 
draws attention to the “awareness network” to share and obtain “knowledge that can help to 
solve novel problems” resulting from intra- and inter-organizational linkages.  Zahra and 
George’s (2002) model, as another example, posits a two-step process of building a 
“potential capability” that is successively followed by “realized capability.”  The ba of EPS 
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is conceptualized as an element similar to “potential capability” that creates a network of 
situated cognition for the EPS stakeholders.  It then fuels the knowledge creation routines, 
akin to demonstrating a “realized capability.” 
 Integrating the constructs that emerged from the study, the EPS ba can form when 
facilitated by the six environmental conditions to which the findings have led.  Controlled 
urgency triggers initial dialog and helps keep the EPS system state in positive tension.  Trust 
and autonomy are especially important when team members and stakeholders begin to share 
and externalize their views.  They should be able to do so in an unconstrained environment 
without fear of reprisal.  Clarity of leadership vision serves as an ultimate judgment standard 
against which to evaluate legitimacy of the team’s action and decisions.  Access to an 
appropriate mix of resources provides the requisite variety crucial for ensuring technical 
soundness of investigation directions, as well as of the chosen solutions.  Finally, a 
framework for sharing provides venues for creating redundancy of understanding among 
stakeholders throughout the EPS phases culminating in routinization.  These factors set the 
context for active and meaningful conversations—a stage for sensemaking and knowledge 
creation.  A well-functioning ba is a vortex of human energy reflected in the positive team 
dynamics.  The energy created in the ba runs the EPS routines, conceptualized as the multi-
directional knowledge flow analogous to the dynamics of SECI (Nonaka et al., 2000).  This 
setup drives the root cause analysis, with a force powerful enough to create “new premises to 
override the existing ones” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 44) to realize system changes.  
Figure 6 below illustrates this integrative epistemological concept.   
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Figure 6. New integrated model of engineering problem solving and knowledge creation. 
 
The chapter now concludes with a set of propositions: 
1. The stronger the six environmental conditions, the more effective the ba will be, 
manifested in positive team interactions. 
2. The more effective the ba is, the more active the SECI dynamics will be. 
3. The higher the SECI effort, the more likely it is for EPS to achieve positive 
system changes. 
Thus, the stage is set for the second and final phase of the research—the quantitative 
study.  The extent to which these relationships hold, and generalize across a larger sample, 
will be explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
The qualitative study, chronicled in Chapter 4, put forward a conceptual model of the 
engineering problems solving (EPS) dynamics.  The model posits that particular 
organizational aspects can be manifest in positive team behaviors, which in turn energize 
knowledge creation routines that lead to sustained learning from problem investigation.  In 
this chapter, these concepts are translated into a testable model that is subsequently analyzed 
quantitatively. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, a research model is presented 
with accompanying hypotheses.  Operationalization of the model constructs is discussed 
next.  Subsequently, data collection and analysis strategy is presented, followed by a report 
of analysis results.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the quantitative study 
findings. 
Research Model and Hypotheses 
Shown below in Figure 7 is a research model, built on theory and the qualitative 
study, to guide the quantitative study of EPS dynamics.   
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Figure 7. Research model of EPS knowledge creation dynamics. 
 
The model posits that engineering problem solving starts with a formation of an 
environment called engineering ba, which sets the stage for active knowledge exchange to 
occur.  Six enabling conditions are hypothesized to form the engineering ba, which in turn is 
reflected by six indicators of team dynamics.  The six EPS enablers, as discussed in depth in 
Chapter 4, are: leadership vision, autonomy, controlled urgency, knowledge redundancy, 
requisite variety, and trust.  In the knowledge creation routines that follow, tacit and explicit 
forms of technical knowledge are processed and integrated to ultimately produce a unified 
interpretation.  This unified interpretation results in learning achieved and problem solving 
performance that has two components: product quality and project efficiency.  Learning 
achieved refers to fundamental system changes in engineering practice such as new ways of 
designing, manufacturing, or testing a product.  Improved product quality is a form of 
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knowledge capture as a result of successful problem resolution, while project efficiency is a 
reflection of effective and systematic problem solving process. 
Learning achieved.  Team learning is achieved when new practices result from 
exchanging insights and negotiating meaning (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006).  In the 
qualitative sample, successful EPS endeavors not only delivered a problem fix but also 
fundamentally altered the organizational routines (Itabashi-Campbell, Gluesing, & Perelli, 
2012).  These changes improved specifications, upgraded equipment, and even transformed 
product development processes.  Learning achieved thus captures the extent to which teams 
“reconsider[ed] existing practices and search[ed] for ways to improve their work and 
implement[ed] novel solutions” (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006, p. 506).   
Product quality and project efficiency.  Product quality and project efficiency are 
two typical measures of new product development project success (Schulze & Hoegl, 2006) 
and are also very relevant in engineering contexts.  In the context of engineering problem 
solving, product quality is one of the primary yardsticks with which to measure how well the 
corrected product meets its requirements.  Product quality is a multi-faceted concept 
encompassing such features as functionality, durability, and compatibility with other systems 
(Omachonu & Ross, 1994).  Every respondent of the qualitative study reported how one or 
more of these product features were compromised at the beginning of his or her problem 
investigation and how they were improved (or not improved) at the conclusion of the 
investigation.  Along with product quality, project efficiency gauges effectiveness of problem 
solving.  It concerns the project’s adherence to its objectives—such as schedule, cost, and 
other requirements—and can be a measure of how efficiently the problem-solving endeavor 
was brought to closure.  Many examples of successful problem solving stories in the 
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qualitative study were associated with solutions that fully met the launch timing and product 
design requirements while not raising (and in some cases lowering) production costs 
(Itabashi-Campbell et al., 2012). 
Knowledge creation.  Knowledge creation is a set of routines in which active 
knowledge exchange occurs, forming a collective engineering interpretation that “enables 
seeing the old in a new way or novel distinction-making” (Langer, 1989, p. 156).  It is the 
process of learning, which “is facilitated by translation and recontextualization[,] and it rarely 
occurs without a transformation in the acquired knowledge” (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 
2006, p. 506).  In Nonaka’s (1994) perspective, this transformation occurs through iterative 
and multi-directional exchange of tacit and explicit knowledge, a “SECI” process (Nonaka, 
Toyama, & Konno, 2000).  It is through the SECI process the tacit knowledge deeply 
embedded in individuals and local contexts is aggregated into a new organizational know-
how—essential for leveraging “inter-subjective and idiosyncratic nature” of knowledge to 
create “firm-specific value” that is a basis of competitive advantage (Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 
20).  Hence, the proposed model conceptualizes engineering knowledge creation as having 
four dimensions that mirror SECI: socialization, externalization, combination, and 
internalization.  As the qualitative study demonstrated, teams in successful EPS examples 
created knowledge through “a step by step approach” to really “drill down” on the issue by 
asking “what else?” at every juncture of the root cause analysis.  Such a high problem 
solving rigor “stimulates their inquiry about alternative practices, and helps the teams adapt 
new practices or combine them with their existing repertoire” (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 
2006, p. 506).  Hence, the proposed model hypothesizes that 
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H1a:  Knowledge creation is positively related to learning achieved. 
H1b:  Knowledge creation is positively related to product quality. 
H1c: Knowledge creation is positively related to project efficiency. 
Engineering ba.  Borrowing from Itami’s (Itami, 2010a, 2010b) and Nonaka and 
colleagues’ (2000) concept of ba, an engineering ba is hypothesized to have been formed 
when the six conditions to which the discussion made reference earlier exist.  Specifically, 
1. Leadership vision:  Clarity of goals and requirements expressed by leadership 
external to the immediate problem solving project team, akin to Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s (1995) intention concept 
2. Autonomy:  Open and unconstrained environment that allows freedom, as well as 
authority, to the problem solving team, identical to the concept of autonomy in 
Nonaka’s (1994) knowledge-creation model 
3. Controlled urgency:  A state of “creative tension” (Senge, 2006; Womack, Jones, 
& Roos, 1990) that keeps problem investigation from degenerating into chaos or 
becoming inertial, analogous to the concept of creative chaos in Nonaka’s (1994) 
knowledge-creation model 
4. Knowledge redundancy:  Ease of and encouragement about information sharing 
to promote knowledge redundancy to enhance interconnectedness (Nonaka, 1994; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995)  
5. Requisite variety:  Accessibility to an appropriate mix of expertise and tools that 
provide requisite variety (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Weick, 
1979) to enrich the resource pool used for problem solving 
  
100
6. Trust:  Unquestioned trust and commitment that “whatever the problem solving 
team comes up with will be supported by the management and organization” (as 
cited by one interviewee from the qualitative study), which is in line with Nonaka 
and colleagues’ (2000) love, care, trust, and commitment concept. 
Using Itami’s (2010a, 2010b) framework, the formation of engineering ba, in turn, is 
reflected by a demonstration of positive group dynamics among the team members entrusted 
to solve a problem.  Success of the EPS projects in the qualitative study correlated to the 
efforts made by engineers to actively manage relationships among relevant stakeholders.  
Positive EPS outcomes, at least in the qualitative study sample, were associated with the 
extent to which all stakeholders came “on board” and supported the EPS goal.  Based on the 
findings from the empirical study and the extant literature, the proposed model further 
hypothesizes that 
H2a:  Engineering ba is positively related to learning achieved.  
H2b:  Engineering ba is positively related to product quality. 
H2c:  Engineering ba is positively related to project efficiency. 
Finally, the model posits that 
H3a:  Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and learning achieved. 
H3b:  Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and product quality. 
H3c: Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and project efficiency. 
The next section discusses how the identified constructs were operationalized. 
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Operationalization of Constructs 
Operationalization of the variables was accomplished using previously validated 
measures as summarized below and explained in further details in Appendix B.  Appendix B 
also maps the original scale items to those used in the final survey questionnaire, which is 
presented in Appendix C.  The final research model has a total of 23 indicators created by 
aggregating some of the 75 items obtained from the survey instrument as outlined below.  A 
minor deviation made in scale format upon adoption is also discussed.  
Engineering ba.  Engineering ba was modeled in a multiple-indicators-multiple-
causes, or MIMIC, (Diamantopoulos, 2006; Edwards, 2011) configuration consisting of 
formative and reflective indicators.  Using the construct ba from Nonaka et al.’s (2000) 
knowledge-creation model as a basis, and incorporating Itami’s (2010a, 2010b) theory of ba, 
engineering ba was modeled as having both the formative (six EPS enablers) and reflective 
(six team dynamics attributes) dimensions.  The formative dimensions were operationalized 
with Nonaka et al.’s (2000) “six enablers” that “energize ba,” measured using Lloria and 
Moreno-Luzón’s (2005, p. 231) “Enablers of Knowledge Creation” scale.  This six-factor 
scale was originally developed based on Nonaka’s theory.  Each of the six enablers—
intention, autonomy, creative chaos, redundancy, requisite variety, and trust—is measured 
with four items (thus, a total of 24 items) using a 7-point Likert response scale.  The authors 
report reliability ranging from 0.689 to 0.903 from a previous study (conducted in a Spanish 
supply chain management context, N = 167).  The scale was adopted in its entirety to 
measure the six EPS enablers that form ba—leadership vision, autonomy, controlled 
urgency, redundancy, requisite variety, and trust.  Summation of 24 items was implemented 
by taking the average of four items measuring each dimension because it was those six 
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dimensions, rather than the items, were the primary interest.  Prior to aggregation, 
Cronbach’s α was used to check acceptable reliability. 
Engineering ba’s reflective dimensions were hypothesized to be “positive team 
dynamics,” which was operationalized using the teamwork quality construct borrowed from 
Hoegl, Weinkauf, and Gemuenden (2004, p. 52).  The construct has six dimensions (totaling 
20 items) pertaining to inter-team collaboration processes—communication, coordination, 
mutual support, effort, balanced contribution, and cohesion—each of which is measured with 
two to five items using a 5-point Likert response scale.  The scale reliability, Cronbach’s α, 
reported from its original study conducted with 222 firms in the European automotive 
industry, ranges from 0.70 to 0.89 (see Hoegl et al., 2004).  All 20 items were adopted to 
measure the reflective side of engineering ba.  Summation of 20 items was implemented by 
taking the average of two to five items measuring each distinct dimension because it was 
those six dimensions, rather than the items, were the primary interest.  Prior to aggregation, 
Cronbach’s α was used to check acceptable reliability. 
Knowledge creation.  Knowledge creation was modeled using Nonaka’s SECI 
process (Nonaka et al., 2000) and was operationalized using the four-factor “Knowledge-
Creation Modes” scale developed by Schulze and Hoegl (2006, pp. 230-233).  The original 
scale was created to model Nonaka’s knowledge-creation concept and mirrors the four 
dimensions of SECI process—socialization, externalization, combination, and 
internalization—each being measured by four items on a 5-point Likert scale (totaling 16).  
The authors report composite reliability ranging from 0.78 to 0.82 from their original study in 
a European context (new product development projects sampled from 33 
German/Austrian/Swiss firms, N = 188).  The scale was used in its entirety to measure EPS 
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knowledge creation routines.  Summation of 16 items was implemented by taking the 
average of four items measuring each knowledge-creation mode because it was those four 
dimensions, rather than the items, were the primary interest.   Prior to aggregation, 
Cronbach’s α was used to check acceptable reliability. 
Learning achieved.  The extent to which new processes and practices resulted from 
problem solving—that is, learning achieved—was measured using the newly developed 
three-item scale by Zellmer-Bruhn and Gibson (2006).   The original scale measures each of 
the three items using a 7-point Likert response scale and reports a Cronbach’s α reliability of 
.84.  The authors also report demonstrated item factor loadings ranging from .78 to .87 
(Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006, p. 509). 
Product quality.  Product quality was modeled using the nine-item “product quality” 
scale developed by Schulze and Hoegl (2006, p. 229) as part of a study to apply Nonaka’s 
SECI process in a new product development context.  The scale has its genesis in the seven-
item scale used in the study by Hoegl et al. (2004) (5-point Likert, N = 74, Cronbach’s α = 
0.89).  In Schulze and Hoegl’s (2006) study, the scale was augmented to nine items, which 
were subsequently converted into a “quality index” in their analysis by averaging the item 
scores.    The nine-item version was adopted to operationalize product quality in this study 
and was treated as a summated scale.  Specifically, nine items that measure various facets of 
quality were averaged to form a single indicator.  Prior to aggregation, Cronbach’s α was 
used to check acceptable reliability. 
Project efficiency.  Project efficiency was modeled using the project efficiency 
construct borrowed from the same study discussed above (i.e., Schulze & Hoegl, 2006).  
Along with product quality, project efficiency was used as one of the outcome variables of 
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Nonaka’s SECI process (Schulze & Hoegl, 2006).   It is measured using a three-item scale 
(5-point Likert, N = 92, Cronbach’s α = 0.82).  All of the three items were adopted for this 
study. 
Control variables.  The survey instrument was designed to query the respondent’s 
roles in terms of his or her (1) engineering function and (2) problem-solving leadership so 
these two attributes could be used as control variables for all of the outcome variables (i.e., 
learning achieved, product quality, and project efficiency).  As already discussed in Chapters 
3 and 4, the qualitative study followed Schein’s (1996) definition of “engineers” and sought 
the voices of those who are “designers [emphasis added] of products or systems that have 
utility” (p. 14).  The primary focus of the qualitative study, in other words, was on those 
technical professionals who had ownership of design, application, or manufacture of a 
product.  These recruitment criteria excluded other types of engineers—such as testing, 
quality, reliability, and field service / warranty analysis engineers—who typically do not 
have ownership of a product or its manufacturing processes yet oftentimes play key support 
roles in product-related problem solving.  As strategized in Chapter 3, the quantitative study 
was to open the floor to all types of engineers having problem solving experience.  Having 
both the lead and support engineers, as a consequence, may result in differing perspectives on 
the problem-solving outcomes.  Attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Kolb, 1995) 
posits that actor-observer differences in self-assessment occur due to two major factors: 
cognitive and motivational.   One, actors (or performers) and observers may have different 
types of information available to them.  Secondly, actors and observers may have different 
interests in interpreting a given event.  These factors can result in, for example, team leaders’ 
tendency to overestimate how smoothly the team is functioning (Kolb, 1995).   
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Scale format.  This study made use of established scales by adopting them in their 
entirety and making appropriate contextual adjustments, with one exception.  The scales used 
to measure the formative dimensions of engineering ba (i.e., "Knowledge-creation enablers" 
by Lloria & Moreno-Luzón, 2005) and learning achieved (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006) 
were converted from their original 7-point to 5-point Likert format to match the rest of the 
scales used in the study.  The conversion was done without changing the scale’s anchor 
points; both the original and the rescaled versions range from “strongly disagree” (SD) to 
“strongly agree” (SA).  Studies (e.g., Dawes, 2008) show that changes in the data 
characteristics (mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis) resulting from re-scaling between 5-
point and 7-point Likert measures are negligible.  A uniform scale format provides greater 
ease of completing the questionnaire than a mixed format and was thus implemented to 
maximize survey response rate.  Hence, all of the 75 items on the survey were implemented 
on a 5-point Likert scale that is anchored on “1” denoting strong disagreement (SD) on one 
end and “5” denoting strong agreement (SA) on the other.  These items are presented in 
Appendix C.     
Methods  
This section discusses data collection strategy and sample, along with the justification 
for using the partial least squares (PLS) approach for data analysis.  Appendix D provides 
further details of the sample characteristics.   
Data collection. The empirical data to test the hypothesized relationships among the 
constructs were collected via a self-administered, on-line survey that asks questions about the 
respondent's experience in problem solving.  The target audience was U.S.-based engineering 
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/ technical professionals who had at least one experience participating in team-based problem 
solving efforts to resolve product-related issues.  The survey explicitly stated that  
1. “Team-based” refers to having at least two people, including the respondent, 
engaged in the resolution of the problem, 
2. “Product” may be hardware, software, raw or semi-finished materials, 
information technology (IT) architecture, or any combination of these, and  
3. “Product-related problem” can include any problematic issue that pertains to 
design, application, testing, manufacturing, servicing, or field usage of the 
product  
to help the potential participants decide whether or not they met the participation criteria.  An 
initial screening question, immediately following the introductory statement that seeks 
consent to participate, served as the first check point to filter out respondents not meeting the 
research criteria.  A series of questions followed, which queried about the contextual factors 
of the respondent’s problem solving experience.  Responses to these questions served to 
provide additional filters to exclude non-qualifying participants, as well as descriptive 
characterization of problem solving experiences being contributed.  Following these 
background questions, the survey began asking the 75 questions captured in Appendix C, 
which directly pertained to the theorized constructs and their relationships.  Upon 
completion, the respondent was directed to answer a few demographic questions.  The survey 
ended with a thank-you statement, which contained a voluntary option to leave contact 
information in case the respondent wished to receive a summary copy of the survey results.   
The survey was launched following completion of pre- and pilot-testing.  The pre-test 
was conducted from late September 2011 through January 2012 using a convenience sample 
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of ten individuals having similar qualifications to those of the target population.  All pre-test 
sessions were administered face-to-face, using a “pen and paper” format.  Based on the 
feedback from these sessions, the questionnaire was put through several rounds of revision 
through February 2012.  From mid-March 2012 through early April 2012, the revised survey 
was pilot-tested.  Pilot-testing was conducted using a web-based survey software application, 
Qualtrics, in the final intended survey format.  Seventeen individuals having similar 
professional backgrounds to those expected of the target respondents took part in the pilot 
test.  Each participant was given a link to the on-line survey and was requested to provide 
feedback on the clarity of questions, issues concerning response options, and the length of 
time required to complete the survey.  The test responses were reviewed for any 
inconsistencies.  As a result, minor adjustments were made to the questionnaire prior to 
launch.  The survey was launched in late April 2012. 
Once launched, the survey was kept open through early November 2012, during 
which time on-going efforts were made to solicit participation.  The author sent a direct 
request to 228 individuals asking them to participate, to refer potential participants, or to do 
both.  Additionally, she sent a direct inquiry to three organizations with a request to consider 
circulating the survey link to their members.  At her request, the Industrial & Systems 
Engineering Department (the author’s home department) at Wayne State University 
forwarded the survey link to the current members of its Engineering Management Master’s 
Program (EMMP).  She also advertised the study by posting a survey link on a total of 18 on-
line discussion groups of which she was a member.  They included engineering associations 
such as Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honor Society and IEEE Reliability Society and, at least as 
of the time the posting was made, were accessible only to their registered members (i.e., not 
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open to general public).  By leveraging the author’s personal networks and using a 
snowballing technique, her recruitment efforts resulted in a total of 334 responses at the time 
of survey closure.  
Sample characteristics.  Of the total responses collected, 117 of them were 
incomplete.  The respondents, in this case, either did not pass the first screening question or 
quit responding before reaching the end of the survey.  Because of the “forced response” 
logic implemented in the survey, participants either responded fully or stopped prematurely.  
For that reason, “missing data” treatment was not warranted because the “missing” pattern 
was non-random (i.e., all non-responses are systematically in the latter part of the survey).  In 
addition, even the best case of the incomplete response had only 73% of the questions 
completed, so imputation of missing values was not justified. Thus, a listwise exclusion of 
117 incomplete cases from the total of 334 logged in the survey left 217 complete responses.  
From those 217 data points, nine more had to be removed due to the respondents’ 
backgrounds not meeting the study’s “U.S.-based” criteria.  The usable sample size with 
which to start analysis, therefore, came to be 208.   
The 208 respondents consisted of 160 (76.9%) men and 48 (23.1%) women.  The 
women-to-men ratio aligns reasonably well with the national labor statistics considering that 
women occupied 33.9% of “computer systems analysis” and 13.6% of “architects and 
engineers” positions in 2011 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  The female 
respondents are likely to fall under one of these categories; so, roughly speaking, their 
sample ratio mirrors the combined average of 23.8%.  For both men and women, their 
experience levels are skewed toward 10 or more years, indicating that the majority of the 
participants were at least in their mid-careers.  Likely to be correlating with their career 
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stages, an overwhelming majority of both the male and female participants had at least a 
bachelor’s degree, with many having graduate degrees.  It should be noted here that the 
information provided for “Other – please specify” response option was examined very 
carefully to determine whether reclassification of the response was warranted.  For example, 
in the case of education, several “Other” responses had to be re-classified into “Graduate 
degrees” as these respondents listed “PhD” under “Other.”  
In terms of contextual characteristics of the EPS example contributed by each 
respondent, the sample was characterized using six attributes:  product involved, industry, 
product development phase, participant’s functional role, participant’s problem solving role, 
and geographical location.  The first three relate directly to the product that prompted EPS, 
while the last three are about the respondent as an actor in the EPS.  In terms of the product, a 
slightly over half of the problems concerned hardware finished goods (52.4%), followed by 
finished goods involving both hardware and software (such as cars and embedded systems, 
26.0%).  Most of these EPS projects had been generated in the automotive industry (68.3%), 
again showing the same trend as that seen in the qualitative study.  As to the product lifecycle 
phase in which the problem solving occurred, the sample shows a relatively even distribution 
between the concept-to-launch and the launch-to-sustainability stages.  Within each of these 
phases, the “engineering verification / validation” of the former and the “full production – 
field / warranty returns” of the latter show the highest EPS occurrence rate.  This data pattern 
is not surprising as engineering validation and field warranty are the phases in which the 
product is “put to the test”—as a prototype in the former and a mass produced sample in the 
latter.   
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Respondents as EPS actors were characterized in terms of their engineering and 
problem solving roles, as well as their home locations at the time of problem investigation.  
Responses from the first two categories were later used as control variables in the model 
analysis, and the location question served as the second filter to exclude non-U.S. based 
respondents.  In terms of engineering roles, the most frequently occurring category is 
“product design, development, architecture, or application” (N = 80, 38.5%), followed 
closely by 71 (34.1%) respondents who played quality, reliability, warranty, or related 
support roles.  Following the first two, “manufacturing” and “product testing” tie for the third 
place at N = 26 (12.5%) each.  The remaining five responses (2.4%) came from “product 
maintenance / service” professionals.  Applying the product ownership criteria based on 
Schein’s (1996) definition discussed earlier, a slightly over half of the respondents are of 
“product owner” category (80 product designers + 26 manufacturing engineers = 106) with 
the remaining respondents falling under the “product support” category.   
In terms of EPS project role, a slightly over half (54.3%) of the respondents assumed 
a leadership role.  The remaining 38.0% and 7.7% played support roles, the former as core 
members of the EPS team while the latter were external stakeholders such as management, 
customer, or supplier.  Finally, an overwhelming majority (74.5%) of the respondents were 
located in the U.S. Midwest at the time of their surveyed EPS involvement, very likely to be 
correlating with their automotive industry affiliation discussed earlier.  
In summary, a majority of survey participants were experienced and degreed 
automotive engineers.  They were engaged in all facets of engineering, from product design 
to manufacturing, testing, and various support functions at the time of problem occurrence.  
Their problems were manifested in hardware-based goods, which were discovered during 
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engineering validation or a warranty phase of the product lifecycle.  They were leaders of 
EPS efforts and were located in the U.S. Midwest at that time.  The pre-dominance of 
seasoned engineers who took lead roles in problem solving is a favorable attribute of the 
sample.  Their observations through experienced eyes and from the perspective of boundary 
spanners interacting with EPS stakeholders carry credibility and thus contribute to face 
validity of the measures.  Appendix D provides further details of these sample characteristics. 
Analysis and modeling approach.  The hypothesized relationships among constructs 
were analyzed using the partial least squares (PLS) approach for structural equation modeling 
(SEM).  The decision to use PLS, rather than a covariance-based SEM (supported by such 
tools as LISREL and AMOS), was based primarily on the goal and nature of the study.  The 
study’s aim was to understand how well the model predicts EPS effectiveness and learning, 
rather than to explain covariance of all measures. The study is based on a not yet completely 
fine-tuned understanding.  The experimental nature of modeling EPS dynamics and the 
extent to which ba, an “empirically under-explored” construct (Nonaka, von Krogh, & 
Voelpel, 2006, p. 1197), lend themselves to an exploratory data analysis approach.  
Prediction—rather than explanation—orientation of the study, as well as the lack of a strong 
theory, makes PLS a very suitable parameter estimation methodology (Chin, 1998; Haenlein 
& Kaplan, 2004).  The choice of PLS also comes with additional benefits that were also 
relevant to the study.  One, the PLS approach is more amenable to the relatively small 
research sample size.  Secondly, with PLS, distributional assumptions such as normality and 
absence of multicollinearity can be relaxed (Chin, 1998; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).  The 
study’s measures were produced on a five-point Likert scale, which makes the data 
susceptible to a non-normal distributional pattern. With PLS, data modeling under conditions 
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of small sample and violations of distributional assumptions is less likely to result in 
improper solutions (Chin, 1998).  Lastly, there is an epistemic need to model engineering ba 
as having both formative and reflective dimensions, and PLS has the ability to handle 
indicators in different modes (Chin, 1998; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).     
In summary, PLS was chosen for its “ability to predict and understand the role and 
formation of individual constructs and their relationships among each other” (Chin, 1998, p. 
332).  The methodology allows greater flexibility than does covariance-based SEM, while 
still providing power to simultaneously model unobservable variables—a great advantage 
that is afforded by second-generation multivariate techniques (Chin, 1998; Haenlein & 
Kaplan, 2004).  PLS-Graph 3.0 (Chin, 1993 - 2003) supported the PLS analysis in the study.  
In addition, SPSS version 20 (IBM Corporation 1989, 2011) was used for preparatory and 
auxiliary data manipulation. 
Analysis Results 
The data analysis was performed in multi stages.  First, scale reliability at item level 
was examined prior to summation.  Next, after summation, the data were checked for non-
normality (e.g., skewness and kurtosis) and presence of influential outliers.  Data 
transformation was tried concurrently to decide on the best data format to use for final 
analysis.   Squared-term transformation was found to produce the best parameter estimates 
and was used for subsequent analyses—that is, exploratory factory analysis (EFA), 
measurement model analysis, and finally the structural path modeling.     
Scale reliability.   Using the sample of 208, scale reliability was assessed using a 
Cronbach α statistic (Cronbach, 1951) for each construct being measured.  Results are shown 
in Appendix E.  All scales had reliability exceeding .70, meeting the generally recommended 
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minimum threshold of .60 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  Consequently, none of 
the original scale items were deleted, so, all 75 original items were retained.  Having verified 
acceptable internal consistency of the scales, the analysis proceeded to summate some of 
them as outlined in the previous section (i.e., resulting in 23 indicators).   
Data screening.  Prior to starting the model analysis, the input data characteristics 
were examined for extreme skewness and kurtosis.  Even though PLS approach works 
without a distributional assumption and is relatively forgiving to non-normality and small 
sample sizes (Chin, 1998; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004), the deleterious impact of non-normal 
data on PLS estimates is documented (Marcoulides, Chin, & Saunders, 2009).  For that 
reason, an iterative approach of trying different transformations and evaluating their effects 
on parameter estimates was taken.  All 23 measures showed negative skewness, most of 
which were statistically significant.  Many of them also showed statistically significant non-
zero kurtosis values.  The squared-term transformation, a common method to alleviate 
negative skew in the data (Hair et al., 2010), was found to most effectively reduce both the 
skewness and kurtosis of the data.  Using the squared-term transformed data, multivariate 
outlier check was then performed.  The Mahalanobis distance calculated on each case 
indentified three that exceeded the threshold at the .001 risk level (χ2α=.001, df=23 = 49.728).  A 
review of demographic characteristics of these three participants did not reveal any oddities.  
Consequently, the effects of keeping versus removing these data points were iteratively 
tested.  In the end, the decision was made to exclude them from analysis.  Therefore, the final 
sample size used for the PLS analysis was reduced from 208 to 205.  Appendix F presents the 
final dataset used for model analyses. 
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Lastly, as part of data screening, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed 
using the transformed data of N = 205, only on the reflective constructs having multiple 
indicators (i.e., ba – team dynamics, knowledge creation, learning achieved, and project 
efficiency).  The EFA was run to check the extent to which the indicators meet the a priori 
expectations of factorability.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO = .919) and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (approximate χ2df=120 = 
1988.169, significance = .000) show suitability of the data for structure detection.  All 
indicators loaded on their hypothesized factors except for two deviations.  The socialization 
measure did not align with the rest of the dimensions posited for knowledge creation.  Also, 
one of the three measures of project efficiency cross-loaded on another factor.  The details are 
shown in Appendix G.  Due to the exploratory nature of the study, the socialization measure 
was re-assigned, and the cross-loading measure of project efficiency was retained as initially 
hypothesized.   
Structural equation modeling using PLS.  The analysis then proceeded to structural 
equation modeling (SEM) using PLS.  The SEM was done in two stages, first to ensure 
acceptable fit of the measurement model then to test the causal model.   
Measurement model.  A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), in the context of PLS, 
was carried out to evaluate the quality of the measurement model.  Because the hypothesized 
model contains both the reflectively and formatively modeled factors, two separate 
procedures and cannons were warranted to account for the differences in their theoretical and 
nomological nature (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009; Götz, Liehr-Gobbers, & Krafft, 2010).  
The MIMIC construct of engineering ba, in the PLS framework, was modeled using a “Mode 
C” (Chin, 1998; Dijkstra, 2010) configuration, which requires a formatively measured 
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variable (Ba – enablers) to be connected to a reflectively modeled factor (Ba – team 
dynamics) by a structural path.  Following this procedure, the first part of the measurement 
analysis addressed the factorial validity of the reflective constructs, followed by the 
assessment of the formative factor.  For both the reflective and formative measurement 
models in the PLS context, significance of parameters can be assessed using asymptotic t-
statistics generated by re-sampling techniques (Chin, 1998; Geffen & Straub, 2005; Götz et 
al., 2010).  The PLS-Graph 3.0 program enables this operation by its bootstrapping 
procedures.  Finally, common method bias (CMB) was also checked as part of the CFA.  The 
details follow. 
Reflective constructs.  The factorial validity of the reflectively measured constructs—
namely, Ba – team dynamics, knowledge creation (Knowledge), learning achieved 
(Learning), product quality (Quality), and project efficiency (Efficiency)—was evaluated 
using factor loadings, composite reliability (CR) scores, average variance extracted (AVE) 
scores, AVEs against factor correlations, and cross-loadings.  Both CR (0 ≤ CR ≤ 1) and 
AVE (0 ≤ AVE ≤ 1) are commonly used metrics of convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010) 
and are among the standard outputs of PLS-Graph 3.0.  Table 4 below presents the factor 
loadings with significance (i.e., T-stat.), CR, and AVE. 
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Table 4  
Indicator Loadings, CR, and AVE 
Reflective Constructs Indicator Loading T-Stat. P-Value CR AVE 
Ba – team dynamics COMM 0.860 39.189 0.000 0.935 0.706 
 
COORD 0.794 25.833 0.000 
  
 
SUPP 0.874 51.191 0.000 
  
 
EFFORT 0.824 36.804 0.000 
  
 
BAL 0.899 66.233 0.000 
  
 
COH 0.783 26.127 0.000 
  
Knowledge SOC 0.734 17.722 0.000 0.891 0.673 
 
EXT 0.853 39.990 0.000 
  
 
COMB 0.845 41.665 0.000 
  
 
INT 0.844 33.418 0.000 
  
Learning LEARN1 0.887 57.897 0.000 0.892 0.735 
 
LEARN2 0.877 40.165 0.000 
  
 
LEARN3 0.805 23.799 0.000 
  
Quality QUAL 1.000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Efficiency EFFIC1 0.816 27.616 0.000 0.880 0.710 
 
EFFIC2 0.888 56.895 0.000 
  
 
EFFIC3 0.822 29.009 0.000 
  
 
As shown in Table 4, all (except for Quality, which is a single-indicator variable and 
is therefore exempted from this analysis) loadings are greater than the acceptable ideal 
threshold of 0.7 (Götz et al., 2010) and are significant at the 0.001 (two-tailed) level.  Both 
CR and AVE metrics more than meet the acceptable thresholds of 0.7 and 0.5, respectively 
(Hair et al., 2010), providing evidence of construct reliability and convergent validity.  
Further, the analysis assessed discriminant validity using AVE figures and inter-factor 
correlations in combination.  Discriminant validity can be established if a latent variable’s 
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AVE is larger than the common variances (Chin, 1998; Götz et al., 2010; Pavlou, Liang, & 
Yajiong, 2007).  Following this guidance, Table 5 below presents the square root of AVE for 
each construct on the diagonal (in bold) to compare against the correlations among the 
constructs captured in the off-diagonal elements of the matrix.6   
Table 5  
Square Roof of AVE vs. Correlations among Constructs 
Construct Construct 
Type 
# of 
Indicators 
Ba – 
enabler 
Ba – team 
dynamics 
Knowledge Learning Quality Efficiency 
Ba – 
enablers 
Formative 6 N/A      
Ba – team 
dynamics 
Reflective 6 0.745 0.840     
Knowledge Reflective 4 0.667 0.703 0.820    
Learning Reflective 3 0.295 0.316 0.467 0.587   
Quality Reflective 1 0.511 0.545 0.528 0.362 1.000  
Efficiency Reflective 3 0.501 0.633 0.503 0.377 0.506 0.843 
Note: Ba – enablers is a formative construct, so its AVE have no meaning (thus, N/A). 
 
As Table 5 shows, each construct is more closely related to its own measures than to 
those of other constructs.  The analysis results, thus, show evidence of sufficient discriminant 
validity.  Finally, to further assess validity of the measures, a cross-loading table was 
constructed following the guidance and directions by Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue (2007), as 
well as Geffen and Straub (2005).  The table is presented in Appendix H and shows that each 
item loads much more highly on its assigned construct than it does on others.  One exception 
to this pattern is the socialization indicator (SOC_sq).  While it does load most highly to its 
assigned factor (i.e., Knowledge), it also loads on another construct (Ba – team dynamics) by 
only a .02 margin.  This finding is in line with the EFA results (see Appendix G); and, again, 
no alteration of the measure was made because of the exploratory nature of the study. 
                                                 
6
 Alternatively, AVEs (rather than their square root) can be compared against the squared term of each 
correlation. 
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Formative construct.  The reversed causality posited by formative constructs 
demands different procedures for interpreting and evaluating the measurement model from 
those applied on reflectively measured constructs (Götz et al., 2010).  The analysis followed 
Cenfetelli and Bassellier’s (2009) guidance.  The engineering ba construct, as already 
discussed, was modeled in a MIMIC configuration.  To start, following Cenfetelli and 
Bassellier’s (2009) procedures, the formative indicators were checked for collinearity.  As 
captured in Table 6 below, the analysis shows bivariate correlations among the indicators that 
are ranging from .412 to .646.  The variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.462 to 
2.421, all of which are under the suggested threshold of 3.33 (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009).  
Based on these results, multi-collinearity does not appear to be a concern.   
Table 6  
Correlations and VIFs for Formative Measures 
 
 
 
Next, the indicator weights and loadings were estimated, along with their statistical 
significance.  Table 7 below presents the resulting estimates of the formative indicators. 
VIF VISION AUTO URG RED VAR TRUST
VISION 1.600 1.000
AUTO 1.862 .456 1.000
URG 2.308 .565 .594 1.000
RED 2.407 .508 .574 .622 1.000
VAR 2.007 .475 .511 .590 .644 1.000
TRUST 2.285 .461 .594 .632 .666 .594 1.000
Correlations
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Table 7  
Parameter Estimates for Formative Measures 
 
As Table 7 shows, every one of the six indicators exhibits a high and statistically 
significant loading, yet only three of them have statistically significant weights.  The high 
bivariate correlation between each indicator and the construct indicates that all indicators are 
important in an absolute sense, while their relative contributions vary (Cenfetelli & 
Bassellier, 2009).  Specifically, the contributions of leadership vision (VISION), controlled 
urgency (URG), and knowledge redundancy (RED) are small relative to the rest.  Because 
“[i]ndicators that have a relatively small contribution to a formatively measured construct in 
comparison to other indicators may still have an important absolute contribution if that 
indicator is independently assessed from the other indicators” (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009, 
p. 693), and because of the newness of the scales,  no refinement to the measurement model 
(e.g., discarding or grouping weak items) was made in the study’s exploratory quest for 
theory development.   
The last phase of the formative measurement analysis was the redundancy analysis 
(Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009; Chin, 1998) to explore the strength of relationship between 
the formative and reflective variables of the MIMIC model.  The path coefficient between the 
two components was estimated by PLS-Graph 3.0 to be 0.79 (P = .000).  The value is 
somewhat lower than the minimum threshold of 0.8 that Chin (1998) proposes.   
Indicators Weight T-Stat. P-Value Weight T-Stat. P-Value
VISION 0.120 1.276 0.204 0.624 8.825 0.000
AUTO 0.399 5.006 0.000 0.845 24.053 0.000
URG -0.046 0.341 0.734 0.709 12.680 0.000
RED 0.123 1.338 0.182 0.791 16.995 0.000
VAR 0.230 3.206 0.002 0.762 15.517 0.000
TRUST 0.381 4.063 0.000 0.867 24.849 0.000
Indicator Weights Indicator Loadings
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Common method bias (CMB).  The data collection instrument for this study was 
basically a self-report survey, administered to a single-reporting source (i.e., engineers / 
technical professionals).  Such a format often lends itself to method bias, which can be a 
problem and so needs to be checked.  First, examination of the correlation among the latent 
variables (see Table 5) does not reveal any concern.  All correlation values are far below the 
suggested maximum threshold of .90 (Pavlou et al., 2007).  Further to assess the extent of 
common method bias (CMB), a special CFA was conducted using Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, and Lee’s (2005, p. 894) “a single unmeasured latent methods factor” technique 
that had been adapted to the working of the PLS methodology by Liang et al. (2007).  In this 
approach, each item is converted into a single-indicator factor that in turn loads to the 
intended construct, thus, creating a second-order structure.  Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, 
and van Oppen (2009) provide procedural guidance on how this may be done in a PLS 
environment (p. 181).  A CMB factor is added into this structure, with its paths to each 
measure now converted into first-order, single-indicator construct.  These CMB factor 
loadings are gauged against the paths from the second-order factors to their corresponding 
first-order constructs (representing substantive loading factors) as the diagram in Appendix I 
illustrates.  Specifically, the squared term of each path coefficient is compared between that 
of the substantive loading and that of the method.  The results show that, on the average, the 
variance associated with the substantive loadings is 25 times higher than method variance.  
Additionally, most method factor path coefficients are not statistically significant.  These 
findings are also captured in Appendix I.  Hence, the method effects are unlikely to be a 
significant concern for our study.  
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Structural model.  The goal of a variance-based SEM strategy—such as PLS—is to 
minimize residual variances, and so the battery of tests recommended for testing a PLS 
model is geared to produce metrics to gauge how well the model describes the effects 
between the latent variables (Chin, 1998; Götz et al., 2010).  The structural model was first 
analyzed with the two control variables—engineering role and problem solving role—
connected to each of the three outcome variables to evaluate their influence.  This first 
iteration of structural analysis showed that the engineering role has no appreciable effects on 
any of the outcome variables.  The problem solving role was found to have no influence on 
learning achieved or project efficiency; it was, however, found to have a statistically 
significant (at the 0.05 level) effect on product quality.  The initial path coefficient estimate 
of −0.127 indicates that the respondent who played a lead role in problem solving is likely to 
give a higher rating on product quality than those who were in supporting roles (1 = leader of 
problem solving team, 2 = core support, 3 = external stakeholder support; see Table D2-5 in 
Appendix D).  To maximize statistical power, non-significant control paths were removed 
before continuing the analysis.    
Path coefficients.  Path coefficients (β), along with their T-statistics calculated 
through a bootstrapping procedure, are shown in Table 8 below. 
Table 8  
Path Coefficients and Their Significance 
 
Hypothesized Path β T-Stat P-Value Significance
Ba → Knowledge 0.720 17.969 0.000      Path is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Knowledge → Learning 0.489 5.079 0.000      Path is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Ba → Learning -0.033 0.330 0.742      Path is not significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Knowledge → Quality 0.282 3.022 0.003      Path is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Ba → Quality 0.321 3.469 0.001      Path is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Knowledge → Efficiency 0.112 1.431 0.154      Path is not significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Ba → Efficiency 0.569 8.847 0.000      Path is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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These results indicate that  
1. Ba has a positive influence over knowledge creation.   
2. Ba has direct, and positive, effects over both product quality and project 
efficiency but not on learning achieved.   
3. Knowledge creation positively influences learning achieved and product quality 
but has no effect on project efficiency.   
Knowledge creation, therefore, potentially mediates both the paths from engineering 
ba to learning achieved and from engineering ba to product quality—but not to project 
efficiency.  
R2 check.  The R2 (which applies only to endogenous variables) is one of the key 
metrics for assessing a PLS model’s explanatory power.  The analysis evaluated both the 
magnitude and significance of each R2 value.  Chin (1998, p. 323) states that the R2 values of 
.67, .33, and .19 are considered “substantial,” “moderate,” and “weak,” respectively.  Further, 
for an endogenous variable that is predicted by only one or two exogenous variables, a 
“moderate” R2 value may be acceptable (Chin, 1998).  To test for significance, Falk and 
Miller’s (1992) F-test was used as outlined below: 
)1(
)1( 2
2
−−
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F
 where N = sample size and m = number of predictors 
 
Table 9 below summarizes the results of R2 check. 
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Table 9  
R2 Values for the Four Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
Therefore, all of the four dependent variables (DVs) explain more than 20% of model 
variance and are significant at the .001 level.  The knowledge creation variable explains as 
much as 50% of model variance.  Three DVs more than meet Chin’s (1998) “moderate” 
level.  The lowest R2 is 21.6%, which hovers between “weak” and “moderate.”  Each of these 
DVs is predicted by no more than two variables, so based on Chin’s (1998) guidelines, the 
model exhibits reasonably good quality from the R2 perspective.  
Effect size (f)2.  Another way a PLS model’s explanatory power may be checked is by 
the effect size, or f2, metric (Chin, 1998; Götz et al., 2010).  An f2 value reflects the change in 
R2 and is calculated as follows:  
2
22
2
1 included
excludedincluded
R
RRf
−
−
=  
The f 2 metric gauges the extent to which a predictor influences the DV by calculating 
the change in R2 with and without the predictor (R2included and R2excluded, respectively).  Chin 
(1998, 2010) and Götz et al. (2010) suggest the operational definition of 0.02 as “small” or 
“weak,” 0.15 as “medium,” and 0.35 as “large” effect sizes.  The effect size on each of the 
three outcome variables was calculated by inclusion and exclusion of knowledge creation and 
engineering ba as shown in Table 10 below.    
R 2 F-stat. at .05 at .01 at .001 Significance of R 2
Knowledge 0.511 211.794 3.888 6.761 11.150 Significant at P < .001
Learning 0.216 27.761 3.041 4.712 7.149 Significant at P < .001
Quality 0.356 55.832 3.041 4.712 7.149 Significant at P < .001
Efficiency 0.423 73.892 3.041 4.712 7.149 Significant at P < .001
Critical F
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Table 10  
f 2 Values for the Outcome Variables 
 
 
 
The effect sizes vary from small to medium, and the differences in f2 values are in 
line with the relative strengths of path coefficients shown in Table 5-5.  
Goodness of Fit (GoF).  Unlike the covariance-based SEM methodology, PLS path 
modeling does not optimize any global scalar function and so does not naturally lend itself to 
a global validation metric (such as χ2 and a host of other model fit indices used in covariance-
based SEM).  To overcome this issue, Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin, and Lauro (2004) have 
recently proposed a global criterion of goodness of fit, a “GoF” index, to “account for the 
PLS model performance at both the measurement and the structural model with a focus on 
overall prediction performance of the model” (Chin, 2010, p. 680).  A GoF (0 ≤ GoF ≤ 1, 
larger the better) is calculated by taking the geometric mean of the average communality 
(denoted as COMM ) and average R2 as shown below: 
2RCOMMGoF ×=  
The GoF of the hypothesized model is 0.533, and using Wetzels et al.’s (2009) 
baseline criteria, this value exceeds their proposed “cut-off value of 0.36 for large effect sizes 
Effect size with or without Knowledge
R 2  with Knowledge R 2  without Knowledge f 2 Effect Size
Learning 0.216 0.101 0.15 Medium
Quality 0.356 0.318 0.06 > small, but < medium
Efficiency 0.423 0.417 0.01 Very small
Effect size with or without Ba
R 2  with Eng.  Ba R 2  without Eng.  Ba f 2 Effect Size
Learning 0.216 0.215 0.00 No effect
Quality 0.356 0.307 0.08 > small, but < medium
Efficiency 0.423 0.266 0.27 Medium
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of R2” (p. 187), indicating that the model performs well from this perspective.  Further 
computational details are shown in Appendix J. 
Mediation check.  Mediation effects were checked by first following Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) causal-step test, followed by a product-of-coefficients test as Wood, 
Goodman, Backmann, and Cook (2008) recommend.  This last part was accomplished using 
MacKinnon and colleagues’ (2007) procedures to calculate asymmetric confidence intervals 
on the product of two mediation path coefficients (i.e., Sobel test).   The mediation test 
results confirmed two mediation schemes: 
1. Knowledge creation fully mediates the relationship between engineering ba and 
learning achieved. 
2. Knowledge creation partially mediates the relationship between engineering ba 
and product quality. 
Computational details are found in Appendix K. As already demonstrated, mediation 
hypothesis does not hold for the relationship between engineering ba and project efficiency.   
In summary, the analysis results support some but not all of the hypothesized 
relationships.  Table 11 below captures the extent to which each of the hypotheses is 
supported.   
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Table 11  
Tests of Research Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Supported? 
H1a: Knowledge creation is positively related to learning achieved. Yes 
H1b: Knowledge creation is positively related to product quality. Yes 
H1c: Knowledge creation is positively related to project efficiency. No 
H2a: Engineering ba is positively related to learning achieved. No 
H2b: Engineering ba is positively related to product quality. Yes 
H2c: Engineering ba is positively related to project efficiency. Yes 
H3a: Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and learning achieved. 
No – full 
mediation 
H3b: Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and product quality. 
Yes – partial 
mediation 
H3c: Knowledge creation partially mediates the positive relationship between 
engineering ba and project efficiency. 
No mediation 
 
The final structural model, with path coefficients, is presented in Figure 8 below.  
Note that only the significant paths (*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05) are shown.   
 
Figure 8. Final structural model. 
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The final model suggests that, controlling for the effect of the problem solving role, 
knowledge creation mediates two of the outcome variables: learning achieved and product 
quality, but not project efficiency.  Further, knowledge creation fully—not partially—
mediates the relationship between engineering ba and learning achieved.  The next and final 
section of this chapter provides interpretation of these analysis findings. 
Discussion 
Thus, in order for sustained learning to occur—the central research theme of this 
study—it is essential that knowledge-creation routines take place fully after an EPS 
enhancing context—that is, ba—has been established.  As to the other EPS performance 
outcomes, product quality and project efficiency, knowledge creation activities have reduced 
impact.  Product quality is affected by both the strengths of ba and knowledge creation 
process.  On the other hand, project efficiency is not affected by knowledge creation at all 
and is solely a function of ba.  Conceptually speaking, these findings make sense.  When a 
product is broken, it needs to be fixed.  Engineers normally find a way to correct the 
problem—by tapping into available organizational resources and knowledge sets—so the 
product quality is invariably better than its pre-fix state.  They, given an environment 
conducive to team work, are likely to accomplish their tasks efficiently as well.  For the EPS 
activities to result in systemic improvements (i.e., double-loop learning), however, 
overarching knowledge that encompasses not only the know-how for an immediate fix but 
that fundamentally changes the way the product is designed, tested, or manufactured must be 
gained.  The model is suggesting that such profound learning cannot be facilitated without 
active knowledge exchange that culminates in system changes.  Therefore, the EPS dynamics 
are far more complex than they can be adequately explained using a routine-based view 
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(Ndubisi, 2011), with “operational efficiency” being the sole metric to assess its 
effectiveness.  Contextual factors, such as resources and unconstrained structure, do matter to 
EPS—but without the dynamics that play out once those structural elements are put in place, 
engineering knowledge creation as a “system” (Senge, 2006) cannot be fully understood.   
From this perspective, this work contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of 
engineering as it is practiced in the real world. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to apply Nonaka’s knowledge-
creation concept to engineering, in a U.S. context—including modeling of ba.  Just as 
Schulze and Hoegl’s (2006) European study found no evidence of cultural incompatibility of 
the SECI process (Nonaka et al., 2000), this study, likewise, did not find support for SECI’s 
non-applicability to U.S. setting.  Thus, the study adds empirical evidence of SECI’s 
transferability to non-Asian settings.  Further, the study makes a novel first attempt to model 
ba.  While a few measurement precision issues were identified, a solid first step was taken to 
operationalize this construct, yielding results that can assist in further developing and 
refining it.  Thus, the study makes a contribution on three research fronts.   
With regard to the construct of engineering ba, three of its six formative elements in 
the posited model—clarity of vision, controlled urgency, and knowledge redundancy—were 
found to be non-significant relative to the remaining three.  This interesting finding may owe 
to the fact that “the collective learning process in an organization is inherently local” 
(Edmondson, 2002, p. 142).  Engineering being a highly technical practice, similar to the 
cardiac operating units in Edmondson’s (2003) study, an EPS team can be equated to one of 
“highly self-sufficient operating units, such that senior management attention and other 
resources seem quite far removed from the front-line activities” (Edmondson, 2003, p. 1443).  
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In such a work context, proximal oversight provided by team leadership becomes more 
influential and can either undermine or enhance corporate policies and vision statements 
(Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 2002, 2003).  The “Knowledge-Creation 
Enablers” scale used for this study had been developed by Lloria and Moreno-Lúzon (2005) 
based on their interpretation of Nonaka’s theory.  They conceptualized the knowledge-
creation enabling conditions as a diverse set of variables having different natures and 
origins—such as strategy formulation, organizational design, and human resources 
management.  Each of the six conditions touches on the micro-, meso-, and macro-aspects of 
an organization at varying degrees.  Vision / intention is a more macro- than micro-level 
factor, having its roots in strategic literature, while autonomy touches on all three levels of an 
organization (Lloria & Moreno-Luzón, 2005).  Autonomy, as conceptualized by Lloria and 
Moreno-Luzón (2005), also interacts closely with creative chaos (equivalent of controlled 
urgency in this study) and requisite variety in a positive way.  Trust and commitment, which 
Lloria and Moreno-Luzón  (2005, p. 229) draw a direct association with the concept of ba, is 
intimately related to psychological safety that is well established in the literature to be critical 
especially for group-level performance (e.g., Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 
2002, 2003).  Thus, the speculation at this time is the over-powering influence of autonomy, 
requisite variety, and trust over the performance of EPS teams.   
In the next and final chapter of this dissertation, a summary of both the qualitative 
and quantitative findings will be presented to set directions for future exploration to further 
refine this framework. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Engineering literature provides ample evidence that supports the positive influence of 
such organizational factors as resources, flexible structure, and trust on problem solving in 
general.  The relevant question that can yield value for both research and practice is, “In what 
way do these factors contribute?”—and what is missing in the understanding of engineering 
problem solving (EPS) as an opportunity for new knowledge acquisition and organizational 
learning.  A major contribution of this study is to unlock the black box of EPS dynamics and 
to show “how” sustained learning can occur.  The empirical evidence from this study has 
demonstrated that, while these well-proven contextual factors fully contribute to project 
efficiency—and partially contribute to product quality—they do not contribute to system 
changes unless mediated by knowledge-creation routines.  System changes are necessary to 
prevent the recurrence of problems, and the EPS teams that fail to systematize routines for 
knowledge creation are less likely to generate true lessons learned.  The remainder of this 
chapter presents the study implications for theory and practice, acknowledging the study’s 
limitations and concluding this research journey with an eye toward the future. 
Limitations 
Several limitations of this two-stage study should be noted.  For both the qualitative 
and quantitative investigations, the informants were predominantly automotive engineers, 
owing to the author’s career background.  Most respondents were employed by, and worked 
at, the home office facilities of U.S. Midwest firms, over half of which were associated with 
the automotive industry.  There is always a chance that regional and industry commonality 
predisposed the samples to location-specific and industry-prevalent attitudes.  Although 
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coherent themes emerged from the data, future research should seek to confirm the study 
findings among a larger sample of non-automotive engineers. 
Secondly, temporal and valence (negative versus positive) issues related to memory 
recall may also have affected response patterns.  In the qualitative investigation, in particular, 
the tendency to recall recent events and positive experiences more vividly (D'Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004) may have influenced sensorial details and clarity of contextual 
information provided in the narratives.  In other words, “successful” stories may have been 
remembered with greater intensity and clarity than “less successful” stories.  Additionally, 
while the interviewees were asked to consider events occurring in the past 24 months, some 
of them were motivated to narrate more distant experiences.  Consequently, the potential 
effect of time on memory in the stories that resulted has to be acknowledged. 
Further, both the qualitative and quantitative investigations were a cross-sectional 
study, that is to say a snapshot of a single point in time.  Because organizations are living 
entities, a longitudinal study to follow up on the insights gained from this study should 
further enhance the understanding of EPS dynamics.  Additionally, both the qualitative and 
quantitative investigations utilized a single-informant source (i.e., engineers).  A future study 
incorporating multiple informant sources is strongly recommended.  For example, a study 
may be designed and implemented such that engineers respond to EPS process related 
questions while managerial responses are collected on EPS outcomes.  Such a dual-informant 
rating system should further strengthen the research design and improve validity.     
Finally, specific to the qualitative investigation, the categorization and interpretation 
of data depended on the perspectives and knowledge of the researcher (i.e., the author)—as is 
typical of a study like this.  A research process is not entirely free of researcher bias, so it is 
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important for researchers “to be continuously aware of the possibility that [they] are being 
influenced by pre-existing conceptualizations of [their own] subject area” (Suddaby, 2006, p. 
635).  The author is an experienced automotive reliability engineer, working closely with 
product design engineers.  While every effort was made to stay attentive to preconceptions in 
exercising interpretive judgment, the potential effect arising from the author’s past and 
present experience must be acknowledged. 
Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
The state of this research is still exploratory in nature; the study results and discussion 
should be viewed as suggestive—rather than definitive—evidence of the phenomena 
revealed.  Despite their preliminary nature, however, the study findings suggest several 
important implications for theory.   
Theoretical implications.  First, this research extends the ontologically based view 
of EPS effectiveness to complement the current understanding of the phenomena by 
addressing the experiential and cognitive sides of engineering.  The study takes EPS beyond 
popular metrics, structural control, and hard assets (e.g., information databases) by taking an 
epistemological approach to explain the “how” and “why” of effective EPS.  In so doing, the 
research has illuminated pathways to sustained learning.  Secondly, this work contributes—
with a combined strength of qualitative and quantitative methods—to the limited body of 
empirical evidence around mechanisms that leverage engineering knowledge embedded in 
local contexts to find problem solutions and achieve project goals effectively and efficiently.  
The work drew heavily from the extant literature on organizational learning; thus, in return, 
provides “cumulative and integrative work” that “cross-fertilizes and synthesizes the results 
from previous research” (Huber, 1991, pp. 107-108) to the organizational learning research 
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landscape.  Finally, to our knowledge, this study was the first to attempt quantitative 
modeling and testing of the ba construct in a U.S. context.  While there is no doubt that 
further refinement is needed, the modeling results offer one glimpse into how contextual 
factors play out in EPS team dynamics and in turn influence collective learning.  Such 
“positioning [of] structure within the emotional realm recognizes frequently ignored 
communication channels that offer an important complement to rational means of structuring 
organizational relationships” (Hatch, 1999, p. 89).  All in all, the study findings are a 
contribution to a more complete and comprehensive epistemology of engineering practices. 
Future research.  In addition to the recommendations for addressing the 
shortcomings of the study discussed in the Limitations section, there are a few very 
promising areas of investigation to continue the course of this research inquiry.  First, at a 
micro level, the engineering knowledge creation routines—explored epistemologically in this 
study—can further be examined from other interpretive viewpoints to better understand the 
“how” of collective learning.  Adams and colleagues (2010; 2011), for example, shed light 
on what “working together across disciplines” really means and specifically what it entails in 
engineering practice.  Their four-tier categorization of cross-disciplinary interactions 
provides criteria for judging the progression of cognitive synchronization among engineering 
actors.  This categorization could serve as a metric of how well the process is working as 
engineers working together learn from others and eventually attain higher learning through 
differences.  The manner in which engineering team members co-create knowledge through 
their disparate knowledge domains and levels is also an important phenomenon to research.  
Do they, for example, achieve collective learning by “traversing” or by “transcending” their 
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knowledge differences (Majchrzak, More, & Faraj, 2012)?  Further exploration of ba 
dynamics in the integration of knowledge differences would be worthwhile.   
At a meso or macro level, actor network theory (Latour, 2005) is a possible 
application to better understand the effects of bounded rationality on the socio-technical 
network configuration.  Engineers trying to solve technical problems constantly build and 
test hypotheses as forms of argument.  It is through complex technical discourse that a lead 
engineer tries to convince other actors and solicit their “enrollment” (Harty, 2008).  
Understanding how engineers’ aligned interests become an actor network, and, most 
importantly, how network heterogeneity (Law, 1992) can be leveraged to form a competitive 
advantage, will be of great interest to engineering firms, to the management of engineering 
talent, and ultimately to engineering education.  Along this line, a deliberate construction of 
contextual settings that harbor power for effective problem solving can benefit from an 
analysis of engineering practice at large.  An environment that facilitates collective 
sensemaking in problem solving efforts may be put in Bourdieusian perspective of an 
organization as a field (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Swartz, 2008).  That is to say the 
engineering context is a cultural milieu situated in a larger field and is configured according 
to power clusters.  Given that problem solving stakeholders (e.g., management, customers, 
suppliers, as well as engineers) reside in various parts of the field, each entitled to varying 
intensity of “capital,” what routines are at play when they come together?  What is the 
underlying logic of the field that is closely connected to its “habitus”—a system of 
dispositions that are acquired through past events and that influence current practices?  Such 
characterization may shed further insight into a strategy to create a “field of resonance” 
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(Yamaguchi, 2006) capable of fostering problem solving that yields knowledge creation for 
breakthrough solutions. 
Finally, micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors are inevitably linked.  To fully 
understand team learning, the influences and resources provided at all levels should be 
considered side by side (Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006).  As touched upon in Chapter 5, the 
enablers of ba as conceptualized by Nonaka and colleagues (2000)—which this study 
explored—are a set of multi-level constructs having diverse origins in the organizational 
literature (Lloria & Moreno-Luzón, 2005).  “[A]dditional research to include factors at 
multiple levels to tease out the particular organizational features most likely to support or 
impede [team] learning” as advocated by Zellmer-Bruhn and Gibson (2006, p. 514) should 
prove useful to further understand how the enablers of ba exude influence on EPS 
effectiveness.  
Practical Implications 
The study has demonstrated that contextual factors—such as autonomy, resources, 
and trust—alone are, at best, predictors only of project efficiency.  They do not predict 
learning and only partially predict product quality.  These knowledge-related outcomes are 
mediated by knowledge-creation routines, which denote action.  Contextual factors, then, 
require more than a check-in-the-box approach to management if they are to serve as 
mobilizing forces of EPS team action.  Scholars have often used a jazz metaphor to explain 
aspects of “organizing.”  The analogy of fluidity and improvisation in the jazz music has 
served to describe the temporal, emotional, and ambiguous dimensions of organizational 
structure (Hatch, 1999); to explain how the dialectic forces of control and spontaneity co-
exist and play out in organizations (Weick, 1998); and to propose an organizational design 
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mirroring a jazz band for maximizing learning and innovation (Barrett, 1998).  Jazz 
metaphors have a strong affinity to the ba concept as a knowledge-enabling context 
advocated by von Krogh and colleagues (2001).  They argue that such a context “involves a 
mix of deliberate decisions and going with the flow” (von Krogh et al., 2001, p. 17), 
requiring a balancing act of “supporting creativity and unhindered communication, yet 
shaping it to serve the organization’s goals” (p. 44).  Amalgamation of both the qualitative 
and quantitative findings, juxtaposed with this ba-jazz metaphor, can lead to the following 
recommendations for practice. 
Good listening skills are essential for healthy collaboration.  Problem solving, 
especially in its early stage, is filled with the unknown.  “Using ambiguity effectively 
requires an engaged ability to listen and respond, as the jazz metaphor makes plain” (Hatch, 
1999, p. 88).  Good listening is essential for good improvisation, which “also requires 
listening to one’s own comments and building on them” (Weick, 1998, p. 547).  For 
engineers to effectively operate as “agents” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hill & Jones, 1992) of EPS 
stakeholders, they need to acquire good listening skills.  They should be encouraged to 
actively engage stakeholders—fellow engineers from other disciplines or cultures, customers, 
suppliers, or whatever the case may be—in the search for a solution.  Their efforts to develop 
the “same language” by openly asking questions, and in so doing suspending judgment from 
time to time to understand a different set of logics that may be at play in the exchange, 
should be supported.  Only after understanding differences in what people know and how 
they communicate, can one start to constructively challenge others’ assumptions.  These 
skills are particularly important for engineers leading the problem solving efforts.       
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By extension, it is the manager’s duty to enable cultivation of such bridging skills.  
Both the qualitative and quantitative study results showed “sociality” of EPS processes in 
bringing out tacit knowledge as an ingredient for the final knowledge outcomes.  These 
processes, akin to jazz, are, in the end, not an individual but a social accomplishment 
achieved through “continual negotiation toward dynamic synchronization [through a] 
remarkable degree of empathic competence, a mutual orientation to one another’s unfolding” 
(Barrett, 1998, p. 613).  Managerial attention should be provided to help engineers, especially 
the young engineers, learn to collaborate effectively with diverse talent.  As Weick (1998, p. 
552) argues, “Young musicians who are laden with technique often tend to be poor at 
improvisation because they lack voices, melodies, and feeling.”  Most novice engineers 
straight out of school do not come equipped with skills to build common ground among 
varied interests.  Such wisdom, or phronesis, can only be developed through experience 
(Grint, 2007).   
Trust and psychological safety cannot be over-emphasized.  Every manager 
should be reminded that technical problem solving, especially in its early stage, relies heavily 
on “experimentation.”  To experiment is to “reflect while acting” (Weick, 1988, 1998), as 
jazz players do to keep the improvisatory nature of their performance from totally going out 
of order (Barrett, 1998).  Quality improvement, for example, as Weick (1998, p. 549) argues, 
“occurs when people are newly authorized to paraphrase, embellish, and reassemble their 
prevailing routines, extemporaneously . . . are encouraged to think while doing rather than be 
guided solely by plans.”  Experimentation flourishes in a “caring” environment.  As von 
Krogh et al. (2001) argue, a “high care” brought to ba infuses mutual trust and active 
empathy and brings everyone on board for knowledge creation; a “low care” on the other 
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hand stimulates hyper-competition and promotes knowledge “seizing” at its worst.  It is in 
every manager’s best interest to ensure that knowledge is freely and actively exchanged in 
the EPS ba without fear of repercussion for expressing or trying out different ideas.  The 
leader of a ba should watch over development of team dynamics and insist on the importance 
of including diverse voices.  Simultaneous listening and playing is what produces the give-
and-take flavor of live jazz performance (Hatch, 1999).  A structured process to give every 
participant a chance to lead a segment of EPS activities, as well as to value those who make 
room for others to excel at times, can be among the measures to offset dominant members 
who may monopolize the platform. 
Group sensemaking requires time.  Reflection-in-action is essentially about 
sensemaking (Weick, 1998).  This dissertation research has shown that sustained learning is 
not achieved unless mediated by a set of knowledge-creation routines.  The full mediation 
structure revealed by the study basically denotes a sensemaking process—that is to say, 
engineers make sense of product-related problems through multi-directional knowledge 
exchange as a pathway to learning.  In successful sensemaking, engineers socialize to 
exchange tacit knowledge and gradually form a collective interpretation that is fully 
externalized and deployed in the end.  This process is not an instantaneous affair.  Good team 
dynamics that facilitate effective sensemaking are not built overnight.  Learning jazz is 
essentially done by becoming a member of the jazz community, “hanging out” to listen to 
great music and recordings, exchanging stories, and taking turns soloing and supporting in 
practice (Barrett, 1998).  The notion that team building can be accomplished over one-night 
beer-drinking sessions merits reconsideration and should be replaced with more mindful 
tactics to enable healthy interactions.  At minimum, the leader of a ba should ensure adequate 
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logistics (e.g., meeting room resources) and treat ba management not as a one-time venture 
but as an “on-going temporal coordination” of the jazz ensemble (Barrett, 1998, p. 612).   
Ba must be managed in situ.  Since sensemaking is embodied in improvisation 
(Weick, 1998), it is virtually impossible to know when a break-through insight surfaces 
during the EPS routines ex ante.  The essence of autonomy—one of the contextual factors 
found to be significant in EPS ba formation—is “a structure that supports but does not 
specify” (Hatch, 1999, p. 83) in jazz improvisation.  This structure is a part of the process of 
becoming, through players’ action and engagement, rather than a state of being (Hatch, 
1999; Weick, 1998).  Similarly, in problem solving, new perspectives tend to form through 
unanticipated connections, often facilitated by personal interactions (Hargadon & Bechky, 
2006).  Such interactions, however, are difficult to predict beforehand and can only be 
monitored and steered as they progress.  Engineering practice is dynamic, both contextually 
and temporally, and so the only way to effectively manage it is to “enter the process” (Hatch, 
1999).  EPS dynamics in a ba must be monitored in situ.  Effective management of ba 
requires an “in-dwelling” (von Krogh et al., 2001) approach, rather than simple cheerleading, 
to recognize “how the memories and expectations of organizational actors intersect at any 
given moment to structure the emotional and temporal dimensions of work and organizing in 
such a way as to influence action” (Hatch, 1999, p. 94).  An effective root cause analysis is 
more than just following the prescribed steps of 8D, Six Sigma, or other popular 
methodologies.  While any one of these can provide a basic procedural structure for EPS 
activities, a methodological framework alone cannot facilitate constructive interactions and 
knowledge exchange.  Cognitive synchronization is a result of on-going reframing to 
evaluate the problem in new contexts as they surface.  Encouragement of healthy technical 
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exchange by on-going managerial engagement in the dialog is one of the ways to keep ba 
productive.    
Sustained learning cannot be achieved with IT technology alone.  For many 
decades, companies made considerable investments in “knowledge management” 
technology, infrastructure, and metrics—only to yield rather limited benefits (Hargadon & 
Bechky, 2006; "Making an internal collaboration work: An interview with Don Tapscott," 
2013; Senge, 2006; von Krogh et al., 2001).  Information technology (IT) databases are 
undoubtedly useful tools if one knows precisely what to query.  When such moments of task 
rationality reach the limits, however, and efficiency is no longer the answer, these empty 
spaces call for opportunities to improvise like good jazz performance (Hatch, 1999).  Over-
reliance on codification of knowledge as a sole means of knowledge management misses the 
aspects of knowledge that is “attached to human emotions, aspirations, hopes, and intentions 
. . . embodied [and] closely tied to the senses and previous experiences” (von Krogh et al., 
2001, pp. 30-31).  Scholars (e.g., "Making an internal collaboration work: An interview with 
Don Tapscott," 2013; von Krogh et al., 2001) argue that knowledge is not a finite asset, 
cannot be containerized because it is boundless, and can only be created and diffused through 
human processes.  Success of EPS depends on organizational members’ commitment to 
actively use the existing knowledge management system to solve local problems.  Such a 
system must be enticing ("Making an internal collaboration work: An interview with Don 
Tapscott," 2013) and thoughtfully put together to enhance users’ ability to reflect on new 
questions.   IT databases neither perform sensemaking nor reframe a past problem in new 
contexts for the users (Brannen, 2004; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006). 
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Basic technical training should not be neglected.  Last, but certainly not least, 
while this study emphasized the importance of evaluative knowledge in problem solving, 
managers should not forget that this knowledge is grounded on both the intellect and 
technical know-how of engineers.   During the qualitative interviews, asked how a company 
might be able to enhance organizational learning, the participating engineers oftentimes 
brought up in-house training classes and mentoring programs to enhance the technical 
knowledge and skill levels of engineering and technical employees.  Several younger 
engineers complained about lack of mentoring and coaching in their workplaces, which, 
according to them, was once a norm but was rapidly disappearing in the company’s attempt 
to rationalize workforce structure and protocol.  “[E]ffective [jazz] improvisation is based on 
a depth of experience and degree of discipline, a reality that is often camouflaged by the 
spontaneity of the performance” (Meyer, Frost, & Weick, 1998, p. 541).  Phronesis is built 
on episteme and techné.  The criticality of intellectual and practical knowledge as the two 
legs upon which superior performance stands is consistent with the findings from 
Trevelyan’s (2007) empirical study.  He found that, while non-technical, inter-personal 
coordination is a major aspect of engineering practice, its effectiveness relies critically on the 
engineer’s technical expertise.  Therefore, it is in the best interest of engineering 
organizations to make available to their members venues for continuous skill improvement.   
In Closing . . . 
Simply put, findings from this study suggest that effective leaders of engineering ba 
must almost be “walking sensors.”  Their duties are much more than enforcing prescriptive 
routines of problem solving.  They must constantly be monitoring the direction of energy 
flow, the intensity of human interaction, and send feedback signals into the ba system at 
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appropriate times—especially when sensing the imminence of break-though insights.  Such 
rare and fleeting moments do not come announced a priori, and grasping them is a perceptual 
acuity challenge that the ba leaders must accept.  It may be a tall order, but it is not 
unrealistic.  Today’s fast-changing business environment is already re-shaping corporate 
strategy management.  The approach taken to strategic planning and execution is becoming 
more surveillance-based, looking for subtle cues and near misses that can, one day, shake the 
business to its core (Evans, 2013).  Strategic management is now an “on-going journey” that 
requires businesses to “constantly re-check their positions” on the map.  Such a process 
requires high attention paid to all aspects of organization, and ba management is no different.  
Firms that are likely to sustain their presence in the complex and dynamic world of today will 
do so by leveraging all of their resources, including the improvisational, implicit aspects of 
organization.   
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
1. I’d like to start by learning a little about you, both personally and professionally.  Please tell 
me about yourself, starting from where you are originally from and ending with your current 
job.  Tell me how you got to your present job and what you do there. 
  
• place of origin 
• schooling 
• reason for becoming an engineer 
• reason for choosing that industry / products  
• present position in the company / responsibilities  
• length of time with current job / company 
• hobbies / outside interests, if any 
 
2. I’m interested in learning about your product engineering experience in solving product 
related problems. Can you think about a particular experience you’ve had in solving a 
product related problem that worked out well?  
 
• customer complaints? 
• lab or field failures? 
• manufacturing defect / returns? 
• warranty claims / spikes, etc.   
 
Please tell me about    
• how you discovered the problem? 
• what you did next? 
• then what happened? 
• what was learned from this experience.  Who benefited from it?  How was the 
learning shared with others?  What did the company do as a result of this problem 
solving? 
 
Can you now think about a particular experience you’ve had solving a product related problem 
that didn’t go so well – for example, the problem was not solved smoothly or not solved at all? 
3. Now, thinking about those two cases you just told me about, 
 
a) For the successful case, what was the most challenging part, and what was the 
easiest?  
b) Please give me three reasons that the first case was successful. 
c) …and three reasons that the second case was unsuccessful. 
 
Talking in generalities, product engineers create tremendous amounts of knowledge day-in and 
day-out, developing products and solving product-related problems. What could a company do to 
capture the knowledge you – and your colleagues – have.  How can companies in general do a 
better job capturing, retaining, and sharing that knowledge? 
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APPENDIX B: CONSTRUCT TABLE 
 
Concept, Construct, Dimensions, and Operationalization 
Concept: Engineering Ba is an enacted context triggered by a need to solve a technical problem, 
hypothesized to have been formed when certain conditions exist and to be reflected in positive group 
dynamics 
Construct name and definition(s): Ba is defined in 
several ways in literature.  A ba can be a – 
 
1. contextual space formed or “born” where 
relationships emerge and positive group 
dynamics are observed (Itami, 2010a, 2010b)  
 
2.  “shared context in motion” for knowledge, 
which is energized by organizational enabling 
conditions (Nonaka et al., 2000 Lloria and 
Moreno-Luzón, 2005) 
 
3. “field of resonance” in which decision 
makers and innovators share tacit knowledge, 
without which paradigm-disruptive 
innovations are not possible 
 
Construct dimension(s): Formative and reflective 
dimensions 
 
Formative –  
• Intention / knowledge vision  
• Autonomy 
• Creative chaos 
• Redundancy 
• Requisite variety 
• Love, trust, and commitment 
 
Reflective – 
• Positive team dynamics 
• Inter-subjectivity  
   
 
Operationalization and scale properties: 
 
For the formative dimensions – 
 
Lloria and Moreno-Luzón’s (2005) “six 
enabling conditions of knowledge creation” 
scale (7-point Likert; µ, σ, ρ not reported): 
 
• Intention / vision (CR = 0.903):  4 items 
[VISION1] – [VISION4] in Appendix C 
• Autonomy (CR = 0.849): 4 items [AUTO1] 
– [AUTO4] in Appendix C 
• Creative chaos / urgency (CR = 0.691): 4 
items [URG1] – [URG4] in Appendix C 
• Redundancy / sharing (CR = 0.689): 4 
items [RED1] – [RED4] in Appendix C 
• Requisite variety / resources (CR = 0.738): 
4 items [VAR1] – [VAR4] in Appendix C 
• Trust (CR = 0.779): 4 items [TRUST1] – 
[TRUST4] in Appendix C 
 
For the reflective dimension – 
 
Hoegl, Weinkauf, and Gemuenden’s (2004) 
“Six aspects of teamwork quality” scale (5-
point Likert; µ = 3.67 / 3.63, σ = 0.41 / 0.37, ρ 
= 0.70 – 0.89): 
 
• Communication: 5 items [COMM1] – 
[COMM5] in Appendix C 
• Coordination: 5 items [COORD1] – 
[COORD3] in Appendix C 
• Mutual support:  4 items [SUPP1] – 
[SUPP4] in Appendix C 
• Effort:  3 items [EFFORT1] – [EFFORT3] 
in Appendix C 
• Balanced contribution:  3 items [BAL1] – 
[BAL3] in Appendix C 
• Cohesion: 2 items [COH1] – [COH2] in 
Appendix C 
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Concept, Construct, Dimensions, and Operationalization 
Concept: Knowledge Creation is a group cognitive state in which active knowledge exchange occurs, 
forming a collective engineering interpretation culminating in superior solution and system changes 
Construct name and definition(s): Knowledge 
creation (as modeled using Nonaka’s theory) is a 
multi-directional knowledge conversion process 
through which tacit knowledge becomes explicit and 
augmented, a.k.a. “SECI process.” 
 
Construct dimension(s): 
• Socialization = tacit-to-tacit knowledge exchange 
• Externalization = tacit-to-explicit knowledge 
conversion  
• Combination = explicit-to-explicit knowledge 
augmentation  
• Internalization = explicit-to-tacit knowledge 
transfer 
 
Operationalization and scale properties: Schulze 
and Hoegl’s (2006) “four dimensions of 
knowledge-creation modes” scale (5-point Likert) 
is used. 
 
• Socialization (µ = 3.33 / 3.49, σ = 0.91 / 0.78, 
CR = 0.81):  4 items [SOC1] – [SOC4] in 
Appendix C 
• Externalization (µ = 3.58 / 3.42, σ = 0.84 / 
0.81, CR = 0.82):  4 items [EXT1] – [EXT4] in 
Appendix C 
• Combination (µ = 3.18 / 3.17, σ = 0.86 / 0.87, 
CR = 0.80):  4 items [COMB1] – [COMB4] in 
Appendix C 
• Internalization (µ = 2.96 / 3.03, σ = 0.98 / 
1.08, CR = 0.78):  4 items [INT1] – [INT4] in 
Appendix C 
 
Concept: Learning Achieved refers to sustained learning occurring as a result of problem solving 
Construct name and definition(s): Learning 
achieved as borrowed from Zellmer-Bruhn and 
Gibson(2006) measures the extent to which the team 
created new processes and practices 
 
Construct dimension(s): Uni-dimensional  
 
Operationalization and scale properties: 
Zellmer-Bruhn and Gibson’s (2006) “learning 
achieved” scale (7-point scale; µ = 4.61, σ = 1.08, 
ρ = .84; λ in PCA ranging from .78 to .87) is used. 
 
3 items [LEARN1] – [LEARN3] in Appendix C 
 
Concept: Product Quality refers to the extent to which the corrected product meets its requirements. 
Construct name and definition(s): Product quality as 
borrowed from Schulze and Hoegl (2006) measures 
the extent to which the product meets technical and 
customer requirements (e.g., functionality, reliability, 
durability, and compatibility with other systems.)  
 
Construct dimension(s): Multi-faceted 
 
Operationalization and scale properties: Schulze 
and Hoegl’s (2006) “product quality” scale (5-point 
scale; µ = 4.22, σ = 0.45 / 0.81, ρ = 0.89) is used. 
 
9 items [QUAL1] – [QUAL9] in Appendix C  
Concept: Project Efficiency refers to the efficiency with which the problem solving endeavor was 
brought to closure 
Construct name and definition(s): Project efficiency 
as borrowed directly from Schulze and Hoegl (2006) 
measures the extent to which the project met its 
objectives such as adherence to schedule and cost-
efficiency considerations.  
 
Construct dimension(s): Uni-dimensional  
 
Operationalization and scale properties: Schulze 
and Hoegl’s (2006) “project efficiency” scale (5-
point scale; µ = 3.40, σ = 0.97, ρ = 0.82) is used. 
 
3 items [EFFIC1] – [EFFIC3] in Appendix C 
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APPENDIX C: OPERATIONAL ITEMS TO MEASURE STUDY CONSTRUCTS 
 
Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Intention / Vision Item IDs: VISION1 – VISION4 
1. There was a set of requirements or criteria that helped define our problem solving goals. 
2. People in leadership positions explicitly conveyed the problem solving goals to   stakeholders both 
within and outside your team. 
3. The requirements / criteria were disseminated to stakeholders. 
4. The requirements / criteria guided efforts of those engaged in problem solving. 
 
Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Autonomy Item IDs: AUTO1 – AUTO4 
1. Team independence in decision making on the tasks carried out was assured. 
2. Independence of qualified personnel in decision making in the tasks they perform was respected. 
3. The problem solving team was motivated to create, apply, and absorb new information. 
4. Each team member was encouraged to create, apply, and absorb new knowledge. 
 
Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Urgency (Creative 
Chaos) 
Item IDs: URG1 – URG4 
1. As a result of the problem, our leadership exhibited a sense of urgency without loss of control or 
disciplines. 
2. Our leadership communicated a sense of urgency in a positive manner. 
3. Our leadership made efforts to positively motivate the team and individuals after communicating the 
sense of urgency. 
4. We felt we were positively challenged during the course of problem solving. 
 
Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Redundancy Item IDs: RED1—RED4 
1. My organization promoted interaction between those involved (team members, stakeholders, etc.). 
2. My organization supported people moving between groups as needed to share information to facilitate 
problem solving.  
3. There was enough overlap of knowledge or expertise among the team members to understand each 
other’s approach. 
4. There were meetings and forums to share knowledge and ideas. 
 
Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Requisite Variety Item IDs: VAR1 – VAR4  
1. There was active and sufficient contact between the problem solving team and its external stakeholders 
(e.g., customers, suppliers, etc.). 
2. The organization supported the problem solving team’s changing resource needs (e.g., a temporary 
priority access to test facilities) as new insights unfolded from problem investigation efforts. 
3. Team membership and task assignments were re-structured or modified as new insights unfolded from 
problem investigation efforts. 
4. Team members and external stakeholders often crossed boundaries to facilitate problem solving efforts. 
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Construct: Ba – Enablers Dimension: Trust & Commitment Item IDs: TRUST1 – TRUST4 
1. In my organization, mutual trust was a stated value.  
2. In my organization, commitment to common objectives was a stated value. 
3. We had mutual trust. 
4. We were committed to common objectives. 
 
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Communication Item IDs: COMM1 – COMM5 
1. There was sufficient communication within our team.  
2. There was active communication between our team members.  
3. Team members openly and candidly shared relevant information on problem solving. 
4. The team members were satisfied with the timeliness of information received from other members.  
5. The team members were satisfied with the accuracy of the information received from other members. 
 
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Coordination Item IDs: COORD1 – COORD3 
1. The team members’ tasks were closely aligned to accomplish problem solving objectives. 
2. The team tried to avoid duplication of effort. 
3. The connected tasks were well coordinated. 
 
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Mutual Support Item IDs: SUPP1 – SUPP4 
1. Discussions to resolve conflicting views and points were constructively conducted. 
2. Suggestions and contributions from team members were always respected. 
3. Suggestions and contributions from team members were always discussed and developed further as 
appropriate. 
4. There was a cooperative work atmosphere in our team. 
 
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Effort Item IDs: EFFORT1 – 
EFFORT3 
1. Team members felt fully responsible for achieving the common team goals. 
2. Team members exerted full efforts for a successful completion of the problem solving. 
3.  Team members gave the problem solving highest priority. 
 
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Balanced Contribution Item IDs: BAL1 – BAL3 
1. Team members were equally engaged to achieve the common goals. 
2. Team members fully contributed to our objectives. 
3. Team members would step in to help other members who might need support. 
 
  
  
148
Construct: Ba – Team 
Dynamics 
Dimension: Cohesion Item IDs: COH1 – COH2 
1. In our team there was personal affinity among the members. 
2. In our team we stuck together during the course of problem solving. 
 
Construct: Knowledge 
Creation 
Dimension: Socialization Item IDs: SOC1 – SOC4 
1. We had sufficient personal interaction with other people within our team to discuss suggestions, ideas, or 
solutions outside organized meetings. 
2. We had sufficient personal interaction with people from other departments in the company in order to 
discuss suggestions, ideas, or solutions outside organized meetings. 
3. We spent adequate time intensely discussing suggestions, ideas, or solutions in face-to-face meetings 
with people from other departments in the company. 
4. We spent adequate time consciously developing a common understanding of a problem with people from 
other departments in the company. 
 
Construct: Knowledge 
Creation 
Dimension: Externalization Item IDs: EXT1 – EXT4 
We spent adequate time… 
1. …collectively framing our ideas or solutions with regard to the problem. 
2. …consulting subject matter experts outside our team about relevant technologies. 
3. …consulting subject matter experts outside our team about customer or user expectations. 
4. …creating detailed descriptions (e.g., protocols, presentations, reports) capturing newly developed 
knowledge from our problem solving efforts. 
 
Construct: Knowledge 
Creation 
Dimension: Combination Item IDs: COMB1 – COMB4 
As part of our problem solving efforts, … 
1. …we systematically compiled and adapted the technical knowledge collected. 
2. …we systematically compiled and adapted the knowledge collected about customer or user needs. 
3. …we systematically compiled and adapted the knowledge collected about the procedures of developing 
and validating the product. 
4. …we distributed within and/or across the organization our newly gained insights about the product from 
our problem solving. 
 
Construct: Knowledge 
Creation 
Dimension: Internalization Item IDs: INT1 – INT4 
We spent adequate time… 
1. …experimenting to further our understanding of the functionality of the product technology. 
2. …experimenting to further our understanding of the customer or user needs. 
3. …experimenting to further our understanding of the procedures of developing and validating the 
product. 
4. …systematically testing our theoretical knowledge about the product and customer / user needs. 
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Construct: Learning Achieved Dimension:  Item IDs: LEARN1 – LEARN3 
On completion of problem solving, … 
1. …our team introduced a new way of doing work (e.g., developing / testing products, sourcing suppliers, 
etc.). 
2. …our team came up with new ideas about how work should be done. 
3. …our team's ideas were copied by other teams and / or implemented organization-wide (e.g., new 
designs, requirements, procedures, etc.). 
 
Construct: Product Quality Dimension:  Item IDs: QUAL1 – QUAL9 
On completion of problem solving . . . 
1. …our team was fully satisfied with the product’s performance. 
2. …the product fully met (or exceeded) our customer’s quality expectations. 
3. …the product was fully compatible with other systems. 
4. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated specifications 
5. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated functionality requirements 
6. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated reliability requirements 
7. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated usability requirements 
8. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated durability requirements 
9. …the product fully met (or exceeded) its initially anticipated visual / appearance requirements 
 
Construct: Project Efficiency Dimension:  Item IDs: EFFIC1 – EFFIC3 
1. On completion of problem solving, the team was satisfied with overall problem solving performance. 
2. On completion of problem solving, the problem was solved soon enough to (a) meet its initially 
anticipated launch schedule in the case of a pre-launch problem or (b) retain its competitive position in 
the field in the case of a post-launch problem. 
3. On completion of problem solving, the overall problem solving project finished by our initially 
anticipated target completion timing. 
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The information presented below provides the descriptive characteristics of the 
survey sample.  
D1. Sample Demographic Characteristics 
 
Shown in the two tables below are respondents’ experience level and educational 
attainment status broken down by men and women. 
Table D1  
Experience Levels of Participants 
Experience in years 
 
Men Women 
2 or more but less than 5 11 4 
5 or more but less than 10 13 1 
10 or more but less than 20 37 20 
20 or more but less than 30 53 16 
30 or more 46 7 
Total: 160 48 
 
 
Table D2  
Educational Levels of Participants 
Education 
 
Men Women 
No postsecondary degree 4 1 
Associate or technical certification 7 3 
Bachelor’s 59 12 
Graduate degrees 84 26 
Professional degrees (e.g., JD, MD, etc.) 5 6 
Other2) 1 0 
Total: 160 48 
2)
 Most of the original responses in this category were re-sorted into other categories.  For example, a few 
participants listed “PhD” as “Other,” rather than “Graduate degrees.”  The only response kept in “Other” is 
“P.E.” 
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D2. Problem Solving Contextual Characteristics 
 
Table D3  
Product Categories 
“What was the product?  Choose only one.” Count % 
Raw materials 11 5.3% 
Semi-finished materials (e.g., steel, chemical formulation, textile) 15 7.2% 
Finished goods – hardware only (e.g., mechanical parts, electrical hardware) 109 52.4% 
Finished goods – software only (e.g., computer program) 9 4.3% 
Finished goods – hardware and software (e.g., cars, embedded systems) 54 26.0% 
IT architecture / infrastructure 10 4.8% 
All other3) 0 0% 
Total: 208 100% 
3)
 After re-categorization 
 
 
Table D4  
Industry Affiliation by ICB Sector4) 
“What industry did the problem solving experience take place in?  
Choose only one.” 
Count % 
3350 - Automotive & Parts 142 68.3% 
2710 - Aerospace & Defense 16 7.7% 
9530 - Software & Computer 13 6.3% 
4530 - Healthcare Equipment 7 3.4% 
1350 - Chemicals 6 2.9% 
2350 - Construction & Materials 6 2.9% 
2750-2757: Industrial Machinery 3 1.4% 
3720 - Household Goods 3 1.4% 
0580 - Alternative Energy 2 1.0% 
1370 - Food Producers 2 1.0% 
9570 - Technology Hardware 2 1.0% 
2770 - Railroads 1 < 0.5% 
2790 - Support Services 1 < 0.5% 
3760 - Personal Goods 1 < 0.5% 
4570 - Pharmaceuticals 1 < 0.5% 
8880 - Entertainment 1 < 0.5% 
Other - Non-profit 1 < 0.5% 
Total: 208 100% 
4)
 Industry Classification Benchmark by Financial Times and Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
(http://www.icbenchmark.com/ICBDocs/ICB_%20Product_Spec_Nov2011.pdf)  
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Table D5  
Product Lifecycle Phase 
“What was the initial phase and mode of failure discovery?  Choose only one.” Count % 
Concept development 13 6.2% 
Product design and development 38 18.3% 
Engineering verification / validation 42 20.2% 
Production trial / launch 31 14.9% 
Full production – factory return 32 15.4% 
Full production – field / warranty returns 52 25.0% 
Other5) 0 0% 
Total: 208 100% 
5)
 After re-categorization 
 
 
Table D6  
Engineering Roles 
“What was your primary engineering role in the problem solving 
experience?  Choose only one.” 
Count % 
Product design, development, architecture, or application 80 38.5% 
Manufacturing, process / equipment design 26 12.5% 
Product testing / validation 26 12.5% 
Product maintenance or service 5 2.4% 
Support role such as quality, reliability, or warranty analysis 71 34.1% 
Other6) 0 0% 
Total: 208 100% 
6)
 After re-categorization 
 
 
Table D7  
Participants’ Roles in Problem Solving 
“What was your primary problem solving role?  Choose only one.” Count % 
Leader of problem-solving team 113 54.3% 
Support – core member of problem-solving team 79 38.0% 
Support – external stakeholder (e.g., management, customer 
representative, supplier representative) 
16 7.7% 
Other7) 0 0% 
Total: 208 100% 
7)
 After re-categorization 
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Table D8  
Geographical Location 
“Where was the facility where you worked located?  Choose only one.” Count % 
USA New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT) 2 1.0% 
USA Mid Atlantic (DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, DC) 10 4.8% 
USA South (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV) 22 10.6% 
USA Midwest (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI) 155 74.5% 
USA Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX) 10 4.8% 
USA West (AK, CO, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY) 9 4.3% 
Other8) 0 0% 
Total: 208 100% 
  8) Nine respondents excluded from this analysis. 
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APPENDIX E: SCALE RELIABILITY 
 
Scale Name  # Items in Scale Cronbach α Improved α if Item Deleted 
Vision 4 .863 None 
Autonomy 4 .798 None 
Urgency 4 .874 .875 if #4 deleted 
Redundancy 4 .773 .796 if #3 deleted 
Variety 4 .712 None 
Trust 4 .855 None 
Communication 5 .865 None 
Coordination 3 .785 .790 if #1 deleted 
Support 4 .835 None 
Effort 3 .838 .847 if #1 deleted 
Balance 3 .854 .878 if #3 deleted 
Cohesion 2 .753 N/A (2-item scale) 
Socialization 4 .841 None 
Externalization 4 .748 None 
Combination 4 .827 .862 if #4 deleted 
Internalization 4 .892 None 
Learning 3 .819 .843 if #3 deleted 
Quality 3 .917 None 
Efficiency 3 .773 None 
N = 208 
Reliability was checked prior to data transformation and removal of multivariate outliers. 
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APPENDIX F: FINAL DATA SET 
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APPENDIX G: EFA 
 
The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted using principal axis factoring 
(PAF) for extraction and an oblique rotation method (Direct Oblimin) based on the 
assumption that the underlying factors are correlated (non-orthogonal).  The results are 
shown below. 
 
 
As shown above, all except for two indicators load on the intended factors.  The two 
problem indicators are SOC_sq that represents the socialization dimension of Knowledge 
Creation and one of three indicators of Project Efficiency (EFFIC1_sq).  The former loads on 
the team dynamics dimension of Engineering ba, and the latter shows an appreciable cross-
loading. 
 
1 2 3 4
COMM_sq .855
COORD_sq .698
SUPP_sq .836
EFFORT_sq .770
BAL_sq .844
COH_sq .684
SOC_sq .703
EXT_sq -.654
COMB_sq -.781
INT_sq -.620
LEARN1_sq .859
LEARN2_sq .840
LEARN3_sq .595
EFFIC1_sq .381 .385
EFFIC2_sq .882
EFFIC3_sq .626
Pattern Matrixa
Factor
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APPENDIX H: CROSS-LOADING TABLE FOR REFLECTIVE MEASURES 
 
 
 
Ba - team 
dynamics Knowledge Learning Quality Efficiency
COMM_sq
.860** .595** .274** .453** .557**
COORD_sq
.794** .609** .312** .545** .467**
SUPP_sq
.874** .642** .257** .459** .547**
EFFORT_s
.824** .528** .187** .461** .542**
BAL_sq
.899** .613** .276** .470** .603**
COH_sq
.783** .556** .291** .357** .462**
SOC_sq
.713** .734** .236** .439** .412**
EXT_sq
.550** .853** .403** .391** .448**
COMB_sq
.504** .845** .462** .410** .429**
INT_sq
.563** .844** .415** .498** .364**
LEARN1_s
.295** .416** .887** .422** .372**
LEARN2_s
.288** .374** .877** .287** .361**
LEARN3_s
.226** .414** .805** .212** .229**
QUAL_sq
.545** .528** .362** 1.000** .506**
EFFIC1_s
.625** .506** .365** .597** .816**
EFFIC2_s
.550** .391** .310** .385** .888**
EFFIC3_s
.424** .379** .279** .302** .822**
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX I: COMMON METHOD BIAS EVALUATION IN PLS 
 
 
 
 
 
λS T-Stat P-value  (λS)2 λΜ T-Stat P-value  (λM)
2
VISION 0.786 6.311 0.000 *** 0.618 -0.079 0.636 0.526 NS 0.006
AUTO 0.558 5.806 0.000 *** 0.312 0.247 2.401 0.017 * 0.061
URG 1.031 14.241 0.000 *** 1.063 -0.222 2.381 0.018 * 0.049
RED 0.875 13.393 0.000 *** 0.765 -0.036 0.577 0.564 NS 0.001
VAR 0.751 8.583 0.000 *** 0.564 0.045 0.661 0.509 NS 0.002
TRUST 0.782 8.909 0.000 *** 0.612 0.053 0.542 0.588 NS 0.003
COMM 0.761 8.569 0.000 *** 0.579 0.108 1.220 0.224 NS 0.012
COORD 0.695 5.194 0.000 *** 0.483 0.099 0.733 0.464 NS 0.010
SUPP 0.654 6.798 0.000 *** 0.427 0.237 2.335 0.021 * 0.056
EFFORT 0.987 9.789 0.000 *** 0.974 -0.176 1.630 0.105 NS 0.031
BAL 1.075 14.643 0.000 *** 1.155 -0.188 2.330 0.021 * 0.035
COH 0.858 8.029 0.000 *** 0.737 -0.079 0.661 0.509 NS 0.006
SOC 0.367 3.198 0.002 *** 0.135 0.437 3.829 0.000 *** 0.191
EXT 0.881 15.026 0.000 *** 0.776 -0.033 0.512 0.610 NS 0.001
COMB 1.026 16.694 0.000 *** 1.053 -0.221 2.976 0.003 ** 0.049
INT 0.952 16.572 0.000 *** 0.905 -0.128 1.899 0.059 NS 0.016
LEARN1 0.878 31.168 0.000 *** 0.770 0.015 0.172 0.863 NS 0.000
LEARN2 0.876 30.688 0.000 *** 0.768 -0.008 0.075 0.940 NS 0.000
LEARN3 0.817 18.911 0.000 *** 0.667 -0.007 0.102 0.919 NS 0.000
Quality QUAL 1.000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Efficiency EFFIC1 0.627 10.357 0.000 *** 0.393 0.258 3.849 0.000 *** 0.066
EFFIC2 0.940 27.741 0.000 *** 0.883 -0.074 1.516 0.131 NS 0.006
EFFIC3 0.945 19.892 0.000 *** 0.892 -0.173 2.912 0.004 ** 0.030
Average: 0.706 0.029
NS Correlation is not significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Method Factor Loading (λM)
Ba - enabler 
(modeled as a 
reflective 
construct)
Ba - team 
dynamics
Knowledge
Learning
Indicator
Substantive Factor Loading (λS)
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APPENDIX J: CALCULATING GoF 
 
The global criterion of goodness of fit (GoF), as defined by Tenenhaus et al. (2004, p. 
173), was calculated as follows: 
2RCOMMGoF ×=
  
where 2R = average explained variability (R2)  
and  
COMM = geometric mean of the average communality. 
The 2R is an arithmetic mean of the R2 values for the endogenous latent variables 
(LVs) in the model.  In other words, 
m
R
R
m
i
i∑
== 1
2
2
  where 2iR = R
2
 of the ith endogenous LV when there is a total of m 
endogenous LVs (i.e., i = 1, . . . , m). 
The COMM is the weighted average of the communalities for the LVs that are 
measured by multiple indicators.  The weights are derived from the number of indicators for 
each LV, excluding those that are single-indicator variables.  Thus, 
∑
∑
=
=
=
n
j
j
n
j
jj
w
xw
COMM
1
1
 
where xj = communality of the jth LV excluding single-indicator LVs  
and 
wj = number of indicators for the jth variable 
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It should be noted, as Tenenhaus et al. (2004, p. 180) emphasize, single-indicator LVs 
should not be included in this calculation since the communality of a single-indicator 
variable automatically leads to 1 (i.e., xj ≠ 1 and wj ≠ 1). 
Following the procedures outlined by Tenenhaus et al. (2004, pp. 180-182), the 2R
and COMM  estimates for the research model were calculated as shown in the table below: 
 
Hence, the GoF for the model is calculated to be 
533.0420.0676.02 =×=×= RCOMMGoF
 
Next, this GoF value was evaluated against Wetzels et al.’s (2009) proposed 
thresholds:  0.1, 0.25, and 0.36 rated small, medium, and large, respectively.  The model’s 
GoF value, 0.533, exceeds the minimum criteria for “large GoF.”  The predictive 
performance of the hypothesized model is judged to be reasonably robust. 
 
Block R 2 Average 
Communality
MVs MV Weight Weighted 
Average
Ba - enablers N/A 0.6055 6 0.2727 0.1651
Ba - team dynamics 0.5938 0.7056 6 0.2727 0.1924
Knowledg 0.5106 0.6723 4 0.1818 0.1222
Learning 0.2156 0.7338 3 0.1364 0.1001
Quality 0.3560 1.0000 N/A N/A N/A
Efficien 0.4225 0.7066 3 0.1364 0.0964
Average 0.4197 Sum of weighted averages: 0.6762
MVs = manifest variables
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APPENDIX K: MEDIATION CHECK 
 
K1.  Ba  Knowledge  Learning 
The first step is to check whether the independent variable (IV) is a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable (DV).  In the mediation scheme illustrated below, the IV 
and DV are Ba and Learning, respectively. 
 
 
PLS analysis results show that the path from Ba to Learning (direct effect) is 
significant (β = .322, T-Stat = 4.77, P-value = .000) as illustrated below.   
 
Having demonstrated that the IV is a significant predictor of the DV, the next step is 
to confirm the significance of (1) the predictive path from the IV to the mediator 
(Knowledge) and (2) from the mediator to the DV while controlling for the IV.  As illustrated 
below, both (1) and (2) conditions hold.  Additionally, with mediation, the direct effect now 
becomes non-significant (β = -.033, T-Stat = 0.330, P-value = .742). 
Eng_ba
Knowledge
Learning
β= .322, T-Stat = 4.771, P-Value = .000
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Finally, using the path coefficient (a and b) and standard error (SE) estimates 
provided by PLS-Graph 3.0, two-sided confidence limits—that is to say lower confidence 
limit (LCL) on one side and upper confidence limit (UCL) on the other—around the indirect 
effect (a × b) were calculated through MacKinnon, Fritz, Williams, and Lockwood’s (2007) 
procedures.  MacKinnon and colleagues (2007) provide a host of programs—including 
Fortran-based “PRODCLIN” and “PRODCLIN2” tools7, as well as a web-based 
“RMediation” application8—all of which compute asymmetric confidence intervals on the 
product of two mediation path coefficients (Sobel test).  If the interval does not contain zero, 
the mediation effect is significant.  Using one of these applications, two-sided confidence 
limits on the posited mediation path were calculated.  The results are summarized in the table 
below:  
 
                                                 
7
 Available at http://www.public.asu.edu/~davidpm/ripl/Prodclin/ 
 
8
 Available at http://www.amp.gatech.edu/RMediation  
Eng_ba
Knowledge
Learning
β= -.033, T-Stat = 0.330, P-Value = 0.742
β= .720
T-Stat = 17.969
P-Value = .000
β= .489
T-Stat = 5.079
P-Value = .000
a b
a  = 0.7196 SE a  = 0.0398
b  = 0.4892 SE b  = 0.0961
LCL UCL
At .05 level (two-tailed) of significance 0.214 0.496
At .01 level (two-tailed) of significance 0.172 0.544
At .001 level (two-tailed) of significance 0.123 0.600
a
 
x b = 0.3520
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Confidence bounds were drawn at three different α levels (.05, .01, and .001).  None 
of them contain zero, implying support for a non-zero indirect effect and thereby support for 
mediation.  Therefore, full mediation is established for the path from engineering ba to 
learning achieved that is mediated by knowledge creation.  
K2.  Ba  Knowledge  Quality 
Same steps were followed to evaluate the significance of Knowledge Creation as a 
mediator for the relationship between Ba and Product Quality. 
 
The PLS analysis results show that the path from Ba (IV) to Quality (DV) is 
significant (β = .517, T-Stat = 8.979, P-value = .000), confirming the significance of direct 
effect, as illustrated below:   
 
Eng_ba
Knowledge
Quality
β= .517, T-Stat = 8.979, P-Value = .000
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PLS estimation results also confirm significance of the IV as predictor of the 
mediator, as well as significance of the mediator as predictor of the DV while controlling for 
the IV.  Further, with the inclusion of the mediation variable, the magnitude of direct effect 
decreases but remains significant (β = .321, T-Stat = 3.469, P-value = .001), as illustrated 
below: 
 
Confidence limits on the indirect effect based on a, b, and SE estimates, calculated by 
applying MacKinnon et al.’s (2007) procedures, are summarized in the table below:  
 
The confidence bounds support non-zero mediation effect at the .01 level of 
significance—but not at the .001 level.  From a practical perspective, we conclude that 
mediation is supported.  Thus, partial mediation is established for the path from engineering 
ba to product quality that is mediated by knowledge creation. 
 
 
Eng_ba
Knowledge
Quality
β= .321, T-Stat = 3.469, P-Value = .001
β= .720
T-Stat = 17.969
P-Value = .000
β= .282
T-Stat = 3.022
P-Value = .003
a b
a  = 0.7196 SE a  = 0.0398
b  = 0.2820 SE b  = 0.0923
LCL UCL
At .05 level (two-tailed) of significance 0.072 0.337
At .01 level (two-tailed) of significance 0.032 0.381
At .001 level (two-tailed) of significance -0.016 0.433
a
 
x b = 0.2029
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This dissertation research explores processes by which engineering problem solving 
(EPS) results in sustained organizational learning.  Approaching from a constructionist 
perspective, the study empirically examines the knowledge creation dynamics instigated by 
product-related problems using a mixed methods research approach.  The research has 
identified the Japanese concept of ba, defined in this study as “shared experiential space,” as 
a key construct that explains the phenomena of interest.  A new framework that the study has 
developed, which interprets EPS as an epistemic journey to attain system-wide 
improvements, is highly complementary to the traditional structured routine based 
approaches to engineering operations and management.      
Operational sustainability is an important issue for every enterprise’s survival, to 
which engineering contributes by managing product and customer requirements.  Effective 
product management is made possible by seamless feedback of lessons learned, which are 
generated by problem solving.  While the literature offers ample evidence of the relationship 
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between problem solving and organizational improvements, however, “how” this linkage is 
actually facilitated is not well understood.  Studies in industrial engineering and operations 
research have traditionally emphasized measurable outcomes and the rational aspects of 
technical problem solving but have yet to saturate the research landscape with more 
qualitative exploration of the actual processes that leverage engineering knowledge 
embedded in local contexts.  
Motivated by the gaps in research, a two-stage empirical study was conducted to 
probe deeply into the “black box” of engineering knowledge creation.   The study used the 
exploratory sequential mixed methods research approach to uncover potentially relevant 
factors for EPS efforts to attain sustained learning, which was defined and subsequently 
operationalized as “positive system changes.”  In the first phase, a qualitative investigation 
using grounded theory helped to develop a conceptual model of EPS dynamics.  In the 
second and last phase, this model was tested quantitatively using partial least squares analysis 
to assess the extent to which the theorized concept can be generalized across a larger 
engineering sample.     
The study findings show that contextual factors alone are not sufficient for EPS 
efforts to result in sustained learning.  While these factors have direct effects on operational 
efficiency and partially affect the effectiveness of problem correction, the EPS processes do 
not accomplish system changes without first carrying out knowledge creation routines.  
These routines are a form of sensemaking posited as necessary for cognitive convergence and 
achievement of a unified interpretation.  To the best of our knowledge, this study is first to 
quantitatively model the concept of ba as a deliberately created environment that promotes 
such routines, as well as to apply it in a U.S. engineering context.  A set of recommendations 
186 
 
 
for engineering knowledge management are provided for practice.  For theory, the outcomes 
of this research illuminate the little addressed link that connects EPS to organizational 
learning and by so doing contribute to a more complete epistemology of engineering 
practices. 
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